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The Inner Light was an experience "before it was a 
doctrine; and it is as an essay in the translation of the 
first into the second, that Barclay's work is to be regard- 
ed. The relations and reactions of doctrine and exper- 
ience may be hard to define; and the absolute priority of 
either, impossible to establish. On the one hand, no 
experience, however fresh or transforming, comes to a wholly 
virgin mind; a mind without any preconceptions, habits of 
thought, judgments of value; in a word, without the elements, 
at least, of a doctrinal system. This is only to say that 
the new experience is the experience of a mind, and not the 
imprint of alien characters upon tabula, raaa. On the other 
hand, it is of the essence of experience to make changes. 
It never leaves things as it finds them. And sometimes it 
happens, as here, that the change is revolutionary. Even if 
the new experience adds nothing to the sum of accepted truth, 
it yet presents it in a new light. "What had been heard by 
the hearing of the ear, the eye now sees for itself, and 
what the eye has seen, the tongue renders, with a new note 
of conviction and authority.
It is not always, perhaps not often, that the tongue is 
equal to its office. If the poet confesses his inability to 
"utter the thoughts that arise in me, w the prophet is at a
similar disadvantage, and if, following the prophet, the 
system-maker succeeds in reducing the experience to system, 
is not the very term "reducing*1 of ominous significance? 
The very words the prophet uses were coined "by men for other 
purposes, - a debased coinage, "soiled by all ignoble use, H 
and the terms and concepts of the system maker are not 
freshly quarried from the living rock, but are rather like 
stones, already hewn, taken from dilapidated and dismantled 
structures, and not quite congruous with their new abode. 
Not seldom, then, will an exercise of sympathetic imagination 
be required of the candid student, - a touch of intuition 
that carries him beyond the surface of his author's thought, 
and seats him at the centre of his author's heart. This is 
what we mean by distinguishing the experience from the doc- 
trine that formulates it.
AS applied to our present enterprise, it will prescribe 
the attitude with which we approach the study of Barclay's 
Apology. The Inner Light, we are assured, was a great and 
transforming experience, individually, and nationally,of far- 
reaching significance. The best expression it has received 
has not been in any intellectual form, - not even in the justly 
famous Apology, - but in the lives, the actions and the suffer- 
ings of a "peculiar people," whose surface peculiarities, if 
in some sense a reflection of the founder's idiosyncracies, 
are far more the index of a peculiar sincerity in serving 
Christ and taking up h£s cross.
vi.
The doctrine and experience of the Inner Light belong 
to that form of religion called mystical. The term Mysti- 
cism has perhaps been over-driven, variously applied at 
various times, and used to cover religious experience that 
are by no means akin. We shall not here attempt to define 
it, - but shall simply annex it, to indicate "the private 
inwardness and originality of the experience in which the 
soul is consciously one with God. 11 Adhere used, it means 
religious experience in an intense and lively form. It may 
be expressed as the subjective knowledge of God, - i.e., God 
is known, as He is, as Subject, and not merely as Object, of 
consciousness. ( M I live - yet not I, but Christ liveth in me H ).
TO the mass of mankind, the mystical experience; the 
subjective knowledge of God, - is unknown or unrecognized, - 
God being ^ith them when they know it not. Their knowledge 
is objective, - a knowledge less of God, than about Him. 
It is the knowledge of hearsay and instruction and authority - 
conveyed by tradition, upheld by institution, stated in creed, 
and vivified by cultus.
The relation of the mystic to the institution, of subject- 
ive to objective knowledge of God, is a variable quantity. It 
is certain that the subjective knowledge of God is not indepen- 
dent of the objective; and many mystics remain loyal servants 
of their church. But these relations are not seldom character- 
ised by strain. The external authority is not always willing 
to cede its claims to the rights of internal. The tension is
vii.
visible in the case of the prophets; and, as Lange says, 
"in history, mysticism generally appears in reaction against 
the formula. 11
The Reformation was such a movement of revolt, and is to 
"be primarily understood as "the victory of mysticism over 
scholasticism in the Western Church11 (Lange). Its philoso- 
phical, theological, literary and (above all) political com- 
plications must not be allowed to conceal the fa,ct that it was 
the outcome, before all else, of a religious need and claim.
But here again is seen that uncertain and wavering rela- 
tion of the mystic to the institution which we have just 
referred to. The Reformation by no means broke entirely 
with the past. It tookjbver from the Catholic system all the 
objective doctrines of Christianity. It retained in their 
entirety the ecumenical creeds. It was in soteriology that 
the issue with Rome was joined, - the need was, not to reject 
or revise the creeds, but how to get right with the God therein 
declared.
The way of salvation was found by a man who .hacked his 
way through alone. Having found it for himself, he declared 
it to Europe, - the way of Justification by faith. This 
really means, the re-discovery of Christ, and of God in Christ. 
When Christ is truly discovered, it is as Christ-for-us, or 
rather, God in Christ for us, - to Whom,, and to Whose approach, 
the sole response is faith. But this discovery, though truly
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objective, is not objective only. NO real knowledge of per- 
sons is wholly objective. Objective knowledge is impersonal, 
cool, dispassionate, No personal relations can be set up, or 
endure, on such terms. Real knowledge of a person is subject- 
ive as well as objective. It implies sympathy and intuition. 
My friend must be M in me, H ere I can say I know him, and can 
call him friend. And so, eminently, of Christ, If Christ 
is, objectively, Christ for us; He is, subjectively, Christ 
in us. And He is not known even objectively apart from some 
degree of subjective knowledge, and so the apostle speaks of 
the revealing of God's £on "in me. M He knows both sides of 
the relation. He knows he is objectively, w in Christ;*1 he 
feels that Christ is subjectively "in him." This is Pauline 
mysticism, - mysticism in the best sense.
The doctrine of Justification by Faith, rightly regarded, 
holds both these sides of the relation in due balance. Trouble 
begins when the two sides fall apart,
Thus, in relation to the Fact of Christ, there is a double 
danger, - that of a false objectivity and that of a false sub- 
jectivity. History reveals that neither danger was avoided. 
The Reformation experience maintained the just balance, and 
expressed it justly in the doctrine of Justification by faith. 
But the Reformation experience was not maintained: it fell 
apart in both directions. In the one, it became a new 
scholasticism; in the other, it became,in the worse sense, 
mystical. It is a development in the latter sense that we have 
before us.
ix.
Prior to the Reformation, in England, and in Europe, there 
was an abundance of mystical religion; and a mass of literature, 
accumulated during centuries, tfsys- ready for the religious 
revival when it should come. It is not doubtful, however, that 
influential as such mystical movements and writings may have 
been in stimulating the subjective, experimental side of piety, 
the fresh discovery and wide diffusion of the Scriptures far 
outweighed all other influences. The sacred volume had an 
immense vogue, and became a capital article of commerce. In 
England, from the beginning of the XVII century, its circula- 
tion was nation-wide. "The people became the people of a book, 
and that book, the Bible"(Green.)
This preoccupation with Scripture was part cause, and part 
effect, of the ecclesiastical situation. The divine right of 
kings being now denied, that of episcopacy went with it: the 
establishment was in the melting-pot. But it did not alto- 
gether melt. The old church tradition still held, in certain 
quarters, its ground. The Bible, if not able to supplant the 
tradition, at least controlled it* The Reform parties were tw®, 
- those who, not discarding tradition, were willing to sur- 
render what Scripture forbade; and those, who were determined 
to allow nothing but what Scripture enjoined. With one, the 
Anglicans, it was a question of how much it was possible to save; 
with the others, the Puritans, of how little it was obligatory 
to retain. The latter gained an ascendancy, which proved to be 
impermanent. The abolition of prelacy (1643) and of the Prayer
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Book (1645), registered the political supremacy of Presbytery, 
*but did little to lodge the doctrines of Calvin or the polity 
of Geneva in the English heart. By the middle of the century, 
institutional religion in England was at its lowest ebb.
On the other hand, the interest in jfaK doctrine rose to 
the highest pitch. The experience of Bunyan, a man of genius, 
but also a man of the people, is typical. Every man had the 
Bible in his hand, and the fear of Destruction in his heart; 
and the pages of the one were anxiously scanned to find a way 
of deliverance from the other. The scrutiny did not yield 
the assurance required. The oracles were conflicting, giving 
rise by turns to elation and despair. The voice of Scripture 
was equivocal; the incidence of threat and promise too uncer- 
tain. NO authoritative decision could be given by a disrupted 
Church. An internal witness must speak. "You must cry mightily 
to be set down by the Holy Spirit in the W0rd. tt So "holy Mr. 
Grifford," Bunyan's pastor, and in this, holy Mr. Clifford was but 
re-echoing the testimony of Scripture itself.
The Bible purported to be itself the product of the Spirit. 
It recorded the utterances of "holy men of old who spake as they 
were moved by the Holy Ghost; 11 and it testified to the continued 
possibility of precisely such revelations as those which its
pages recorded. The sublime figure of the prophet witnessed 
to the intimacy of God with men; and Moses, first of the line, 
was the man who had seen God, and spoken to Him as a friend. 
The U T shewed the same phenomenon, now democratised. Not
xi.
apostles only, and specially gifted men, but the commonalty of 
the Christian Church, the least in the Kingdom of God, w§re 
what they were "by a "birth of the Spirit and an unction from on 
high. The confession of Christ as Lord, required "by every 
catechumen, was one that could only be given in and through 
the Spirit. The fruits of life that accredited his profession, 
were frrnit of the Spirit, Hot to have heard of the Spirit was 
proof of not having received Christian baptism; not to be led 
by the Spirit was to be as "a heathen man and a publican. 11
Such was the total impression derived from any earnest study 
of the Scriptures, and to such study, seventeenth century 
England was largely devoted. The rise of an emotional, 
inspirational type of piety is thus easily understood. Tides 
of feeling ran, too strongly to be confined within any ecclesias- 
tical or confessional barriers. Separatist sects multiplied 
exceedingly. From the high Anglican, through the Presbyterians 
and Independents to the Seekers, the Familists, the Ranters, - 
the gamut may be said to have been complete.
It is towards these last bodies, who formed the Left Wing 
of religious society, that our gaze must be specially diverted.
"There was" says Rufus Jones, (Stud.Myst.Relig.p.469.) 
"in England, under the Commonwealth a real contagion of the 
idea of God as indwelling." In the case of the Ranters, this 
was held with no moral criterion to guard it. The Familists, 
or Family ot Love, insisted on the indwelling God as giving the 
guarantee of a real righteousness, an actual (as distinguished
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from a merely imputed) holiness. The regenerate state was a 
real reversal of the Fall; it brought a man into "the same 
perfection of holiness which was in Adam before the Fall," 
and this state was attainable here and now. The Seekers were 
a body of people who were keenly alive to the present state of 
apostacy, and who believed it could only be ended by a divine 
interposition. They had left all visible churches and societies 
in despair, and wandered up and down Mas doves without their 
mates. 11 They associated with all like-minded, and used to meet, 
not formally or in set order, but they waited upon God in 
silence, and spoke only as "anything rose in anyone of their 
minds that they thought savoured of a divine spring" (Penn.) 
It is obvious how near in spirit .ta the later Society of Friends 
were those Seekers, waiting for the return of a lost Apostolic 
Age. It was among these that FOX found his best reception. He 
saw in them a "field white unto harvest; 0 and they, in him, the 
God-sent apostle of that restoration for which they had been
waiting.
and 
The experience of FOX, at once typical/ creative , we must
accordingly try to delineate.
George F0x was born in 1624, and died in 1690. He lived 
through an era of social and ecclesiastical upheaval; and saw 
to the end of mediaeval and the beginning of modern England;
He was of the people, - his family of the lower middle class, 
simple, comfortable, godfearing. From the age of 19, George
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followed no occupation of wage or of profit; but had, from 
some unknown source, a sufficiency for his own simple wants 
and for charitable outlays. The family was "Church of England," 
which at that time varied in complexion, topographically, - 
here, Laudian; here, Presbyterian; and here, Congregational. 
His own minister was as it happened, Presbyterian, and was later 
ejected for noncomformity.
As a child George was "taught how to walk to be kept pure. 
When I came to eleven years of age I knew pureness and right- 
eousness." His youthful acquaintances found that "if George 
said Verily, there was no altering him."
A crisis arose in his 19th year. At a fair, with friends, 
he was invited to drink. He thought it no harm, his friends 
being "professors" (i.e. Church members.) But when they began 
drinking healths,- a new custom,-George left them. He got no 
sleep that night. Towards morning, a Voice spoke in his heart! 
"Thou seest how young people go together into vanity, and old 
people into the earth. Thou must forsake all, both young and 
old, and keep out of all, and be a stranger to all." Thus,"at 
the command of the Lord, I left my relations and brake off all 
familiarity or friendship with young or old." The incident in 
the inn was an apocalypse of prevailing depravity. Extrication 
from an untoward generation was his urgent need.
His flight was also a search. "I fasted much, and walked 
abroad in solitary places many days, and often took my Bible, and 
sat in hollow trees and lonesome places, till night came on,
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and frequently in the night walked mournfully abroad by myself, 
for I was a man of sorrows in the times of the Lord's first 
workings with me,"
Things got worse. At first he would confer with ministers 
of the Establishment, preachers, and any who might be expected 
to be able to help. AH to no purpose. Meantime it occasion- 
ally happened that he had "openings, 11 - glimpses, as through an 
open door, of another world, of truth and reality. As thus, 
that a Christian was constituted not by church baptism, but by 
a new birth: and thus, that to be bred at Oxford or Cambridge 
was no sufficient qualification for a minister of Christ. Or 
thus, that God, who made the worlS, did not dwell in temples 
made with hands, but in people's hearts.
Trite as these "openings 11 seem to us, they were not so in 
XVII century England. They had to be discovered. They were 
in Scripture. Why had. he to "discover* them? Plainly because ' 
Scripture could not render even the truths it contained. These 
must come round by an inner way. Nothing, even in Scripture, 
was a word of God to FOX which was not thus inly rendered,- 
delivered to him, G.F., as freshly and immediately by the Holy 
Spirit, as it had been to the sacred writer.
These openings are still negative,- whav Christian was notf 
what a minister of Christ was not; what a temple was not. The 
positive counterpart is known only as a necessity, not yet as an 
experience.
At last (l64-6) "When all my hopes were gone, so that I had
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nothing outwardly to help me, nor could I tell what to do, then - 
oh then I heard a Voice which said, "There is One, even Christ 
Jesus, that can speak to thy condition." And when I heard it, 
my heart did leap for joy. Then did the Lord gently lead me 
along, and did let me see His love, which was endless and eternal 
and surpasseth all the knowledge that men have in the natural
fk
state, or can get by history or books.-
His new experience must be given in his own words:-
"Now was I come up through the Flaming Sword into the 
Paradise of God, AH things were new, and all the 
creation gave another smell Unto me than before, beyond 
what words can utter. I knew nothing but pureness 
and innocency and righteousness, being renewed up into 
the image of God by Christ Jesus, so that, I say, I 
was come up to the state of Adam which he was in before 
he fell. The creation was opened to me, and it was 
shewed me how all things had their names given them, 
according to their nature and virtue. And I was at 
a stand in my mind, whether I should practise physic 
for the good of mankind, seeing the nature and virtues 
of the creatures were so opened to me by the Lord. 
But I was immediately taken up in spirit to see into 
another, or more stedfast state than Adam's in innocency 
even into a state in Christ Jesus that should never 
fall. And the Lord shewed me that such as were faith- 
ful to Him, in the power and light of Christ, should
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come up into that state in which Adam was "before he 
fell, in which the admirable works of the creation, 
and the virtues thereof, may be known through the 
openings of that Divine Word, of wisdom and power by 
which they were made. Great things did the Lord 
lead me into, and wonderful depths were opened unto 
me, beyond what by words can be declared, but as-, 
people come into subjection to the Spirit of God and 
grow up in the image and power of the Almighty, they 
may receive the word of wisdom that opens all things 
and come to know the hidden unity in the Eternal Being." 
Let us endeavour to determine the view of truth which POX 
had now arrived at, and to the propagation of which he devoted 
44 years of strenuous advocacy.
Human life can be lived on either of two planes,an earthly 
or a heavenly. On the earthly, all human life begins, and for 
the most part proceeds. Upon it, civilisation is built up. It 
is a realm of darkness, ignorance, lies, injustice,- in a word, 
of misery. Those who are not conscious of their misery are not 
therefore less miserable,- only more deluded. God's love "did 
let me see myself as I was without Him, And I saw all the 
world could do me no goods if I had had a king's diet, palace 
and attendance, all would have been as nothing --- And I saw 
professors, priests and people, were whole and at ease in that 
condition which was my misery."
Alongside this common heritage of depravity, and && part of
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human nature at all, is "somewhat of God" in each man. It is 
the Light of Christ, and "everyone that believes in it comes out 
of condemnation, and corned ton<U»nLight of life; while those who 
hate it are condemned by it, whatever profession of fe-ith they 
make."
This "somewhat of God," that is no part of human nature, be- 
comes, in the believer, a new centre of personality. At first 
fragile and tender, it grows as a seed grows. And that mightily, 
For the "power" of it is indubitable. FOX had seen it triumph 
over howling mobs subduing them as raging waves die down. And 
when bodily agitations convulsed a whole meeting (whence "Quakers"-) 
it was a natural manifestation of the "power."
But its truest manifestation was in the moral sphere. The 
same Light that reveals corruption is the Power that redeems from 
it. Sinless, it lifts out of sin; it enables the believer to 
see to the end of all temptations. And this, in fact, was the 
groUnd of high offence taken by the Presbyterian divines, who 
would not hear that any "mere man since the Fall could perfectly 
keep the commandments of God." But then, FOX could never convince 
them that the believer was no "mere" man, he was an incarnation of 
the Spirit. And as this Light, Seed, Power of God was a principle 
of Sinlessness, so also was it of Infallibility.
These high claims of Perfectibility and Infallibility, made 
for the true believer, were subjected to a crucial test in Jas. 
Nayler's case. Jas.Nayler was an early Quaker preacher of un- 
doubted sincerity and considerable gifts. But his vessel was not 
able to hold the strong wine of the new doctrine. He
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overstressed the idea of incarnation, and allowed himself in a
very public manner to receive quasi-divine honours. His case 
came up in Parliament, and a Committee of the House of Commons 
found him guilty of shocking "blasphemy; and sentenced him to y
exemplary and "barbarous punishment. (One is glad to add that 
Nayler's repentance was as deep as his offence. He re-estab- 
lished himself with his Friends,-though with difficulty in 
"G.F's., case; and his dying testimony is widely famous and 
deservedly admired.)
The early days of militant Quaker is>m were marked,(or 
marred) bytextravagancies,- such as .nudity, wearing sackcloth, 
and so on. G.F. was himself not free of the taint. Yet he 
had a fundamental sanity and strength of judgment which kept 
such outbursts in check. He gave, indeed, a general approval 
to the giving of "signs," as these vagaries were called; but 
he provided a rule and a criterion for them. The rule was, 
Be careful not to run out of your measure of the Spirit. The 
criterion of any proposed demonstration was, that there should 
be "a cross in it, 11 i.e., it ought to run counter to natural 
inclination.
His disapproval of Jas.Nayler f s "sign" was due to his belief 
that "J.N. rt had transgressed both these canons. \ POX had 
noticed some previous indications that Nayler was "running out 
into his own notions; 11 and also, there was something gratifying 
to the flesh in the honours he permitted to be paid him.
xix.
How do Fox's doctrines of Perfectibility and Infallibility 
come through such artest case as Nayler's? FOX would answer 
that it does not touch them. Had Nayler remained within the 
limits assigned him by the unerring Spirit, he would have been 
kept right.
These doctrines, then, of Perfection and Infallibility, 
have to be qualified by a third doctrine,- that of Measures To 
each man his own measure of the Spirit. AH men are not equal. 
Yet each within his own limit may be perfect. This c cmmonsense 
doctrine of the Measure,manifestly provides for the institutions 
of Authority. The true Quaker doctrine is not subversive of
Authority. Subjection to due authority does not do away with
The servant needs such guidance 
the need of inward guidance/in two directions $ he needs it for
the right performance of his service; and he needs it in order 
to choose his master. For his obedience is in no case uncon- 
ditional or unreserved. His allegiance is maintained subject 
to a higher, and finally to Hie Highest. External authority 
is derivative and provisional, not absolute. Furthermore, it 
loote forward to its own supersession. The only authority a 
free man can freely recognise, is the authority that helps him 
to be more free,- the wise authority that makes him wise, the 
authority of law that makes him more just; the authority of 
strength to foster his weakness and make him strong. AH true 
external authority is therefore serviceable, the highest 
Authority is Servant of all.
XX.
In trying to estimate the value of FOX'S doctrine, we 
will not forget that he was a very great man, and his exper- 
ience, a real discovery. It stood the teat of a strong intelli- 
gence, and of a long life of arduous enterprise and bitter 
suffering. The character and calibre of the founder and of 
most of his colleagues, the widespread and immediate response 
to his message, and the highly honourable history of the Society 
during three testing centuries, all combine to give FOX'S 
experience great and undoubted significance. We have, in fact, 
as much interest in trying to account for it as he had himself. 
And if we are not satisfied with the terms in which he stated it , 
it behoves us to find better,- terms which shall be just to the 
experience itself, on the one hand; and congruous, on the other, 
with all that we hold as knowledge .
One thing seems plain, at the outset, viz., that FOX was by 
no means so independent of his own history and environment as he 
thought he was. We cannot deny him the virtue of originality. 
But, whatever meaning attaches to that term, it cannot be held 
to imply that the original is the under ived,- that it has no 
earthly history, no root in the soilu of experience.
A typical test is provided by FOX'S attitude to Scripture. 
From childhood, he was saturated with it. He arrived at no 
truth, and communicated none to others, which is not also found 
there. Yet he ever maintained that the truths he held were not 
derived from Scripture, but immediately from the Spirit. He
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even claims that certain truths, thus immediately given, were 
not known by him, till afterwards, to be in Scripture at all. 
And, in general, his claim is supported by the fact that all 
England had the Bible; but he, G.F., had yet to discover and 
declare the truth. What are we to say to this?
The answer is given by reference to familiar laws of human 
thought, as illustrated in the processes of learning. The 
student is first faced with an opaque mass of truth, externally 
rendered, and with few if any apparent points of contact with 
his "apperceptive mass." He studies, thinks, returns to study, 
thinks again,- all to no seeming purpose. A period of Incuba- 
tion succeeds to the stage of Preparation. And then in a happy 
moment of Illumination, the truth unfolds itself,- a gift, a 
heavenly visitant. This familiar process takes even startling 
forms occasionally, especially with minds of the "psychic 11 
order,- minds in a high degree suggestible. Ideas harboured in 
other minds reappear, somehow, in theirs, coming whence they do 
not know. FOX'S supersaturation with the Bible, and his 
association with the Separatist sects, supply the parentage of 
every single truth which he delivered to his age.
As regards the divine and supernatural source of his 
inspiration, we know that this was a question on which he held 
the strongest views. It was the question discussed between him 
and Cromwell, in one of their close and protracted interviews. 
The Protector argued tha$ if, as FOX averred, the Light was 
given to every man, then it must be a natural Light. This FOX
xxii. 
would bfr no means allow. TO yield this point would fee to
surrender every guarantee of its supremacy. It was of just 
such a principle of Human Nature that Butler was thinking 
when he cried/Had it strength as it Has right; had it power 
as it had manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the 
world." It was this desideratum,- this missing element of 
power, that FOX stood for. And the guarantee of its power 
lay in its divinity.
What are we to say to this?
Let us take our courage in "both hands; let us venture into 
the dangerous field of analogy. Take the analogy of fire, ao 
often used as a figure of the Holy Spirit. We commonly 
distinguish "between the fire and the fuel. And they are dis- 
tinguishable, for fuel can exist without fire. But fire can- 
not estist without fuel. For fire is fuel incandescent.
I venture to submit that in any work of the Spirit we have, 
as it were, fuel in an incandescent state. The fuel is human 
faculty - the heart of man; and it becomes "incandescent, 11 
under conditions ill-understood, and known better in their 
results than in their processes. But it is human fuel.
Probably the best statement of these results is given not
bv 
by the theologian/ but/the poet. Wordsworth describes it in
terms quite worthy to be compared with FOX'S own classical 
description of his great noun,: he tells
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"that serene and blessed mood 
In which the affections gently lead us on 
Until, the "breath of this corporeal frame, 
And even the motion of the human "blood 
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep 
In "body, and "become a living soul; 
While, with an eye made quiet "by the power 
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy 
We see into the life of things."
I do not stop to draw out this most significant parallel in 
detail. Just a word about the poet's use of "harmony.* It 
is an inward harmony,- the accord and concord'of all the in- 
ward elements. Ai],- emotional, perceptive, volitional - are 
present in powerful exercise. But there is not now, as at 
other, unhappy times, any dissonance whatever between them. 
The Soul is in a united state for once,- a Soul at peace with 
itself and all the world. The feelings are not jarred; not
 
is the reason left out, nor is the will dominating harshly. 
An is unity; and union is strength; and the strength is 
perceptive; and the result is Vision.   The soul "sees into 
the life of things*"
I am accordingly to suggest that this remarkable parallel 
goes far to suggest, or establish, the operation of a higher 
faculty of knowledge than the intellectual. It is as though 
Truth, Reality, itself personal, could not be embraced in its 
solidity ("thickness 11 1m. James called it) by the intellect
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alone,- or "by anything less than the entire personality.
In Wordsworth's case we have the Poetic consciousness,- 
the knowledge of reality on that side of it at which the poet 
stands. In FOX'S, we have the Religious consciousness,- the 
knowledge of reality on that side of it at which the prophet 
stands. Doubtless there is yet another,- that of the Philo- 
sophic Vision - the aspect of reality on that side of it at 
which the thinker stands. These several aspects of Beauty, 
Love and Truth are aspects under which the same, sole Reality 
appears to these different orders of mind; but only when the 
mind knows its "serene and blessed mood. 11 The truth is 
luminous then, because the soul is aflame,- is fuel that has 
become incandescent.
"An thoughts, all motions, all delights,
"Whatever stirs this mortal fr.ame,-
AH are but ministers of Love,
And feed His sacred flame."
We conclude, then,that FOX'S clear-cut distinction
the 
between the natural an^supernatural, the human and the divine
is not ultimate. We cannot it is true, simply identify the 
two; but at least we may say of humanity that it is caps^e dei. 
This, Fox too would say, and we are glad to agree with him. 
Buf  :«* contend that the human does not cease to be human in 
becoming the bearer of the divine. Just as we can think of the 
fuel without fire, so we can all too easily think of the human 
apart from the divine. But the potency of divinity is in
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humanity itself, as the potentiality of fire is in fuel. The 
fire is not a "somewhat 11 apart from the fuel.
I think this was FOX'S actual experience, and that, in the 
light of this view, we can "both understand and qualify what he 
says about Perfection and Infallibility. For I hold that 
Wordsworth's description of the illuminated state as a "mood,"- 
a "serene and "blessed mood,"- is "both more modest, and more true, 
than Fex's claim for it as a state or status (as of Adam "before 
the Fall.) FOX'S doctrine of Perfection and Infallibility is 
both true and helpful, if these high attributes are attached 
to moods that come and go, rather than to permanent states. 
K£ true artist, whether of brush, or pen, or "trembling string," 
will ever relinquish the quest of either; they are the goal 
of his aspiration, the root of his "artist's melancholy." The 
touch that makes all perfect, the infallible stroke, the 
inevitable word (le mot juste), these are their .unceasing quest, 
and these, at inspired moments, their rapturous achievement. 
But "the light that never was on sea or land, the consecration 
and the poet's dream" are not a sure or a permanent possession; 
are, rather, "like angels' visits, few, and far between."
XXVI. 
BARCLAY'S APOLOGY.
The historical conditions above described,- the almost 
messianic expectancy of waiting, seeking multitudes; and the 
advent of the prophet of their dreams, resulted in a religious 
movement which, "by the Restoration, made FOX the outstanding 
religious force in England, and put him at the head of perhaps 
40,000 people out of a population of four or five millions. 
The genius of FOX was not prpphetic only, but practical. He 
was Rosebery's "practical mystic, H and he bent his gifts of 
statemanship during the three latter decades (apart from 
apostolic missions furth. of England) to the consolidation 
of the Society. A simple, but most effective type of organi- 
sation was evolved, giving^form and channel to the spiritual 
energies evoked, utilising whatever gifts of leadership and 
ministry emerged, eacdting and animating all with esprit de corps 
- the self-consciousness of a body welded together for fellow- 
ship and service, with a faith and a mission for England and 
the world.
It was inevitable that such a consciousness should seek, 
sooner or later, to give reasoned expression to its distinctive 
principles. The necessity was not only urged from within, but 
forced on from without. The clergy were little inclined, and 
perhaps little qualified, to meet the stalwart "publishers of 
truth" face to face, and debate the point "beneath a tree." 
Their training did not fit them for dealing effectively with
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open air audiences, composed of the illiterate, to whose 
"condition" their illiterate opponents were so much "better 
able to "speak11 . They retired accordingly, to their studies, 
and safe from rude interruption, prepared and launched their 
diatribes; and were answered in kind. But the time was 
opportune for a higher flight - it called for someone to carry 
the cause to the ultimate court of appeal, and to speak in 
terms to which the instructed mind of Europe might listen.
The call was answered by the publication, in Latin, at 
Amsterdam, in the year 1676, of Barclay's Apology, followed 
in 1678, by the author's translation into English. It took 
at once the place it has ever since held, of the classical 
exposition of the Quaker faith.
The author was Robt. Barclay, laird of Ury, near Stone- 
haven, Kincardfcsilure, Scotland. He was a young man of 27 
when he finished it. It was a work to which he had dedicated 
some years of preparatory study, after his "convincement" as 
a lad of l8. By character, talent and learning, he was highly 
qualified for his task; and he had at his elbow George Keith, 
as able as himself and even more learned; from whose erudition 
the work takes, in a measure, its wealth of patristic reference.
The full title is: An Apology for the True Christian 
Divinity, as the same is held forth and preached by the People 
in scorn called Quakers. Being a Full Explanation and 
Vindication of their Principles and Doctrines, by many Arguments 
deduced from Scripture and Right Reason, and the Testimonies of
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Famous Authors, both Ancient and Modern. ^ith a Full Answer 
to the Strongest Objections usually made against them. By 
Robert Barclay.
The Apology is the elaboration of XV "Theses Theological," 
published some time previously. These had been addressed, with 
a few faithful words, H T 0 the Clergy of what-sort-so-ever, unto 
whose hands these may come; but more particularly to the 
Doctors, Professors and Students of Divinity in the Univers- 
ities and Schools of Great Britain, whether Prelatical, Presby- 
terian, or any other. 11 The theses had attracted notice, 
favourable and otherwise; and this encouraged their author to 
explain and defend them more at large.
The Apology was apparently completed towards the end of 
1675; for an Address, presenting it to Ghas. II., is dated 
"Srom Ury, in my native country of Scotland, the 25th of the 
month called November, in the year. 1675." This Address, like 
the shorter one presenting the Theses to the Clergy, is faithful 
He reminds Charles of his troubled childhood, his father f s fate, 
his own experience of exile and oppression, his bloodless 
restoration, "marvellous considering the strength of those that 
had possessed themselves of thy throne, and the terror they had 
inflicted upon foreign states." "God, 11 he says, "hath done 
great things for thee ... There is no king in the world who can 
so experimentally testify of God's providence and goodness ... 
Thou hast tasted of prosperity and adversity; thou knowest 
what it is to be banished of thy native country, to be over-
xxix.
ruled as well as to rule:  and "being oppressed thou hast reason 
to know how hateful the oppressor is "both to God and man" etc., 
etc., The moral, Charles, is obvious!
The Apology, then, is the reasoned demonstration of the 
XV Theses Theologicafe. The Theses, or Propositions, are arranged 
in logical sequence. The design is to show what the Inward 
Light is, how it operates in the redemption of fallen man, and 
how, once established in the believer's heart, it works out- 
ward into all his social relationships, alike in worship and in 
the conduct of life. It is a constitutive and also a regula- 
tive and all-determining principle. It constitutes the be- 
liever's and the church's experience, and regulates the forms 
of their activity. Thus it fully accounts for, and justifies, 
all that seems peculiar in the Society of Friends. But it is 
not, on that account, a sectarian principle. It is Christianity 
itself; and the measure of its novelty and strangeness is the 
measure in which the existing Churches have apostatized from 
the primitive standard,- to which the Quaker rule is, jaana. 
phrase T a return.
The Fifteen Propositions succeed one another in unbroken 
order. Nevertheless they naturally fall into certain groups, 
into which, for purposes of closer study, they may be con- 
venientjy assorted. Thus, the first three deal with the 
subject of Divine Knowledge; and how it is acquired,- not by 
Scripture or any external means, but by immediate and inward 
revelations.
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Propositions Four to Nine develop the actual operation 
of the principle in hitman experience,- the experience of re- 
demption. What has hitherto "been regarded as a principle of 
knowledge, is now regarded as a principle of salvation. These 
two are not, however, separate operations, they are one and the 
same. For Knowledge of God is Salvation. TO come to "know" 
God, is to come to be saved. The desperate need of man; the 
divine means for meeting it; and the unlimited prospects 
thereby opened out, are the theme of this group.
The first nine propositions, it will be seen, deal with 
the isolated individual. Prop. X to XIII have regard to the 
Christian in the fellowship of the church, its Ministry, Worship 
and Sacraments.
The last two propositions relate to the believer's life 
as a citiaen in the world,- his relation to the Civil Magistrate 
(Prop. XIV), and to the forms, ceremonies, recreations and 
usages of society generally,- with particular reference to the 
Quaker attitude to judicial oaths, and to war (Prop. XV).
the purposes of our investigation, accordingly, it 
will be convenient to divide the ground into these four fields:-
I. The Inner Light: the Principle of Revelation. 
II. The Inner Light: the Principle of Redemption.
III. The Inner Light: the Principle of Christian
(Fellowship.
JV. The Inner Light: the Principle of Social Conduct.
Part I.
Of Knowledge and the Way of Knowledge
Chapter.
1. The First Proposition: assumes the supreme value of 
knowledge, and asserts the necessity of a right 
method. "True 11 and "false 11 knowledge. True 
knowledge distinguished from false, not so much 
in terms of ultimate content, as in terms of 
Source, Subject, Object and Outcome. True know- 
ledge a function of Eternal Life, which it pre- 
supposes.
2. The Second Proposition: states the Way of Knowledge,- 
by Inner Light. Analysis of the Proposition. 
Important topics raised for discussion in follow- 
ing chapters.
3. First topic? Is there a Revelation of God in Nature 
and History? Barclay's a priori argument (from 
the nature of God) that there is not. This 
refuted.
4. Second topic: Does the prophetic consciousness vouch 
for inward revelation? Barclay's "proofs" (from 
Scripture instances) inconclusive. Scripture 
concerned with results, not processes. The 
prophetic consciousness postulates external 
elements in revelation.
5. Third topic; Faith and the W0rd of God. Faith and the
Word of G0d correlative. The lord is significant
laot. Fact is externally rendered to faith.
6. Fourth topic: Relation of Holy Spirit to Inner Light. 
Activity of Holy Spirit impressively attested in 
Scripture. The Spirit and Jesus. Believers' 
experience of Guidance and Sontrol. The process 
of knowledge not exclusively statable in either 
human or divine terms,- as "discovery11 or as 
"revelation." The Holy Spirit's intromissions 
not exclusively inward. A datum of fact (Logos- 




?. Fifth topic: Authority and the Inner Light. Infalli- 
bility and Certainty are not attributable to ex- 
ternal Authority: do they attach to internal? 
Claim of infallibility dismissed. Certainty, as 
a subjective state, attainable; but not indepen- 
dently of external Authority.
8. The Scriptures. Barclay's relative depreciation:
perhaps connected with his superficial description 
of their contents. What is the unity of Scripture? 
Scripture is History; and History is (not brute 
Fact but) Fact read in its significance. The 
inspiration of Scripture is the inspiration of its 
writers, enabling them to read the divine signifi- 
cance of Fact.
CHAPTER
Prop. I : The Nature of True Knowledge.
The Proposition. "Seeing the height of all happiness iM 
placed in the true knowledge of God ...
the right understanding of (the) foundation 
and ground of (this) knowledge is... most 
necessary to be known in the first place."
The Argument. TO acquire any art or science, we must first 
know how to go about it: and so with know- 
ledge of divine things,- we must first 
determine how that knowledge is to be ac- 
quired. Otherwise it is only too easy to 
miss the way at the beginning; and not very 
easy to go back and begin again. This is 
particularly true for the right knowledge 
of God. It springs out of great initial 
uneasiness, and if, by misdirection, this 
is relieved the wrong way, the false peace 
i$ not readily relinquished. 
The inveteracy of false knowledge is 
illustrated by the Pharisees and Jewish 
Doctors; whereas the ignorant common people 
more readily became disciples. Conceit of 
wisdom is invincible. The devil f s shrewd
device is to persuade men into wrong notions 
of the true God, rather than to lead them to 
deny God altogether. Thus while idolatry 
and superstition abound in the world, 
atheism is comparatively rare; and where it 
occurs, it is the product of wrong notions of 
God.
These things are not controverted, and 
require no further argument.
Barclay's object in this first proposition is merely to 
state the obvious necessity of ascertaining the true way of that 
divine knowledge in which, as all, he thinks, will agree, "the 
height of human happiness is placed. 11 This apparently harmless 
statement, however, has not escaped criticism. T, Rees ("The 
Holy Spirit" 198) mentions it as one of "two defects" of Barclay's 
doctrine, that "it makes knowledge into the principal factor in 
salvation." This defect, if it is one, is at least not peculiar
to Barclay. "The two main positions which have been taken up
are 
by religious thinkers/ (i) that a knowledge of divine things is
a condition of attaining the blessings promised in religion,
./ BX& (ii) that this knowledge is itself a possession of great value"
* 
(Pat.Giff .309.) But apart altogether from the fact that
Barclay's "defect" is thus widely shared, Rees' criticism labours 
under a strong suspicion of ambiguity. The ambiguity attaches 
to the use of the word "knowledge." Barclay is at constant
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paina to make it clear that "by "knowledge" he by no means under- 
stands what passes for knowledge in this schools. "We do 
distinguish, 11 he says at the outset (Prop.ii.sect.1.}, "betwixt 
the certain knowledge ,oC God and the uncertain; betwixt the 
spiritual knowledge and the literal; the saving heart-knowledge,
t
and the soaring, airy head-knowledge." These two, he says, are 
different in nature, are differently attained, and lead to very 
different results. Failure to notice this difference is 
inexcusable in the reader of Barclay. And Sees* criticism, in 
particular, falsely suggests that Barclay attributes importance to 
knowledge as commonly understood, whereas to such knowledge 
Barclay attributes less than no importance at all.
What then are we to understand by this "true" knowledge, in 
which is placed the height of happiness; and how is it to be 
discriminated from false?
It can hardly, to begin with, be distinguished from false 
knowledge by reference to its content. For as to its content, 
as a "sum of saving knowledge, M Barclay has very little to say. 
It is, in fact, a question whether he would allow himself to use 
such a phrase as "sum of saving knowledge." Knowledge, for him, 
is life; and life cannot be summed. On the other hand, he is 
not aware,- he would by no means have admitted,- that the ultim- 
ate content and result of true knowledge was anywise different 
from what is contained in Scripture, or rendered by "eight 
reason," or delivered in the ecumenical creeds. Of him it was
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certainly true, what Edward Grubb says of the first generation 
of Friends,- that they "were never unwilling to set down, as 
occasion required, their Christian beliefs; and these statements 
usually ran on quite orthodox lines. 11 Wherein, then, the 
distinction "between "false" and "true" knowledge? Why all this 
pother about an Inward Light, if what it renders is no more, ofc 
other, than Scripture contains, and Reason attests, and the 
Creeds aver? The answer to that will appear as we go on. But 
we may so far anticipate as to say that true knowledge and false 
are like property, acquired honestly in the one case, and dis- 
honestly in the other. The dishonest holder lacks a title; 
he has not got it from the right source in the right way. And 
so with the possessor of false knowledge. He has not acquired 
it rightly, and cannot use it profitably. His truths may be 
truths of Scripture, but they must not be simply lifted from 
Scripture. Scripture is not a source, but a product of truth. 
Real knowledge, then, is distinguished from unreal, not so much 
in ultimate content, as in the living Source from which it springs 
Got in that way, it can certainly be accumulated, and become a 
"sum of saving knowledge;" but only to its possessor.
Further, I have said that Barclay would not have admitted 
that the sum of saving knowledge differed in any wise from the
truths of Scripture and right Reason. It is worthy of notice,
that 
however,/for him, true knowledge may consist with a vast amount
doctrinal error, at least to begin with. Turks and Hindus, 
superstitious Papists, mental defectives and (very expressly)
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ignorant and illiterate persons,- victims, as these all are, 
H to the disadvantages and epidemical errors of their several 
sects or ages" - may yet all be the subjects of saving know- 
l^dge. They may have the living core of knowledge, however 
debased the content of their notional minds. We shall have 
later to investigate the nature of this living c^re. Suffice 
it now to indicate that it is of a nature that tends to grow. 
It exfoliates error. It waxes, and the other wanes. Thus 
Socrates, for example, by following the way of true knowledge, 
"became informed of the falsity of heathen gods. 11 Similarly 
a Turk, by the same means, wou&d come to learn "that Mahomet 
was an imposter." Thus, apparently, true knowledge, once 
implanted in even heathen hearts will of its nature advance, 
till it comes to cover the entire area of Christian truth and 
be indeed a "sum of saving knowledge."
Next, the nature of true knowledge may be defined by 
relation to the Subject of it. The subject of saving knowledge 
is, to begin with, always the "anxious enquirer." Thus we find 
Barclay describing hims-
"When a man first proposeth to himself the knowledge of God, 
from a sen&s of his own unworthiness, and from the great 
weariness of his mind, occasioned by the secret checks of 
his conscience, and the tender yet real glances of God's 
light -upon his heart; the earnest desires he has to be 
redeemed from his present trouble, and the fervent 
breathings he has to be eased of his disordered passions
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and lusts, and to find quietness and peace in the certain 
knowledge of God, and in the assurance of his love and 
goodwill towards him, make his heart tender," etc. Cfaf.i) 
Barclay holds, it is plain, (with others of our own day) 
that divine truth does not reveal itself to the dispassionate 
theorist, or mere spectator of life, but only to one desperately 
in earnest. He would cordially have agreed with
(Var. 431.) who doubted "if the dispassionate contemplation of 
the universe, apart from inner unhappiness and need of deliver- 
ance, on the one hand, and mystical emotion on the other, 
would ever have resulted in religious philosophies such as we 
now possess. 11 This sentence might well have been penned after 
reading the Apology. The sort of knowledge Barclay pursues is 
related to needs of a subjective and practical kind.
And as it begins on this practical level ao it remains all 
through. The enquirer ceases to be the "anxious enquirer," 
but he remains a constant enquirer, waiting ever upon God. Only 
now, relieved from its burden of anxiety on his own account, 
his heart is at leisure to bear others 1 burdens. The "enquirer" 
has become "the-.; witness." Such truth as he holds, is truth 
that he can witness to. If he says "Jesus is Lord," it is not 
a statement lifted out of the Bible; it is a personal confession, 
equivalent to "I know that Jesus is Lord. 11 Hence is to be 
understood Barclay's otherwise harsh-seeming dictum, that 
spiritual truths in the mouths of unspiritual men are "lies," 
(Prop. II sedt.6) This is justified only if spiritual truth is
Speaking
to be known experimentally, and given forth/in forma
"True"knowledge then, consists of a given content, or sum of 
knowledge, held as a precious personal possession, and rendered, 
if uttered at all, as testimony.
In the next place, true knowledge may be defined in re- 
lation to its Object. Its Object is G0d, G 0d Himself; and 
God less, perhaps, (at first at least) in His Nature, than in 
His Win; less in His qualities and attributes than in His 
action. (Beua loquena. Prop II. sect.8.) It is God-Redeemer 
that is known, but less as Redeemer (if I may say so), than as 
Redeeming. This, again, it will be seen, lifts the process of 
knowledge out of the theoretic sphere, and sets it on the plane 
of personal interrelations. Knowledge of this kind is not 
within the compass of intelligence merely. "Intelligence 11 
(Bando*in) "is the mode of approach appropriate to crude matter; 
intuition, the mode appropriate to Life." We are dealing here 
with Life,- personal, active and purposive life,- when we are 
dealing with God. Such knowledge is beyond the range of intelli- 
gence. And the reason is plain: intelligence suffices for 
"objective 11 knowledge; but knowledge of persons is not merely 
objective. For persons are subjects, and must be known sub- 
jectively. Thus we speak of learning to know one's neighbour 
by "putting one's self in his place." It is, in its degree, a 
sort of transference of personality. Intuitively, by an act of 
sympathetic imagination, (or somehow) we get inside the object.
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All this is eminently true of knowing God. A modern writer 
says that today we think of God as Subject, instead of, as the 
ancients did, as Substance. If therefore G0d is Subject, He 
cannot be known merely as Object. He must be known, somehow, 
as from the inside, subjectively. Barclay, it is true, has not 
been able entirely to rid himself of the category of Substance 
in speaking of G0d. But his real thought is deeper than his 
thought forms. And this truth, of God as Subject, and 
requiring to be known as such, is, I believe really what he is 
after. The knowledge of God which regards Him merely as Object 
is, for him, false knowledge. Barclay's error* I find, is on 
the other side. God is > for kim » only too exclusively Subject. 
But the intuitive, is not independent of the discursive,- even 
dispassionatergaze of intelligence. In seeing into the M life 
of things," it doesn't lose sight of the "things" it sees into.
Finally, the "true" knowledge, thus distinguished from the 
"false," by reference to -lit Source, its Subject and its Object, 
is also to be distinguished by its Outcome. Here we see the 
significance of the equation Barclay draws between knowledge and 
happiness. Hence he can speak, as he proceeds to do, of the 
autithesis of knowledge as being, not ignorance, but misery. 
This is only possible because, for him, knowledge and happiness 
are convertible terms. Furthermore, both knowledge and happiness 
are equated with Eternal Life. Knowledge, then, is not just 
a means of salvations it is salvation, in one of its aspects.
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Another of its aspects, later to be considered, is holiness 
(righteousness, moral goodness). Thus knowledge takes its 
place alongside happiness and holiness, as one of the several 
phases of Sternal Life. These phases, it will be seen, cor- 
respond to the tri-partite nature of consciousness. Knowledge 
is the intellectual constituent; holiness, the volitional; 
happiness, the affective. These aspects, distinguishable by 
analysis, are, in fact, inseparable. Each presupposes the 
other, and all presuppose the unity of life in which they 
inhere. Thus knowledge is a function of life, and presupposes 
life. And the true knowledge of God is a function of Eternal 
Life, which it, too, presupposes.
In view of all this, we dismiss Rees 1 criticism as both 
mnintelligent and misleading. Unintelligent, because it over- 
looks the distinction of false and true knowledge which Barclay 
so strongly emphasises. And misleading, since it suggests an 
intellectualism which Barclay unaffectedly disowns.
It would be premature, at this stage, to discuss Barclay's 
concept of knowledge further. It is largely, so far, only a 
negative conception. We have found what its Source is not; 
what its Subject is not; what its Object is not; and what its 
Outcome is not. In all these respects it is distinct from, 
and opposed to, false knowledge. It was necessary, and it 
suffices, to make this clear before going on to the next step -
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viz., the way or method of knowledge. Whatever that way may 
ultimately be found to be, it will not be the way in which 
ordinary, intellectual knowledge is acquited, for on such know- 
ledge Barclay places no value.
CHAPTER II.
The Second Proposition: 
The Way of True Knowledge.
Together with Propositions Five and Six, this Second 
Proposition is the locus classicus for the doctrine of the Inner 
Light. Those affirm it as a principle of Salvation; this, as a
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principle of Revelation. These are not, however, two prin- 
ciples, but one and the-same. The way of knowledge is the 
way of salvation. The subject of knowledge is at the same 
time the subject of the redeeming process. In short, as we 
saw before, knowledge is a function of life. But though 
the experience of knowing is not really separable from the 
experience of salvation, the theory of each can be separately 
dealt with. And in this famous Second Proposition we have 
the theory of the Inner Light presented as the true and only 
way of divine knowledge.
The salient points of the thesis are these four:-
1. NO man knoweth the -Father save the Son, and he to
whom the Son revealeth Him.
The revelation of the Son is in and by the Spirit. 
Therefore the Spirit's testimony is the sole means of 
revelation.
2. By the Spirit*s revelations God hath manifested
Himself all along, whether by outward voices or 
appearances, dreams, or inward, objective 
manifestations in the heart.
3. Such revelations were ever the formal object of the
saint's faith, and continue to be, since the
object of faith remains the same.
4. These inward revelations never contradict Scripture 
or right reason.
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But, being selfevident, like the axioms of mathe- 
matics or logic, they are not to be subjected to the 
test of reason or Scripture, as to a more certain and 
noble rule or touchstone.
It will be evident that positions }, 2 and 3 develop the 
theory of the Inner Light itself; while position 4 discusses 
its relation to external Authority. We shall accordingly 
follow that order in our discussion.
It will appear further, that 1 is of the nature of an a priori 
argument. It deals with the nature of God and of His relation 
to the World; and intends thereby to prove that God's Nature 
and relation to the world being what they are, no divine know- 
ledge ie attainable apart from inward and immediate revelations 
of the Spirit.
2 is an argument a posteriori, drawn from instances of divine 
and human intercourse recorded in Scripture. These, it is held, 
show that such intercourse has always proceeded by way of inward 
and immediate revelations.
3 is an argument based on the Nature and Object of Faith. Faith 
is reliance on the W0rd of God, a word inwardly and immediately 
given. And since faith is still today the same, its object 
(inward and immediate revelations) remains also the same.
These 3 positions we must examine in detail, when it will 
appear that important questions arise for decision in each case.
CHAPTER III.
THE WAY OF KNOWLEDGE.
1. God and the World. 
Is there Revelation in Nature and History?
The thesis here is that there is no knowledge of the Father- 
save through the S 0n; and none of the Son save through the 
Spirit, whose revelations are given inwardly and immediately to 
the spirit of man.
The argument proceeds thus:- £/ty.#.<*c*.*-*J.
The nature of God is triune, - Father, S0n and Spirit. 
"God the EATHER, infinite and most wise, is the founda- 
tion, root and spring of all operation, the infinite 
and incomprehensible fountain of life and motion." 
"The Father hath wrought all things "by His eternal 
WORD or Son, Jesus Christ, Who is Himself God; hath 
been in eternity with God; and in time hath partaken 
of the nature of man." Hence, "no creature hath 
access to the Father but in and by the Mediator Son." 
Further, "there is no knowledge of the Son but by the 
SPIRIT" ... "In His outward manifestation, Christ 
revealed the Father to his disciples, when he testified 
for the truth, and approved himself faithful through- 
out. Being withdrawn as to the outward man, He doth 
teach man inwardly by His Spirit." 
This argument we shall now review.
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Barclay's doctrine of God the Father is one of sheer trans- 
cendence. The Father is "the infinite and incomprehensible" 
(not simply uncomprehended) "fountain of life and motion. 11 
With this view we have no quarrel. If we care to pursue the 
analogy of M the fountain," then we must freely admit that the 
stream conveys no knowledge of its real origin. The tiny 
trickle in which the river "begins, is not the veritable fountain, 
Tracing the stream to the well-head, we may say, Here the stream 
begins. But we know quite well that the spring is not the 
real origin of the stream. That is the universe.
exeunt in myaterium. At the well, we only find ourselves
on the threshold of the mystery out of which the stream emerges.
But this vague, nameless mygteriUm _1^_remen,duin et faacinanay 
takes form and body. There is then, in God transcendent, a 
principle of form, or determinateness. There could be no 
thought of transcendence, if transcendence were the whole story. 
Sheer transcendence is the negation of thought. The mvsterium 
must condense to form the stream. This principle of form, or 
immanence, we name, with Barclay, the LOGOS.
The Logos is rational. It is also purposive and operative
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ItA cosmic, creative,- the means^as Barclay says, by which "the/
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infinite and incomprehensi'ble fountain of life and motion 
operates in the creatures."
This operation is conscious. The Spirit is the principle 
of Selfconsciousness in G0d. The Spirit, and the Spirit alone, 
knows the things of God. Whence,any human knowledge of the 
things of God, must be the impartation'of the Spirit, and this 
impartation is inward and immediate. Such, in brief, is the 
Barclaian view, which we are now to examine. Our question takes 
the double form: (a) Whether, and in what sense, there is 
revelation of God in Nature; and (b) Whether, and in what sense, 
there is revelation in Man and man's history. These two we 
shall find to be not really separate questions; but the "hidden 
unity" may be thus separately approached.
(a) Revelation in Nature.
It will doubtless strike the reader as surprising that 
Barclay should affirm an operation of the Logos-Son in Nature, 
while denying that such operation is anything towards the pur- 
poses of a revelation. It remains surprising even when we 
remember (as in reading Barclay we always must) that the know- 
ledge in question is "saving, certain and necessary;" it is 
knowledge of a Redeemer - God, and of His redemptive action, that 
is in question. Is. it not, I say, surprising, that Barclay 
should say that God is operative in Nature without any trace of 
his redemptive purpose being therein discernible? Are we to 
say that God's operations in Nature are entirely apart from His
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redemptive operations in man?
The classic distinction of natural and revealed theology 
proceeded on that assumption. It assumed that while a certain 
amount and kind of divine knowledge was derivable from Nature, 
yet it stopped short of a full and satisfactory provision for 
man's requirements, and was mercifully eked out "by supernatural 
means. The distinction was held no less "by those who believed 
that natural evidences were cogent, as far as they went (Vatican 
Council), than by those to whom they seemed dubious and incon- 
clusive. It now seems pretty clear that the distinction rested 
on a falsely abstract view of "Nature. 11
For just as'it is an abstraction (however useful for certain 
purposes) to Separate Nature and Man, so it is ultimately an 
abstraction to set Nature, in its widest sense,- as inclusive 
of Man,- over against the "supernatural. 11 For the term 
"supernatural, 11 as used in this connection, is applied to certain 
occurrences of an abnormal kind. But these, however super- 
normal, are still occurrences within the field of experience   
Just as well as "natural" happenings, they belong to the totality 
of the phenomenal. Our vision of Nature, therefore, must be 
extended to include the supernatural, if good grounds for its 
claim to recognition are forthcoming.
It is Hature, then, in this extended sense, that we are 
to interrogate regarding its availability for the purposes of 
revelation. Does it, or does it not, shew decipherable traces 
of Divine purpose and activity? This is not, of course, Barclay^
problem, since it is not his view of Nature. But it is ours. 
What shall we say about it?
The answer confessedly cannot be given in simple terms of 
Yes and NO. It is manifestly a question of interpretation, 
and that implies the eye to see. In other words, it is a 
judgement of Yalue, and implies a sense of value. Experience 
is strictly relative to the values cherished by the subject of 
experience. Of these, some are to be described as absolute, 
as final, as existing in their own right. They are in the 
proper sense divine. They are, in the measure of our holding 
them, our own. But they are objective too (Pringle-Pattison). 
They are of God. God is their seat and home. Where they are 
found, God is. Are they found in Nature?
The answer is, they both are and are not. Nature is not a 
flat, undifferentiated surface, upom which the mind can chalk 
out whatever figures it likes. It is endlessly varied, and not 
all its manifestations have equal significance. If we take an 
analogy from the artistic consciousness, we see the truth of 
that. The artist finds Beauty in Nattire: finds it because 
it is there. But it is not equally manifest in all quarters.
He finds some manifestations more, some less, significant. Yet
that
it is observable/; as he dwells upon the most obviously signifi- 
cant, as his artistic sense develops, he finds significance in 
quarters where he did not find it before. He begins to see, or 
to adumbrate, a beauty and significance in the whole.
Similarly with the religious mind. It finds religious
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values in nature; finds them because they are there. But, 
again, no-t equally, in all directions. Some phenomena it 
finds tremendously significant,- these it is apt to call 
"supernatural. 11 But once descried, they may "be seen again 
and yet again. Commerce with the more significant leads on 
to clearer perception of the less. Until every common "bush 
is "afire with G0d."
This view does justice, one would fain believe, to what 
is vital in Barclay f s doctrine, while correcting its false 
subjectivity. On the one hand,Barclay is surely right in 
saying that a "scientific" view of nature (such as the theology 
of his day took for its purposes of "proof") yields no "certain 
saving knowledge of God." It might, or again it might not, 
reach a satisfactory conclusion regarding God's existence, or 
the soul's immortality. But what was that to the purpose of 
the man roused to "anxious enquiry?" He wanted to know how 
God was disposed to him; and what was to become of his 
immortal soul. These things he must know, with inward, home- 
felt certainty. But on the other hand, he could only know 
this, or anything else about God, as he found it in an experience 
which was, however significant, still o£ a piece (even though 
only potentially) with his total experience. And experience 
is experience of Nature, in its wide extension. For God is, 
for us, in the ultimate resort, our interpretation of the 
"nature of things."
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(b) Revelation in History and in the historical Christ.
We turn now to a brief examination of this second question,- 
the more brief since it will be seen to be only a special, case 
of the general question just examined.
Have we then a revelation of God in the historical Christ? 
Barclay's answer is in the negative. Without wishing to dis- 
parage the evangelical records in the least, he repeatedly and 
emphatically relegates it to its place - an inferior place,as 
belonging to what is at the be»t comforting and edifying history; 
but only available for one who lives by the Inner Light, and 
not indispensable for him.
But here Barclay would seem to be guilty of inconsistency. 
For he says:-
* As his manifestation was sometimes outward, when he testi- 
fied and witnessed for the truth in the world, and approved 
himself faithful throughout, so being now withdrawn, as to 
the outward man, he doth teach and instruct man inwardly 
by his own Spirit. 11 (II sect.6.)
This points back to Christ's earthly life, and avers that 
Christ's life and teaching were a revelation of the Father to 
the disciples. We simply ask, Has that revelation ceased? 
Is it no longer available? It is not denied that Christ's 
human life was not psi: .afi. a revelation. It was no revelation 
to the Pharisees. It became revelation to Peter, because 
something more than "flesh and blood" revealed it. But the 
vehicle of revelation was still flesh and blood. What Peter
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saw, was seen "by insight into what was before him. If the 
Spirit revealed anything to Peter it only served to shew him 
what was there,- what was in the fact,- what the Fact really 
was. And that Fact remains,- "the same yesterday, today and 
affiK for ever."
The real truth is that Barclay, and all that generation of 
the Friends, (whatever was the case later,) had their minds so 
saturated with Christian knowledge that they hardly realised 
where it came from. It was the air they breathed, and they 
were as little conscious of it as we are of the surrounding 
atmosphere. For them, in their sincerity and devotion, Christ 
had become "a second nature." They had but to look within, to 
find Him there. A«d they forgot, (in theory, though never in
c
practice), the humble, historical path He trod, before He could 
find, in just such hearts as theirs, His home.
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CHAPTER IV.
THE WAY OF KNOWIEDGB (continued). 
2. Recorded Instances of Immediate Revelation.
The Prophetic Consciousness.
We next turn to Barclay's a. posteriori argument, from 
instances abundantly afforded by Scripture of divine and human 
intercourse.
"By this revelation of the Spirit God hath manifested 
Himself all along, whether by outward voices and appear- 
ances, dreams or by inward objective manifestations in 
the heart." f»f.£0
Here we have two forms of revelation,- the first „$.& simple 
and direct,("inward objective manifestations in the heart*1 ); 
the second, complex and indirect, ("by voices, appearances, 
dreams etc"). Both are held to be of the nature of inward and 
immediate revelation. TSe shall examine these cases separately.
(a) Revelation by "inward objective manifestations in the
heart. tt
This position is supported by reference to historical, or quasi- 
historical, Scripture instances.
"It is undeniable that God conversed with man from Adam to 
Moses by inward manifestations of the Spirit 1* (since of course 
no other means existed.) (i£-^+-7-)
"Noah had not the writings or prophesy ings of any going 
before him, noi yet the concurrence of any church or people to
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strengthen him." 
The same for later times. In the Mosaic era the High Priest 
annually entered the Holy of holies, and conversed immediately 
with God. Many others enjoyed the same sort of fellowship. 
Indeed :-
"none were shut out who earnestly sought after it, and 
waited for it." &r-)
The Psalmist enjoyed it ("Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit?"); 
and the prophets conspicuously;
"and that God revealed Himself under the New Testament, to 
wit, to the apostles, evangelists and primitive disciples, 
is confessed "by all." fll-rt
and finally, a continuance of this intimacy is assured to all 
"believers by Christ's promise of ths Spirit.
x
Remarking on the above, its naivete will be apparent.
Not without a smile we read that such a prophecy as that of 
Isaiah ?9. \2 - M I have put my words in thy mouth," or that of 
Jeremiah 31. 33 - "I will put my laws into their minds and write 
them in their hearts," is a proof of immediate revelation, since-
"no mention is made of any books or writings." 
Similarly, it is held proven that the inward revelation is 
"objective," - i.e., not merely subjective "heightening of 
faculty to understand what was written." For -
"It is not said, ! The Spirit shall teach you to understand 
what has been written,' but ''It shall teach you all things.'
2?
The Spirit 'brings them to remembrance, 1 not 'helps me 
to remember the objects brought from elsewhere. 1 " &-"-) 
The argument, it need not be said, was used in perfect good 
faith, and may have appeared cogent to many of his readers,- 
though one doubts if the argument fix alientifl ("no mention is 
made fcf any books or writings" 1) appeared more convincing in the 
XVTI icentury than it does today.
We shall later have occasion to raise the question as to 
the bearings of Scripture testimony on the fact of divine and 
human intercourse. Meantime it will suffice to say regarding 
Barclay's Scriptural "proofs," that while Barclay is engaged
to prove one thing, Scripture is concerned with quite another.
one of 
Barclay is dealing with a question of process; Scripture, with/
result. TO Barclay, "The Lord spake unto Moses saying -" is 
proof of how a communication was made - viz., inwardly and 
immediately. Scripture, on the other hand, is chiefly con- 
cerned with the substance of wgat said; not with the manner in 
which it was conveyed.
It may be convenient here to say a word about "immediacy." 
Someone recently drew a distinction between "psychic 
immediacy" and "psychological immediacy11 which may serve our 
turn. "Psychological immediacy" is really an absurd term,- for 
psychology is just the study of process; and immediacy is the 
negation of process. "Psychic" immediacy, again, is just 
another term for consciousness, which is always immediate,- i.e., 
conscious. Visual perception is a case in point. It is a
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state of "psychic" immediacy. Yet as we know, it is not 
unmediated. Here, then, a mediate process issues in an 
immediate result. But this result gives no account of itself, 
or how it came about. Immediacy, then, attaches to what is 
given, leaving untouched the question,, of how it is given. The, 
latter is Barclay's question; and to its answer, the Scriptures 
he adduces make no contribution.
And one thing more. For Bafclay, it would seem, the 
question of immediacy, (as negation of process), has a close 
bearing on the question of value. One feels that if the 
psychological processes of a revelation were demonstrated, its 
value, as a revelation would "be, for him, destroyed. Its 
divine immediacy, uncontaminated by any earthly admixture, is 
its guarantee of divine value. For our part, we do not look 
for results of any kind, divine or otherwise, without processes. 
Nor is our criterion of the divine, the absence of human process. 
We evaluate the process from the result, not vice versa . If, 
therefore, immediacy of feeling ("psychic" immediacy) has 
nothing to say regarding origin; immediacy of process has nothing 
to say regarding value,- or indeed, regarding anything, since it 
is nothing in the world.
The Arg^efl't Resumed.
Resuming the argument (b), we have now to notice another 
class of Scripture instances,- viz.,
"External voices, appearances and dreams."
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These might appear to be damaging exceptions to the rule of 
inward immediate revelations. Not so. They are merely 
"circumstantial and accidental 11 variations, which, so far from 
infringing the rule, really rest upon and establish it. For, 
such occasional theophanies were of dubious origin, not self- 
authenticating. They required a certificate of their genuine- 
ness, and this was given inwardly and immediatelyj-
""What made the saints give credit to these visions?
Certainly nothing else but the secret testimony of God's 
Spirit in their hearts...Abraham believed the angels: 
but who told him that these men were angels? We must 
not think that his faith was built upon his outward 
senses, but it proceeded from the secret persuasion of 
God's Spirit in his heart." (%: ****•)
These instances deserve our attention. Barclay claims 
that they are only in form exceptional, and really establish 
his rule. His readers will think, perhaps, that they rather 
demolish it.
On the face of them, they are not instances of inward 
revelation aimpliciter. The apparitions convey a message, but 
they require to be accredited; and this attestation is given 
by inward revelation. Plainly, an alternative to simple, 
direct, inward communication has here been resorted to. 
"Accidentally" of course! But unfortunately, the infant, thougi 
only a little one, is none the less illegitimate. For Barclay's 
case is that inward revelation is the exclusive way of knowledge*
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"but here the exclusiveness of the rule is invaded. If once, 
or twice, why not many times? Why not normally, and always? 
For if vision, T6i<£e or dream can be thus inwardly attested, 
"becoming thereby the vehicle of revelation, what is to hinder 
the giving of a similar certificate, say, to Scripture, or 
dogma, or to "a sunset-touch, a chorus-ending from Euripides," 
or to anything else in the world? And that is just the Authori- 
tarian case.
We must, I think, press this point.
With reference to these theophanies, Barclay sayss-
Mwe must not stick to that which is circumstantially 
and accidentally so, but to that which is universally 
and substantially so."
But the whole question is precisely as to what is "univers- 
ally and substantially so." Theophanies, Barclay means to say, 
are not universal, but only occasional. The reply is, that 
theophanies (presuming their occurrence) are not to be thus 
secluded in a class all by themselves. If admitted at all,
they must take their place in "the nature of things. 11 They
totality of 
will be recapitulated in the field of phenomena, as part of the/
experience. And if, as such, they can be the subject-matter of 
divine attestation, and the vehicle of divine instruction, it 
$ill be found impossible to deny the same function, in its 
degree, to any other part of that totality.
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We cannot, however, dismiss Barclay ! s argument from 
Scripture instances so easily. We have admitted that there is 
an impressive volume jdasx% of Scripture testimony to the fact 
of divine-human intercourse of some kind," whether mediate or 
direct. The consciousness of the Hebrew prophets is an im- 
portant part of that testimony; and to it, as perhaps not in 
principle different, may be added that of the first Christians. 
Barclay links the experience of "apostles, evangelists and 
Christian disciples, 11 to that of the prophets. TO the same 
effect, we find the modern Quaker, Ed.Grubb, claiming Quakerism 
as a "recovery of Hebrew prophetism;* and Wheeler Robinson 
describing the experience of the primitive Church as the 
"democratisation of the prophetic consciousness." Some brief 
examination of this consciousness would therefore seem to be 
called for,- particularly as we are here on much stronger 
ground historically, than when the question is of what happened 
to Noah.''
And truly, if in re rum natura there is anything that can 
claim to be immediate revelation, the Hebrew prophets might be. 
held to be the subjects of it,- the standing exordium of whose 
deliverances was, M The word of the Lord came to me. H As 
regards this formula, it has been contended that in course of 
time it had become a mere convention, presupposing nothing 
more than the prophet's conviction that what he was about to say 
was God's truth. We cannot however be satisfied with this. 
For one thing, if in time the exordium became conventional its
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form points back to a time when it was, or was regarded as, 
something more. For another, we have in the case of Paul, a 
classical example, of first-rate historical importance, of the 
use of the formula (or its equivalent) in no mere conventional 
sense. Paul, "besides, on certain occasions explicitly dis- 
tinguishes between what he has "received of the Lord, 11 and what 
he had excogitated by the normal exercise of his faculties,- in 
short, by common-sense. Here, then, the distinction is drawn 
explicitly between reason and revelation; and if only the 
apostle had been of a mind to tell us how the revelation was 
received, it would have had a perhaps important bearing on 
Barclay's theory. Unfortunately, as to the means and manner in 
which the communications came, the apostle is silent. Here 
again it is evident that the result, not the process, is the 
thing of moment.
What,is not doubtful, however, is that Paul claimed to 
have received both his gospel and his commission without human 
intervention; and in this he seems to stand on common ground 
with the prophets of old, to whom "the word of the Lord came. 11 
The phrase seems to point fcfc a distinctive mental condition,- 
the "prophetic state,"- characterised, not seldom, by absorption, 
rapture, trance, ecstasy and so on. This is a matter concerning 
which psychology will claim to have a say. For psychology, 
every mental state has a history. Even the feeling of immediacy 
is not, as we saw, unmediated. The train of association that 
issues in' a sudden insuperable feeling of conviction o* constraint,
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has,had, in the subconscious region, its history. Emerging in 
abrupt, peremptory, authoritative shape, its unaccountability 
tends to be accredited to the "divine." Its "suddenness 11 
endows it with mysterious attributes, with supernatural quality. 
It comes whence no one knows. And, surely, that is how the 
word of the LORD should cornel
Such abnormalities are, however, by no means of the essence 
of the case. They belong, in Barclay's phrase (used in another 
connection) to "what is circumstantially and accidentally so, 
not to what is universally and substantially so. M They are not 
of the. core; of the prophetic message; at best they are of the 
nature of attestation,- gaining credence for a message in itself 
opaque or unwelcome, or for the prophet as its medium. If the 
message in early times derived weight, both with the prophet 
with his hearers, from the abnormal circumstances in which he 
received it, or from the rapture that characterised its delivery, 
in the later, purer stage the weight falls more on the message 
and less on its adventitious accompaniments. The influence of 
Christ and of Paul was quite manifestly exerted towards this end. 
Christ refused the demand for "signs" in authentication of His 
word. And Paul, while by no means disparaging ecstasy, sought 
to lead his churches to cultivate preferably those forms of 
utterance which appealed to the reasonable mind; and to ensue, 
most of all, that Charity which not only spoke, but was, the 
Truth. Truth in that form, he rightly held, was its own 
evidence, and made a universal appeal.
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Abstracting then from the external and adventitious, how 
shall we express what was fundamental to the prophetic conscious- 
ness? Perhaps we might say that was given in such a formula 
as "I am the Lord thy God which brought thee up out of Egyptf 
go thou and"- do this, or say that. Three separate elements 
are here distinguishable. First, the prophet is faced with a 
situation in which something requires to be said or done. 
Second, there is the oonaciouaneaa ff inward and immediate, that 
the situation is charged with divine significance,- a duty or a 
truth stares him in the face,- he sees it in the situation; the 
situation speaks to him, calls to him with a voice which he 
knows to be the Voice of God. But thirdly, this Voice is not 
the voice of a stranger,- but of a God known in hist6ry» in the 
past of the people,-"the God of thy fathers." The prophet's* 
mind is no tahuia £aaa; it is saturated with tradition,- a 
tradition mediated in normal ways of pious instruction. Within 
the field of that tradition, the new truth or duty enters and 
takes its place. No truth which could not be seen as lying 
within the perspective of the tradition, could ever hope for 
reception by the prophet's mind. F0r the prophet was "no 
innovator." (A.B.Davidson). A tradition, piously mediated, 
and assimilated by a mind of quick and sensitive perception; 
and a momentous situation calling these perceptive powers into 
highest exercise, what further account is needed, or can be 
given, of the prophetic consciousness,- and, mutatis mutandis T 
of the Christian consciousness? Here the "tradition 11 is Christ.
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And every "new" truth is "but drawing out of an inexhaustible 
treasury,- the "unsearchable riches of Christ. 11 Was not 
Mazzini right when he said, "Conscience and Tradition are the 
two wings of the soul, by which it reaches truth?"
Barclay's account of the matter ignores the tradition. 
But in so doing, he leaves no room for any growth in the know- 
ledge of God. For if no knowledge of God is stored in the 
memory of the race, how can it be stored in the memory of the 
individual? If all that is of moment,- all that is real 
knowledge,- is given in the moment of revelation, what provision 
is hsre for advancing knowledge? What need for it? The 
believer lives "from band to mouth." Advance requires memory. 
And if the believer's memory is to be trusted, why not tradition, 
the memory of the race? Barclay f s doc trine, then, makes no" 
sufficient provision for knowledge. It is not merely individ- 
ualistic; it is atomistic. It rests on mere discrete moments 
of revelation. It is riddled with discontinuity.
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CHAPTER V.
THB WAY OF KNOWLEDGE (continued) 
3. Faith and the Word of
The third stage of Barclay's argument for inward revelations 
was concerned, it will be remembered, with the nature of Faith 
and its object. Barclay's position here is that faith in all 
ages is the same; its object is the Word of God; and this 
Word is inwardly rendered "by the indwelling Spirit. These are 
his statements*- (# «* ' *>
"Faith is a firm and certain belief of the mind......"
"The formal object of faith is the promise, word or testimony 
of God, speaking to the mind (Deus loauens) Deua loauer^a is 
the Holy Spirit.
By Him, "Christians are now to be led in the same manner 
as saints of old, and that, not merely subjectively, but 
by formal, objective manifestations of truth.*1
What, we ask, does Barclay understand by the MWOrd of God? 11 
And how is it inly rendered by the Spirit?
1. The Word of God we are to understand, in the first place, 
in its simple and natural sense, as anything G0d says to 
the soul,- any divine statement, promise or command. And 
faith, accordingly, is belief of the statement, or con- 
fidence in the promise, or obedience to the command.
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The divine, utterances are accepted fl in good faith."
But the "Word" has larger, more mystical meanings for 
Barclay. Any particular "word 11 of God is but a "form" of 
The Word. (Hence his use of "formal/-a word of God is the 
"formal object ofikith." i.e., the word in question is the 
particular form, which, for the occasion, The Word assumes.) 
The Word in its largest sense = LOGOS « Christ. The Word 
inheres in every specific "word*1 ; or, alternatively, each 
specific "word" partakes in the nature of The Word. Hence, 
for Barclay, every "word" of God is the Word of Christ,- 
the Word which is. Christ. Consequently, every act of 
genuine faith is fundamentally faith in Christ. Without 
difficulty, he can think of the saints of old as "Christians? 
and also of "heathen" saints as Christian in reality. 
Everyone, in any age or place, who hears and believes a 
word of God is, implicitly or explicitly, a Christian; 
and all such faith is likewise, implicitly or explicitly, 
Christian. He is supported in this view by the apostle 
Paul, who wrote of the Church in the Wilderness, "they 
drank of the Rock which followed them ... and that Rock was 
Christ."
2. Thus far we can follow Barclay with agreement. Our
difficulty begins with the second question, H0w is the 
Word of G0d rendered for faith? His answer,is, by "inward 
immediate, objective" revelation of the Spirit. The
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Spirit alone knows the Word. By the Spirit alone it is 
conveyed. And since the locus of the Spirit is within, 
the revelation can only "be from within.
But just here arises a difficulty. HOW can the 
Spirit communicate anything to the soul? For according to 
Barclay, a bridgeless gulf divides the divine from the 
human $ He quotes the apostle's words a"bout only the Spirit
of a man knowing the things of a man; and only the Spirit 
of G0d knowing the things of God. This he amplifies as
follows:-
11 that is, that as nothing below the spirit of man (as 
the spirit of brutes, or any other creatures) can 
properly reach unto or comprehend the things of a man, 
as being of a nobler and higher nature, so neither 
can the spirit of man, or the natural man ... receive 
nor discern the things of God, or the things that are 
spiritual, as being also of a higher nature." (II sect. 
6.)
This however appears to be an unfortunate analogy, for 
two reasons. In the first place, there is commonly no 
question of intercommunication of knowledge between man and 
the brutes, while such intercommunication between God and 
man is precisely the question here at issue. Hence the 
analogy falls. In the second place, where any measure of 
intercommunication between man and the brutes does occur 
(as in the case of domesticated animals) it proceeds on tie
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"basis of something common to both,- some .spark of 
intelligence in dog or horse, some community of interest, 
desire or affection, "between the animal and its master. In 
other words, where no community exists, no intercommunication 
is possible. But where intercommunion exists, it argues
some basis of intercourse. If therefore there is any
of 
question at all/man's knowledge of divine things, some
common measure between the human and the divine must be 
supposed. Barclay denies any common measure. He thereby 
renders divine knowledge impossible. He has created a gulf 
which he is unable to cross.
T&fc reply of Barclay to this I think would be: There is here 
no question of any relation between the diy.ine and the human. 
For the purposes of divine knowledge man is a nonentity,- an 
inchoate unorganised mass; a formless, lifeless thing. Into 
this dead mass, as an informing, organising principle, there must 
enter the Spirit of God. This Spirit, spark, seed of divine 
intelligence is the organic principle alike of knowledge and of 
life.
If this is indeed Barclay's real thought,- and later 
indications (Props IV. V. and VI.) will show that it is,- then 
what becomes of faith? There is no place for faith in such a 
theory. The language which Barclay uses to describe faith 
cannot be made to fit in with such a theory. When we say faith 
we are full in face of personal relations - "I" and "Thou;" and 
the I is just as real as the Thou. Cor ad cpr
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Revelation and faith are correlative; and "both are personal 
processes. The Word is a reasonable entity; and faith is a 
"reasonable service. 11 The statement, promise or command that 
evokes the response which is faith, must be intelligible to the 
recipient's mind,- that implies the mind f s faculty for recog- 
nizing truth. It must come with the coerciveness of truth to 
be received, or duty to be done,- that implies the sense for 
sacred or absolute values. The truth perceived, the duty 
required, is activating,- it is a summons,- it calls for the 
venture of faith,- the soul must "proceed upon it, H - that 
implies that the soul is not a hopeless ruin. AH this, 
Barclay tacitly presupposes in what he says of faith. Here, 
accordingly, we are in agreement with him. Revelation and 
Faith are correlative. Faith f s object is the Word of G0d.
Where we break with him is on the point of how the Word 
is rendered. We have seen his answer,- by inward immediate 
revelation of the Spirit; and we have seen how inconclusive 
that answer is. It was not established by his Scripture 
references and examples. These were of more than doubtful 
historicity; and, in any case, indicated results, not processes, 
And now we find it is not borne out by what he has to say 
regarding faith. TO what view ought we then to subscribe?
Our answer has been given in what we found as to Revelation 
in Nature and History. These, together, form what the poet 
calls "the mighty sum of things for ever speaking." Nature, in 
the wide extension we give to the term, is the Word of God.
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All "words," including, very specially, the "Word made flesh, 11 
are special determinations of The W0rd. In these, Nature 
(the lf nature of things 11 ) "becomes significant, vocal, charged 
with meaning. Certainly, the Word must be interpreted, and 
certainly for its interpretation a faculty of soul is required. 
That faculty we do not call the "Inner Light". The Inner 
Light is not a faculty; it is a state. It presupposes faculty; 
but it presupposes also the external object. There must be a 
power to interpret the Word; there must also be a Word to be 
interpreted. The Inner Light is the state of soul that arises 
from the conttecct, of these two,- that condition, luminous and 
serene, that comes when the soul "sees into the life of things."
40. 
CHAPTER VI.
THE WAY OF KNOWLEDGE (continued). 
4. The Holy Spirit.
We shall not have done full justice to Barclay's view 
till we have paid some attention to his argument concerning 
the Holy Spirit, (II. sects. 10-12.)
By far the largest and most impressive testimony of 
Scripture has reference to this subject. And Barclay rightly 
lays stress upon °the great and notable acts that have been 
performed by the Spirit in all ages."
"In short, what thing relating to the salvation of the 
soul, and to the life of the Christian, is rightly per- 
formed, or effectually obtained, without it?H 
The Spirit's intromissions are inward and Immediate.
"The Spirit of God leadeth, instructeth and teacheth every 
true Christian whatsoever is need-ful for him to know. 11 
and this, "immediately, objectively and continually." 
This is done not merely "subjectively, by enlightening their 
understandings to understand and believe the Scriptures... 11
"but by presenting (spiritual) truths by v/ay of object... 11 
"For there be many truths which as applicable to particulars 
and individuals, and most needful to be known by them, are 
in no wise to be found in the Scripture." 
The teaching of the Spirit is "no peculiar, extraordinary 
privilege, but that which is common to all the saints."
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It is H a more certain touchstone ... to discern and try
seducers by, than even the apostle's own writings." (i John,2.27.
It does not seem desirable to follow Barclay along the 
tortuous ways of Scriptural "proof" for his doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit. Nor is exhaustive treatment of this great subject 
possible. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a brief 
statement designed to indicate our view of the relation of the 
Holy Spirit to the soul, and where, in particular, we think the 
Barclaian statement is, not so much wrong, as one-sided and in- 
complete.
Regulative for Christian thought must always be what we 
learn from Christ, and here, we must confess, the material for 
a verdict is not abundant. As far as the synoptic gospels 
are concerned, the general silence of Christ on this subject 
is rather remarkable, A possible and pregnant reason for this 
reticence will be supplied as we proceed. It is to the 
Johannine gospel, therefore, that we are compelled to turn. 
Two strains of thoughiare evident here, (i) That the Holy Spirit 
is Christ's alter/ago (e.g., "I will come again") (a) That 
"Holy Spirit was not yet given," whil^i Christ was on earth; but 
remained a promise only. The Acts takes up this second strain 
and follows it on to its fulfilment at Pentecost.
The fact that "Holy Spirit was not yet given" mj^t be held 
sufficient to explain the paucity of allusion to the Holy Spirit
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in the Synoptics. Founding on this phrase in 'John,' Bp. Gore 
puts forward the view that, before Pentecost, it was the Logoff, 
not the Spirit, that was active in the world and the church; the 
afliBfcmtu;/ of the Spirit coinciding with the Pentecostal birth 
of the Christian Church, which then became the organ of the Holy 
Spirit. This seems to the present, writer an fia parJifi. statement, 
put forward, most likely, in a High Church interest. The 
simpler view is that Spirit was not yet given qua. Spirit &£ 
Christ T - the distinctively "Holy "Spirit. But that the Spirit's 
earthly activity began at Pentecost, is unthinkable. Admittedly 
it entered on a .new phase; that is all.
If, now, the relative silence of Christ regarding the
Spirit does not favour the view that "Spirit was not yet given,"
silence 
what other explanation of tfcfcVis forthcoming? A simple explana-
tion lies in the other Johannine view, that Spirit was Christ's 
dltertego. It was because the Holy Spirit was so much a part of 
Himself,- of His deepest, inmost self, that Christ found little 
occasion to speak of Him objectively. His knowledge of the 
Spirit was part of His own self consciousness,- it was of that 
11 inside'1 , subjective kind, which we have desctibed as the truest, 
the only "true", knowledge of the Eternal Subject. Christ and 
the Spirit were not indeed identical, yet they were wholly one, 
with that oneness which constitutes personal intimacy, wherein 
the mutual intimates live each in the other's life - "I 'in Him« 
He itt Me." This relation of the human Christ to the Spirit is
typical,- regulative for thought, and the goal of Christian effort
not 
If this is spiritually true, it ought/to "be a -peculiufp Of
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theology; it will find witnesses among those who are not 
systematic theologians, but who are deeply versed in the secrets 
of man ! s spirit. We find Emerson, e.g., saying thiss
"I conceive a man as always spoken to from behind, 
and unable to turn his head to look at the speaker. In 
all the millions who have heard the voice, none ever, saw 
the face. As children in their play run behind each dther, 
and seize one by the ears and make him walk before them, so 
is the Spirit our unseen pilot. That well known voice 
speaks in all languages, governs all men, and none ever 
can get a glimpse of its form. If the man will exactly 
obey it, it will adopt him, so that he shall not any 
longer separate it from himself in his thought; he shall 
seem to be it; he shall be it. If he listen with 
insatiable ears, richer and greater wisdom is taught 
him, the sound swells to a ravishing music, he is borne 
away as with a flood, he becomes careless of his food and 
of his house, he is a drinker of ideas, and leads a 
heavenly life."
Some such view of the Holy Spirit would seem to be required 
as a corrective of what may have appeared,in preceding pages, 
an "all too human" view of Revelation. The fact would seem to 
be that the process of revelation is susceptible of expression 
from two sides,- the human and the divine. In the foregoing 
pages it is taken on its human side. ^hen we tried to define 
the prophetic consciousness more exactly, we found ourselves
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speaking of a tradition: of a piind saturated in the tradition; 
and of a situation to which the prophets mind addressed itself. 
The matter is thus described in terms of human discovery, not 
as in essence different from similar efforts in other fields of 
human interest and achievement. If this is a sufficient des- 
cription, then it is otiose to introduce another factor,- the 
divine Spirit. ("ISntia non multiplicanda praeter necesaitatem"). 
We have postulated a Logos-activity in nature (which later 
we shall define more precisely as in character redemptive). We 
have also postulated the prophetic soul. And we have spoken as 
if the interraction of these two sufficed to give the required 
result. There is, however, here a missing factor, to the 
presence of which the prophetic soul has given strong and unvary- 
ing witness,- the sense of Guidance and Control. Historically, 
it was the overpowering sense of this which created the doctrine 
of the Holy Spirit. And further, it is to be noticed that this 
testimony comes precisely from those who might "be supposed to be 
less dependent on it. The pregnant situation, and the keen 
prophetic spirit, might be supposed able to divide the field 
between them. But it is just the prophetic soul that refuses 
to put in a claim to any credit for the result. It avows that
it knows too well to Ihofo the credit is due, and refers all to the 
Spirit.
The relations of the S0n and Spirit are notoriously 
difficult to disentangle, (and the language of Scripture, and of
the Apostle Paul in particular, does not help to extricate the
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entanglement.) On the one hand we cannot suppose Christ the 
Son to have, retired into inactivity. On the other, the doctrine 
of the Spirit seems to leave no room for Christ to work.
We may, however, aafely think of Christ's exalted position 
as being still used to perpetuate His redemptive work,- to 
carry forward that work in human society,- and "by the same means, 
viz.", redemptive suffering. We are to see the continued 
activity of Christ in every example of suffering loire, and 
patience, and injury sweetly borne. And we may think of all 
that as being the "lesson-bfcak11 in the hands of the Divine 
Teacher, the Spirit. He "takes of the things of Christ"- both 
the past things and the things still going on - "and shews them 
unto us; H shews them, mark you, not Himself. He hides Himself, 
sinks Himself in His holy task, willing we should forget the 
Teacher if only we learn the lesson. But as in all the best 
teaching, the Personality of the Teacher subtly imparts itself 
to the learner. As Person says,"He, (the learner)> becomes It."
Can one say more?
A quotation from Pringle-Pattison may fitly end this dis- 
cussion: He says (Theism p.32) M So natural is this process of 
divine education that it seems as if the new insight were 
wrested by man himself from the void and formless infinite,- as 
if the new truth, the new ideal, were the creation of his own 
spirit. And he then bows down and worships himself as a god 
in a godless world. The»e however are but the two sides of the 
shield which may be opposed to each other to all eternity. AH
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moral and religious truth is won by the race for itself, in the 
sweat of its own moral experience, but not without the indwelling 
spirit of God."
"Not without the indwelling Spirit, 11 - here Barclay is right. 
But also, not without the "outward," historical, redemptive 
activity that makes Nature significant,- that incarnates and 
reincarnates the Eternal Logos in quivering human flesh. H0w 
could Barclay forget that; and how could his "suffering Friends* 
allow him to forget it?
Testimnp^um lyiternum Spiritua Sancti.
A brief note* b^ way of appendix, may be added on this
%
historic phrase. Reformation usage chiefly had regard to the 
Spirit f s witness to the Scriptures. In theory, Scripture, 
simpiiciter T was not the Word of God. To become such, a 
scripture had to reach to something within the reader which 
responded to it, and testified to it as an oracle of the living 
God. In Coifiridge's familiar words, the particular Scripture 
"found" the reader,- got home to that deepest part of him where 
the sense of "the sacred" resided. This is our modern human 
way of putting it. The teat, int. S>SI. is the same thing, 
looked at and expressed from the other, the divine, side. It 
is possible to speak of man's "discovery" of God; or of God's 
"self-disclosure" to man; and probably impossible to delimit 
the two. The Interchanges of personality are very subtle. 
And there is no need to suppose that an exhaustive description 




THE WAY OF KNOWLEDGE (continued.) 
Authority, Infallibility and Certainty.
Having completed our investigation of the doctrine of the 
Inner Light in itself, we now proceed to examine its relations 
to outward Authority, and its pretensions to infallibility and
certainty,
second jpart of the 
These matters are raised in the/aedond Proposition,
These are Barclay's statements:-
"These divine inward revelations *.. neither do nor 
can contradict the outward testimony of the Scriptures, 
or right and sound reason. Yet it will not follow 
that they are to "be subjected to the test either of 
reason or Scripture as to a more noble or certain 
rule and touchstone. For this divine revelation is 
evident and clear of itself, forcing by its evidence 
and clearness, the well-disposed understanding to 
assent, irresistibly moving the same thereunto, even 
as the common principles of natural truths move and 
incline the mind to a natural assent: as, that the 
whole is greater than its part; or, that two 
contradictories can neither be both true or both 
false.*1 (Prop.IIB.)
In brief, inward revelation has intrinsic authority, arising 
from its selfevidence,- a selfevidence such as the axioms of 
logic or mathematics possess. This renders it independent of
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all external authority, with which, ao far as legitimate, divine 
revelation has no quarrel. In other words, inward revelation 
is at all times willing to "be tried b# the deliverances of 
authority; but not to "be subjected to them,- the truth being, 
as will appear, that the source of both kinds of authority is 
the same; but that inward revelation stands in a nearer 
relation to that source.
These positions are established polemically, in course of 
meeting objections to his doctrine. With his polemic we are not 
primarily concerned here. Yet it is not without its own interest, 
as throwing sidelights on the whole question of authority, its
need and nature.
Thus Barclay supposes his opponent arguing thuss "Granted 
the existence (for the sake of argument) of such inward revelations 
as you advocate, a question arises as to their validity. 
History, both early, (Gnostics) and recent, (the Anabaptists of 
Munster) shows to what vagaries in thought, and to what excesses 
in practice, such inward revelations are apt to lead." Barclay's 
answer is to admit and disown the abuse of the doctrine; but 
to deny that its disuse is therefrom to be inferred. For if so, 
would his opponents be themselves in better case? Have not 
their principles too been abused? (Instances given, 11,13.14) 
It is not in the nature of Inward revelation to lead to vagary 
and excess, any more than it is in the nature of Scripture, 
tradition or reason, to lead to the slfrife which history shows 
to have been constantly waged under these different banners.
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And if the abuse of a principle does not necessarily flow from 
the principle, the principle is no wise compromised by the abuse. 
Further, the infallibility of a principle does not infer the 
infallibility of its adherents. And no presumption is therefore 
raised against the infallibility of inward revelation, by reason 
of the all-too-human frailty of its professed devotees.
This is good fence. But Barclay's opponents mean to say 
that on their principle, human fallibility is overtly recognised, 
and carefully guarded against; the will, or caprice, or per- 
versity of the individual is restrained; and the gathered 
wisdom of the past is placed at his disposal. But no such 
{ subventions are provided for him who turns away from these 
helps, and shoulders off these restraints, in sole and untram- 
melled dependence on the light within. T 0 this objection 
Barclay would reply that the Inward Light is its own sufficient 
safeguard, if only the subject waits upon it with pute intention. 
The inward light is clear, selfevident and infallible in itself; 
but it is not seen except by the man whose eye is single. AS 
for the transgressor, external authority exists to deal with 
him.
Yes, says the opponent, but will the light be seen, even by 
the man whose eye is single?
TO that, Barclay has the final rejoinder that if the Inward 
Light has no existence and no validity, it is so much the worse 
for the authoritarian. For, whatever be his princ^e.of authority, 
- whether Scripture, tradition or reason,- it is not self-
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authenticating, it requires certification from without itself. 
So that, in ultimate resort, all schools of authority are driven 
back to rely on the Spirit of God,- the Inner Light.
In brief, then, Barclay distinguishes internal and external 
authority, and recognizes the right of both. They both proceed 
from the same Spirit. But the outward authority stands at a 
long remove from its original source. Its original is divine; 
but its history human; and in the course of its history it has 
gathered up much of an .entirely- human character, and labours 
under the imperfections which attend every work of man. The 
internal authority, on the other hand, is pure and uncontaminated: 
it comes fresh from the divine mint.
This is the theory we are now to examine.
Barclay's claim of infallibility and selfevidence for the 
Inner Light is, if not subversive of External Authority, at least 
such as to relegate it to a region inferior to that in which 
the spiritual man is privileged and ought to live. He has, 
within, an authority whose deliverances are so clear, coercive 
and infallible, as to render him wholly independent of outward 
guidance or control. He can be certain both of what this 
Authority says, and that what it says is right.
Let us examine these claims of infallibility and certainty 
with a view to seeing whether they do displace external Authority.
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[Of Certainty we may say it is a subjective, of Infallibilitj 
an lobjective attribute. In other words, certainty applies to 
the subject of knowledge; it is a subjective state, characterise 
as assurance of possessing truth, of being in touch with reality. 
Infallibility, again, attaches itself to the source whence truth 
emanates. In a word, infallibility belongs to the Authority; 
certainty to the subject of Authority.]
I.
AS relating to an external Authority, infallibility cannot 
be substantiated. It has been claimed; it still is, in one 
august quarter, claimed. But the sober judgment of the 
generality of mankind is reflested in Iverach's verdict, , 
"Infallibility, inerrancy, are not categories for men to use. 11
£  H. Leckie shows convincingly that so far from being a 
fact, it is not even a necessity; for all the purposes of 
external authority can be served without it. External authority 
is not final nor ultimate. It is provisional in its nature. 
Its position is that of trustee in behoof of heirs whose interests 
are its chief concern, and whose ultimate assumption of the estate 
is its goal. External authority must ever work towards its 
supersession by internal. ("He must increase; 1 must decrease 11 ) 
That end, the claim of infallibility is much more likely to 
stultify than to promote. For nothing could more tend to 
stifle criticism, and therewith the growth of judgment and 




Turning next to Certainty, as a mental state of the subject 
of external Authority, it is obvious that, here, certainty 
attaches primarily to the Authority itself, and only derivatively 
to what the Authority pronounces. I may be certain my medical 
adviser is competent and trustworthy, and only then, and mediate- 
ly, am I certain that what he says is right. The first certain- 
ty,- the certainty attaching to jirJjaa veritaa - is intuitive; 
the second, inferential. As intuitive, it "sees in" to the 
physician's mind; and subjectively shares the physician's self- 
confidence,- in proof of which, one sees that doubt or hesitation 
on the doctor's part causes an immediate slump in the patient's 
confidence.
Such, then, appears to be the nature of Certainty, as 
relating to external Authority, It is a mental state of the 
subject, induced by the Authority itself, and reflecting the 
assurance which the Authority possesses, or successfully prebends 
to possess, of knowing the truth, or having the right to control. 
Such certainty is not, as said, a reasoned, but an intuitive 
state,- how slender, often, its rational grounds, is shown in 
(say) Balfour's "Foundations of Belief;" and how pathetically 
misplaced it often is, needs no enforcement here.
As far, therefore, as external Authority is concerned, we 
find no theoretical grounds for attributing either Infallibility 
or Qertainty to it. Accordingly, if either could be claimed 
for an authority which is wholly inward, Barclay's somewhat 
"superior" attitude to the external would be justified. HOW
53.
then does the matter stand in this quarter? He claims for the 
inward authority infallibility, as emanating from a source which 
is divine; and certainty, as that arises from the clear and 
coercive nature of its revelations. This claim we must probe.
n.
As to infallibility, the claim is based on two grounds. 
The first, a priori, is that revelations coming from a divine 
Source must be infallible. (II. sect. 13.) The second, a. 
posteriori T is from experience 8-
MWe can boldly affirm it from our certain and blessed ex- 
perience. For this Spirit never deceived us, never 
acted nor moved us to anything that was amiss; but is 
clear and manifest in its revelations, which are evidently 
discerned by us, as we wait in that pure undefiled light 
of God (that proper and fit organ) in which they are 
received11 (II. Sect. 13.)
But this high claim suffers some reduction, in as much as 
it is admitted that the infallible revelations are given to 
fallible subjects. And in point of fact, the early Quaker 
pretensions to infallibility, were noticeably abated after the 
desolating experience of Nayler. Hence we incline to think 
that the claim of infallibility is of the nature of an inference 
from the unexamined certainty with which the Friends believed 
themselves to be in immediate contact with the Spirit of G0 d. 
PronouncBBents emanating from that quarter could not but be
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infallible. It was a pious opinion, based on the Certainty 
whose grounds we now proceed to explore.
Certainty, as we have indicated, is a subjective state, 
arising from the selfevidence and coerciveness of the truth or 
duty presented to the subject f s mind. Selfevident must be the 
truth which the Subject cannot but believe; coercive the duty, 
which the subject feels he must do. Certainty is thus correla- 
tive to cogency and coerciveness.
Such cogency in the theoretical sphere is, we are led to 
understand, never absolute; always hypothetical. Its formula 
is, If A, then B. Certainty, here, arises from the self evident 
cogency with which the existence of B is connected with that of 
A; which latter remains hypothetical.
Religious certainty will never rest satisfied with that. 
It will not present its "certainties" in a hypothetical form. 
IJ i£ does so, it is only rhetorically. "If God be for us, 
(none) can be against us," is a categorical assertion, cast, for 
rhetorical purposes, into hypothetical shape. If, therefore, 
theoretical certainty expresses itwelf in the formula,*If A, then 
B; religious certainty attaches to the proposition that affirms 
A. Religious certainty therefore lives in another region than 
jtiuc theoretical. Agreeing with Iirerach that "infallibility and 
inerrancy are not categories for men to use, 11 J. H. Leckie yet 
says.i:that to deny religious certainty would contradict the uni- 
versal experience and testimony of the saints. With Corner,
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he calls it a "vital spiritual state." HOW is it attained?
It seems to be attained in moments of intenser perception 
than usual. The various elements of the soul are wrought 
into unusual unity in presence of an object, or a situation, 
in which the soul's interests are deeply engaged. It is not 
a case of cool, dispassionate observation. Values are at 
stake which are as dear as life, or dearer. In presence of 
these, the soul is "broad awake. 11 Illumination and certainty 
are not of the commonplace order. They are the fruit of rare 
hours of insight, which it is the task of faith to carry forward 
to fulfilment through days of gloom. But the question here is 
not, psychologically to discuss or account for the illuminative 
experience that results in religious certainty. Our question 
is to determine its relations to external authority. These we 
believe to be vital.
In the first place, we have spoken of "values" that are 
felt to be at stake,- values dear as life, or dearer. HOW 
have these come to be felt as values? This is precisely 
the disciplinary task of authority. Authority is the trustee 
of certain values; the guardian of a body of truths, the 
monitor of a system of duties, in which those values are enshrined. 
It is her task to impart a sense of these values to the subjects 
over whom she is placed.
In the second place, it is her tafek to preserve the system 
of truth or duty for which she stands, and to present it to 
pupil-minds in such wise that they may make it their own. It is
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the task of inculcation,- a preparatory, but still absolutely 
necessary task.
This is all that external authority can do. But it is
y 
much, nay, indispensable. The subject of authority, as mere
subject, is not yet a person. He will have attained personality, 
in measure, when he sees with his own eyes, feels with his own 
heart, and judges with his own mind. To that day, authority 
looks forward. When it has arrived, her work is done. Her 
pupil passes from her hands,- but only into the hands of 
another, higher, yet still external, authority.
Such, then, we conceive to be the necessary relations of 
external to internal authority. The soul is born and nursed 
in the shadow of external authority. It conveys to the soul
i««#m44
its own values,- the soul !fc^ the seat of values, and the external 
authority provides the values b^ which the soul lives. Further, 
the authority holds, guards, and renders to the soul, the truths 
in which these values are enshrined. These truths are
systematised by the authority. Some, but some only, of these
U* 
truths the soul makes Xt$ own,- sees them with selfevident
clearness. The rest, she takes upon trust, as belonging to 
the system, part of which the soul has verified, and more of 
which she hopes to verify in course of time.
This may seem a too-partial account of the matter,- it 
provides for the action of the authority upon the soul, but notfor 
the reaction of the soul upon the authority. It makes no
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provision for advancing knowledge - gives no place to the 
pioneer of new truth. But even so, the pioneer is himself 
the nursling of authority, and would "be the last to forget 
his debt thereto. It is also to "be remembered that the soul 
is not subjected to one authority, but to many. A son of 
the Church, today, is also (let us say) a student of science. 
He has to combine, in some sort, the truths rendered by bottj. 
authorities; and the resultant is a new truth* -With this, as his 
contribution, he returns to his authority, to have it authorised,- 
received into the authoritative system, which it, in greater 
or less measure, transforms.




It was inevitable that the apologist of the Inner Light 
should join issue with the upholders of Scripture. These 
represented very various schools; yet all agreed in looking 
to the Scriptures as the chief, if not the only, source of 
religious knowledge. None of them, Reformers, Romanists or 
Rationalists, held that Scripture, simpliciterj was the Word 
of God. AH held that it required interpretation. The 
instrument of interpretation varied,- the light of reason, 
the Church*s tradition, the internal testimony of the Spirit; 
but all agreed that the substance of revealed truth lay there, 
requiring only to be properly extracted. Hence a doctrine 
of inward revelation, deposing Scripture from the place of 
primacy, inevitably lay exposed to the allied attack of those 
who, though by no means mutual friends, were now united in hos- 
tility to it.
The Third Proposition accordingly sets forth Barclay's 
doctrine of Scripture.
The following are the salient points in his thesis:-
(a) The Scriptures proceed from these revelations 
of the Spirit of God.
(b) "They contain -
(i) an^-historical account of the acts of God's 
people in divers ages; with many singular 
providences attending them.
(ii) a prophetical account of (things to come.) 
(iii) a full and ample account of the chief princip- 
les and doctrines of Christ ...
(c) "They are not the fountain, "but only a declaration
of the fountain. 
"They are therefore not the principal ground of
truth and knowledge; not yet the primary rule df
faith and manners. 
M Yet they are a subordinate rule, secondary to the
first. 
"By the Spirit within we can alone know them,- and
they point beyond themselves to the Spirit as
first and £rincip&il. rl
The proposition, it is apparent, is divisible into three 
parts, (a) states the Source of Scripture,- inward revelation. 
(bj the Contents. These are -
1. History (i.e., Historical books of 0 T; the Gospels and 
Acts.)
2. Prophecy (i.e. 0 T prophets and The Apocalypse.)
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3. Doctrine (i.e. Psalms etc., of 0 T; and Epistles of N.T.) 
(c) indicates the Use and Value of the Scripture,-* as a subordi- 
nate rule, derived from the Spirit and requiring His help in 
reading it. The argument is directed to the establishment of 
this third point (c). Barclay yields nothing to his opponents 
in point of deference and honour to the Scripture - "the most 
excellent writings in the world." There is "a majesty in the 
style, a coherence of the parts, a good scope in the whole 11 
worthy of their divine origin. But these are not discernible 
"by the natural man. The use and value of the Scripture there- 
fore depend on something 'other than the Scriptures themselves. 
Other considerations point the same way. The gospel in its 
character as a "new covenant, 11 refuses submission to the bondage 
of the letter. Moreover, the generality of Scripture disquali- 
fies it as a guide for particular cases. It tells me how I 
may be saved,- it can*t tell me that I am. It indicates that -> 
preachers are required,- but it is unable to say whether I 
should be one. Again, access to the Scripture is denied to 
many,- congenital idiots for example, or the victims of Papal 
concealment and. priestly duplicity; or the truth is concealed 
under textual errors, mistranslation, or the imperfect trans- 
mission of MSS; the canon too, is uncertain, and in any case 
can only have been humanly determined. Are those, thus pro- 
videntially denied access to the original Scriptures, to be re- 
garded as thereby incapacitated, in whole or part, for salvation? 
The Scriptures are therefore to be valued as a comforting and
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even "necessary" (sic) adjunct to the means of grace; the 
records of saints and martyrs they contain are inspiring; they 
are well fitted to arbitrate in controversy; and to correct 
the errors of backsliders. But, when all is said, they are 
not indispensable. He alone who has their inspiring Spirit 
can use them to profit; and with the Spirit, he can make shift 
without them.
Such is the gist of Barelay f s argument; of which, on the 
whole, it would appear that, honorific references notwithstanding, 
the ultimate tendency must be to cheapen Scripture,- since "all 
can raise the flower now, for all have got the seed." This 
relative disparagement of the use and value of Scripture would 
seem to be naturally connected with his account of its content, 
which a brief examination will show to be very external. 
As to content, Scripture consists of (i) history, (ii) prophecy 
and (iii) gospel truths.
But the distinction between (i) and (ii) is really a distinction 
without a difference. For Barclay, both are forms of history,- 
the one, written after the fact; the other, in Bp.Butler*s 
phrase, "history written beforehand." This was of course the 
view then, and long after, current; perhaps, in certain quarters, 
current even yet. It rests on a supernatural view of author- 
ship. For if prophecy is indeed "history written beforehand," 
its author must be more than human. And since the history 
(proper) relates the same order of facts as the prophetic (pre-
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dieted) "history," it would seem reasonable to ascribe its 
authorship to the same supernatural source,- the more especially, 
because, included within the history, were "facts, 11 (such as the 
Creation and Fall), which were inaccessible to unaided human 
research*
Barclay's third division of Scripture,- the "precious 
declarations of the gospel of Christ" - indicates a more or less 
miscellaneous collection of utterances of the Holy Spirit, given 
forth "at sundry times and divers manners," imparted to their 
human authors by inward, immediate revelation.
Speaking generally, we find there is a lack of unity in 
Barclay's account of Scripture and its contents. A unity of 
Source, he certainly asserts; but it is not the unity of an 
organising principle. What Barclay offers is a melange of 
unassorted items,- "acts" and "providences," without organic 
unity,- the unity, say, of "drama," (Wheeler Robinson)- of great 
action proceeding under a controlling Hand, to a predestined 
end. He speaks, indeed, of "a majesty in the style, a coherence 
in the parts, and a good scope in the whole." This however is 
"not discernible by the natural man," which is doubtless the 
reason why he does nothing to make it apparent.
HOW, then, should w« seek to supply this defect? Have we 
any unifying principle to suggest,- any formula to reduce the 
multiplicity of the scriptures to the rich simplicity of an 
organic whole? Let us see.
Beginning with Barclay's first division,- the historical
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element. He connects the record of these discrete historical 
happenings with the Spirit, their Author, in a way which we find 
unreal. The scriptural writer is more than a mere "amanuensis 
of the Spirit." HOW much more?
At first sight, one might be inclined to think that for the 
simple recital of history no more is required than the historian^ 
ordinary equipment with the spirit, and the material, of research 
Thus, for example, Luke, addressing himself to the task of 
acquainting the "excellent Theophilus" with "the facts of our 
religion," seems to claim no more than a due degree of diligence 
and honesty in ascertaining and narrating the historical facts. 
Much the same may be said of Paul. Paul's task, it is true, 
was not the historians; he even seems, quite in the style of 
Barclay, to disparage historical knowledge, as "being a knowledge 
of Christ "after the flesh." Yet Paul yields to none in his 
insistence on the historicity of the facts on which his gospel 
is "based. And yet, for his knowledge of these facts he claims 
no other source than the common tradition of the Church. ^hen 
he does claim more, it is not the bare fact he is dealing with, 
but the fact in its spiritual significance. This he claims to 
have received "of the Lord."
Almost, therefore, it would seem that "inspiration" need 
not be claimed for the historical parts of Scripture.
This, however, would be a too hasty conclusion.
Never must it be forgotten that the sacred historian is 
writing what, for him, was "sacred" history. Even his
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historical labours have an evangelistic purpose. With success, 
E.F.Scott has tried to show that an apologetic element (and that 
really means an evangelistic purpose) underlies the seemingly 
dispassionate synoptic narrative. Here then, if anywhere, is 
the sphere of inspiration. The facts, as brute facts, lay open 
to all,- to one man as to another,- to Josephus as to Luke. 
But in the one case they bear a significance which they have not 
in the other. In that significance the facts have their value. 
And the apparently dispassionate and objective narration is 
eloquent of the conviction that the facts do have this meaning, 
and only need to be fairly set forth, for this their true nature 
and significance to appear.
This view covers not merely the field of history proper; 
it embraces also the quasi-historical. With the naivete' of 
their age, Scripture writers record as bona fide fact what we now 
call by other names. But if they recorded as fact what we call 
myth, folklore, or whatever else, it was still for the religious 
value of the aoi-disant facts that they recorded them. This
-fHvJtrtHCi
value remains. The Creation narrative can still speak to the 
scientist. The Fall story is no mere myth to the man who knows 
titfat he has been the "Adam of his own soul. 11
This view extends not only to the proph^etic literature, but 
even to the undeniable predictive element in that literature. 
The prophet may well have believed that he was inditing "history 
beforehand." But it was not as a feat of television he did it. 
It was still the significance of fact,- the religious meaning of
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present fact, in motion towards a divine event which would 
vindicate faith,- that he was concerned with. And our interest 
in these predictive prophecies today is less in having seen 
them fulfilled, or in hoping yet to do so, than in the spiritual 
values they affirm,- and that, often, with a glowing and poetic 
ardour which has inexpugnably lodged them in the Christian heart.
Of Barclay's third division,- the "doctrines of Christ,"- 
we say the same. AH are rooted in fact,- all are concerned with 
the Divine character and action, as the one is revealed, and 
the other proceeds, in the field of history. They record the 
"doings of the Lord."
Here then is the organic unity we find in Scripture,- the 
vital union of Fact and Meaning,- such union as makes the truth 
of history. For History is not just fact. Brute fact is no 
more than the staple of annals, of memoires pour servir. But 
History is Fact interpreted; seen to "be informed with spirit 
and purpose; and interpreted "by a spirit akin to its own.
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Part II.
Of Salvation, its Need, its 
Means and its Outcome.
Chapter.
9. The "Natural Man": Barclay's genetic account of. 
elements of human nature non-moral; require 
impregnation either by the good or by the evil 
"seed."' The seed a foreign "substance. 11 
Whence the prepotency of the evil seed? Barclay 
has no answer, since he has no real place for 
the Fall, and denies Original Sin.
10. Total Depravity: twin basis of this doctrine,- in 
Scripture and experience. Its basis not 
theoretical! a value-judgment of the religious 
order. The doctrine is its own refutation.
Original Sin* Sin a religious concept; relative to 
Grace. Original Sin, as reflected in the ex- 
perience of the saints, is a deficient response 
to Grace. Roots of Sin,- in Nature and Society. 
A problem of extrication.
11. Fifth and Sixth Propositions: develop the theory of
the Universal saving Light. The Death of Christ 
the ultimate cause of salvation; the Inner Light, 
the proximate. The former is "procuring cause 11 
of the latter. Both are absolutely universal. 
The Inner Light is a divine substance, indwelling 
in, but not part of, human nature. Its operation 
requires passivity of the subject. The religious 
interests at stake.
12. Criticism of above. 1. Category of Substance, or Seed,
a case of hypostasis. What 
Barclay calls a substance is 
really a relation. The 
relation is redemptive.
2. The connexion of Christ f s Death 
with the Seed an arbitrary 
assertion.
3- Barclay has no real place for 
the Cross.
13. Criticism (continued); must be conservative. The 
interests of Barclay are also ours: the divine 
initiative; the inwardness; and the universality 
of Redemption. y
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hap . i. The initiative is divine. An objective Atone- 
ment is necessary. Sin costs. Forgiveness 
implies suffering.
2. The redemptive relation is personal in its terms; 
and cannot persist on an external footing. 
Christ is Subject; and cannot remain a mere 
object of consciousness.
3. Redemptive activity is absolutely universal.
Christ's historical redemption only the sup- 
reme instance.
Note on "Grace and Nature"; relations of these are 
mutual. Illustration from the Prodigal.
14. Justification by Faith. Barclay's a "germ" theory,
with no real place for forgiveness. It is opposed 
to the imputation theory. Both are false extremes: 
a true doctrine of Justification will bring both 
together. Christ is not savingly realised as "for 
us" except as He is also "in us"; but it is "Christ 
for us" Who is thus subjectively realised.
Perfection and Perseverance: sainthood a vital interest, 
both human and religious. Barclay's provision 
insufficient. Surreptitious introduction of the 
human element. This provides for a real, but 
interrupted, progress. The truth in Perseverance.
CHAPTER IX.
SIN.
1. The Natural Man."
With the Fourth Proposition we pass to the subject of 
Redemption; and first of all, we envisage the situation 
requiring it. It is sufficiently desperate:-
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(a) "An Adam's posterity ... is fallen, degenerated and 
dead; deprived of the sensation or feeling of this 
inward testimony or seed of God; and is subject to 
the nature, power and seed of the serpent, which he 
soweth in men's hearts while they ? abide in this 
natural and corrupted state; "Whence it comes that 
not only their words and deeds, but all their imagina- 
tions, as proceeding from 'this depraved and wicked 
seed, are evil perpetually in the sight of God.
(b) "Man therefore, as he is in this state, can know nothing 
aright; his thoughts and conceptions concerning 
Grod and spiritual things ... are unprofitable both 
to himself and others.
(c) "Nevertheless, this seed is not to be imputed to infants, 
until by transgression they actually join themselves 
therewith." 
The topics that emerge for discussion are these three:-
(i) Fallen man in maturity; or, the question of "total
depravity." 
Ui) Fallen man in infancy; or, the question of "original
sin." 
(iii) The ministry of unregenerate men; or, the question of
"valid orders."
The last topic crops up rather oddly here, and is mentioned 
only to be reserved for later treatment (Prop. X.)
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Together, Topics (i) and (ii) comprise a genetic account of Sin.
Exposition.
*
At the outset, we notice the introduction of a significant 
new word,- "seed,"- applied "both to the saving principle ("seed 
of God"), and to the principle of sin and ruin("seed of the 
serpent.") AS applied to the saving principle, it is none other 
than our old acquaintance, the "Inner Light, 11 under another 
name: what was formerly termed "Light" is now termed "Seed, 11 - a 
dynamic term. As we saw, and shall see again, this seed is
Sev-/.*/t*V-
aliauid del,- "that of God in man;" and, by parity of reasoning, 
the evil seed falls to "be regarded as aliauid diaboli. The 
underlying metaphor, in each case, is evidently that of pro- 
creation.
_I
The seed, deriving in one case from God, in the other, 
from the devil, is a strictly foreign element, indwelling, "but 
not inherent in human nature. The existence and indwelling of 
the two seeds are due in each case to a historical event,- in 
the one case, the sacrifice of Christ; in the other, the Fall 
of Adams these two events are in counterpoise.
The seed requires a matrix. That is provided "by nature, 
at the stage of infancy. The congenital elements are destitute 
of moral quality. As we shall see, Barclay explicitly denies 
the existence of any good thing in human nature as such. Man 
has "no inward will, faculty, light or power to follow that 
which is good, and make real progress towards heaven." By
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parity of reasoning, is to "be presumed (though Barclay does not 
take the trouble to say it) the non-existence of any innate 
power to follow evil. In short, the basal element, or ground 
of human nature, requires to be fecundated. Its role is pure 
passivity. By non-resistance to either influence, the good 
or evil seed is received. Conception follows: the hidden man 
of the heart develops, bearing the character of the seed whence 
it sprang. Hence is understood the absolute disparity between 
the "spiritual 1* and the "natural" man. Each-, is after its kind: 
the one wholly good; the other, altogether bad.
From this standpoint, all Barclay's distinctive positions 
stand forth clearly,- his thorough going miserabilism; his 
relation to the opposite schools of Augustine and Pelagius; 
and his repudiation of original sin (both idea and term), with 
its horrible corollary of infant damnation. At the same time, 
another thing also'becomes clear,- viz*, that Barclay has no 
satisfactory explanation to offer of the pre-potency of the evil 
seed. ^hy shouldthe "serpent-seed" so invariably prevail? 
Why is human culpability universal? HOW comes the phrase 
"natural man," to carry the sinister significance it always 
bears in Barclay's pages, and indeed in common speech? T0 
these questions Barclay offers no real answer.
Upon each of these topics we shall briefly animadvert.
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Rejnarka.
And, first, as to what Rufus Jones has called Barclay's 
"miserabilism,"- his unrelieved pessimism regarding the condition 
of the natural man. Regarding this, there is no room for 
doubt, as a cursory glance at the proposition will show. A 
clearer statement of total depravity it would "be impossible 
to find. Here Barclay's sympathies are with Augustine. The 
point at which he breaks with Augustine,- the culpability of 
infants,- he charitably ascribes to "the infirmity of Augustine's 
declining years* and "to the heat of his zeal" against Pelagius. 
The mention of these extenuating circumstances leads us to infer 
his sympathy with Augustine's main doctrine of depravity.
But if his disagreement with Augustine is to be regarded 
as "an affair of out posts, 11 in the case of Pelagius the onset 
is an "attack in force." The Pelagian doctrine asserts the 
survival from the Fall, impaired perhaps, but not extinguished, 
of some measure of goodness in man.
We have seen how Barclay relates himself to this view: he 
denies, not the survival merely, but the original existence 
of "any good which Adam had belonging to his nature." And what 
Adam had not himself of course he could not propagate. The 
ground of human nature, which is all that can be passed on from 
sire to son, is a moral neutrum,- merely a matrix for the good 
or evil seed. This is all that infants possess. They are 
without "knowledge" (in Barclay's pregnant sense of the word) 
of good and evil: they are alive without the law (though how
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Barclay does not show,) and free from evil imputation.
If so, the question becomes acute, as to why this neutral 
state so invariably pawses over to the condition above described. 
The obvious answer to this would be,- the Fall. f̂e shall give 
reasons to show that this answer is not available in Barclay's
case. Beyond doubt, Barclay believed in the historicity of
that he believed as 
the Fall,- or believed/it. Bu^is his wont, he spiritualised
the history; and the history thus spiritualised, lacks pith to 
support his argument.
His view of the Fall was this: it was a real historical 
event, whose effects were partly outward, but chiefly inward. 
Loss of Eden was assuredly an outward, material calamity. But 
the "mystical signification" of Eden's loss is the main affair, 
and its "mystical signification and true account*'was loss of 
God's fellowship.
NOW, it will be obvious that these outward and inward con- 
ditions are not equally heritable. Heritable certainly are 
the fallen fortunes of the house,- the thorns and briars of 
untamed nature. These, however, are but relative misfortunes, 
and can be measurably overcome. But in what sense is spiritual 
misfortune heritable? Not as regards the ground of human nature, 
for that, after, as before the Fall, remains morally neutral. 
Not, again, in the sense that, after the Fall, communion with 
&§d was impossible; for the burden of Barclay's, as of every 
gospel, is that it is possible. Well then, does the misfortune 
lie in the fact of exposure to the "power, nature and seed of
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the serpent?" Yet the story shows that even in Paradise, 
Adam was not exempt from temptation. TO all important intents, 
we must conclude the Fall has no vital significance for Barclay, 
- as Moehler has shewn. Barclay accepted it for a fact; "but 
it has no real place in his theory. And if its historicity 
should "be doubted or disproved, Barclay f s withers would be 
unwrung.
From our modern standpoint, this is all to the good. But, 
unfortunately for Barclay, it leaves him without a reply to the 
query. Why do all men sin? Should Barclay attempt to answer 
in these termss "Have I not said that fallen man is deprived of 
the sense and feeling of God, an<* i s > a^ the same time, subjected 
to the power, nature and seed of the serpent?" then we shall be 
compelled to anticipate a little, and confront Barclay with his 
(forthcoming) theory of the universality of the saving seed. 
The universality of the saving seed is the distinctive Quaker 
doctrine; yet here its absence is invoked to help Barclay out of 
his difficulty. We cannot allow Barclay to "have it both ways." 
Either the saving seed is present to fallen humanity, or it is 
not. If it is, how does he account for the prepotency of the 
evil seed? If it is not, what becomes of the Quaker pe_cjil±UBl?
It seems, in fine, impossible to avoid the impression that 
Barclay unduly simplifies his problem. As he presents it, it 
might almost be reduced to algebraical terms: as thus:-
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Let a   the ground of human nature. 
n b   the seed of God. 
* cm the serpent-seed.
Then ab 9 the "spiritual man;" and ac - the "natural man" 
Such "bloodless categories" will never hold the rich and varied 
contents of human nature.
CHAPTER X
SIN (continued). 
Total Depravity and Original Sin.
Yet, when all is said in the way of criticism, there remains 
something to "be explained; and Barclayb doctrine, if it fails to 
explain it, at least does not explain it away. The doctrine 
of Total Depravity T like other doctrines that have commanded 
wide assent, springs from a very real experience, of sin's 
dominion, and man f s distress. Further, a doctrine of salvation, 
so transcending as the Christian Gospel, implies a desperate 
need. Sit dignus vindice nndua- The doctrine of total 
depravity at least satisfies this canon; for it presents "a 
problem fit for a God. 11 What shall we say about it?
Tentatively, we shall say that it derives from the Bible, 
with some basis in experience.
(a) When I speak of its Biblical foundation, I am not to be 
understood as implying that there is a single, consistent 
doctrine of man in the Bible. What is here argued is, that 
Biblical warrant for the darker view of human nature is very 
easily secured. And that not merely from "proof texts"
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(which indeed might be ranged on "both sides) "but from a cer- 
tain Weltanschauung which was undoubtedly held by certain of 
the sacred writers, as well as by many of their devout readers 
in all ages. It regards man's mundane history as bpunded by 
two dire events,- the Fall at the beginning, and the Apocalypse 
at the close. Each of these "events" supports, and is in turn 
supported by, the miserabilistic view of man and human life. 
The Fall-story leaves man to envisage himself as the natural, 
object of Divine disapproval, and his labours as blighted by 
God's curse. The Apocalyptic view in turn, regards the 
kingdoms of this world as mere "provinces of the Kingdom of 
darkness." (the quotations here are from Paterson's Gifford 
Lectures p2l7)» "destined to cataclysmic disappearance, and to 
be replaced by a Kingdom of God, either established above the 
clouds, or on a re-created earth." Thus the whole life of the 
ra.ce, as bounded by these two events,- a fall at the start, and 
a catastrophe at the close,- wears the aspect of M a hopeless 
experiment and an ignominious failure." It would not seem to 
be "moving on towards an issue worthy of the human genius, and 
of the divine power which set man his tasks and equipped him 
for their accomplishment. 11
Tjiis, I repeat, is not put forward as "the" Scriptural 
account of man's life; but only as one for which there is 
"Scriptural warrant." Confessedly, some such viev/ prevailed 
in the early Church. It was authoritative for classic
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theology; and its influence, in particular, was supreme: ;in 
the creative eras of Augustine and the Reformation.
(b) That leads us up to the second pillar of this doctrine,- 
its "basis in experience.
The relations of doctrine and experience are reciprocal, 
and hard to disentangle. The truth in the present case may 
be, that misery gave "birth both to the Fall-story and to the 
apocalyptic expectation; and that they, in turn, grew up to 
support their parent. What is certain, at any rate, is that 
if Augustine found the Fall-story rea^dy to his hand, he brought 
to its interpretation a deep experience and penetrating 
psychological insight. T0 Apocalypse, again, Luther's 
experience of guilt and impotence gave a Significance which 
it had not even for those of his contemporaries who shared 
his apocalyptic presuppositions. And if we are to trust 
Paul's selfwitness,- as we surely must,- he too had known 
the Fall as part of his own life-story. It is therefore 
much rather in experience than in Scripture, that we are to 
look for the root of this doctrine. The forms which Biblical 
miserabilism assumes, may be no more substantial than the 
Brocken-shadow, monstrous, grotesque, spectral;- yet they have 
the man behind them whose shadow they are. -Projections of a 
guilty conscience they may well be; yet the guilty conscience 
is real, and no shadow.
77-
It is remarkable, for instance, how men so different, and 
historically se> far apart, as Augustine and George POX, found 
common ground in their view of depraved and fallen man. Both 
were "twice-born men." Both emerged from profound conflict 
into profound peace. And both, reviewing their former condi- 
tion from the summit reached, passed upon it the self same 
verdict of total depravity. This is the more remarkable in 
view of the disparity of their moral experience. Unlike 
Augustineb "fine Confessions," the Journal of George FOX pro- 
vides no material for a Byronic sneer. HAt the age of 11, tt 
he says,"I knew pureness and righteousness." FOX'S trouble 
was not an acute sense of positive transgression. It was 
rather an intense perception of the darkness, folly and 
hypocrisy of his generation, and of his own (albeit involuntary) 
implication with it. He was not at home in the world; and knew 
as yet no other home.
The important fact, for us now, is this,- that when at 
last "Gr.F." obtained deliverance, he figured his new condition 
as a reversal of the Fall. Plainly, an ineffable, unapproach- 
able good had haunted these men's youthful minds, turning this 
world's good to "apples of Sodom" in their mouths. This 
supreme good they at length attained; and from the standpoint 
reached, they passed a "judgment of value" on their past history 
and experience. This judgment they expressed in terms of 
"total depravity."
But we cannot overlook the important point that, while yet
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in a condition of dark and helpless bondage, these men still 
groaned under it. Had their depravity been as total as they 
declared it to be, they would not have groaned. They would 
not have felt it. They would have hugged their chains. ^ords- 
worth speaks of "those high instincts before which our mortal 
nature doth tremble like a guilty thing surprised." In 
those high instincts he, perhaps rightly, finds "intimations of 
immortality." For our present purpose it is enough to point 
to their presence as the presupposition of guilty fear. From 
this point of view, the refutation of a doctrine of total 
depravity lies in the very fact of there being such a doctrine 
at all.
Barclay's argument, of course, is that these "high instincts 11 
are not part of our "mortal nature." They are present to it; 
but not of it. They are non-human, supernatural; and confront 
the nature they condemn, as that which is"wholly other" than 
themselves. The divine, in short, and the human, are mutually 
exclusive. But a divine element that is universally present, 
is hardly to be distinguished from nature itself, And when 
Perm is found saying, It is natural to man to have a supernatural 
light, one feels that the question has come to be merely one of 
terms.
In the light of the fore-going, our verdict on the doctrine 
of total depr&vtty would be, that it is a value-judgment of the 
religious, and not primarily of the ethical, order. There is 
good, real good, in men, short of that goodness which comes only
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when the heart has wakened to a full sense of what the Love of 
G0d really is. In the. joy of that discovery, and in the 
selfreproach that attends the consciousness of how little of 
its due such Love has hitherto received from us, our language 
is no longer measured and calm and balanced. It is the lan- 
guage , of rapture on the one hand, and of execration on the
as 
other. ( M I was/a beast before Thee.") If expresses a truth
of feeling rather than of fact. It is not the language which 
theology should use,- or rather it is language which only a 
theology acutely aware of its presuppositions should use. 
Valid and objective in its own sphere, this judgment must not 
be oblivious of other values. They have their rights, which 
it is no good service to disparage.
Original Sin.
We have now seen the insuperable difficulty Barclay is 
under, of accounting for the universal prevalence of sin. He 
asserts the total depravity, by nature, <ojf Adam f s posterity. 
But he has not been able to explain the prepotency of the evil 
seed. His theory of the Fall will not account for it. And 
he will have nothing to say to the doctrine usually associated 
with it,- and usually advanced in order to account for it,- viz., 
Original Sin. Nature, in its ground, and as it presents itself 
to view at the stage of infancy, is a non-moral substance. 
It.is as destitute of moral quality as the tree in which the saw- 
fly lays its eggs. The seeds alike of good and evil, are
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foreign to it. It awaits impregnation by either. And since 
Barclay denies to it any will or faculty of choice, it seems 
largely a matter of accident which will get in first.
What shall we say about Original Sin? That it is a theory, 
or hypothesis, advanced to account for the universal prevalency 
of sin. As much as "total depravity/ it belongs not primarily 
to the moral sphere; but to the religious. Both of them 
describe states, not actions; and the judgment passed on both 
states is a value-judgment of the religious order.
My meaning is, that ."Sin," as here used, whether as original, 
or at the stage of depravity, is really a religious rather than
an ethical term. It is valid, that is, in the sphere constituted
a specific
by/activity of God,- viz., His forth-going redemptive love.
Sin is not so well or ao clearly defined when regarded as "want 
of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law tof God, H as it 
is when regarded as want of response in kind to. G-od's redeeming 
love and grace. That is what I mean by saying that Sin is 
a properly religious, rather than moral concept. It is of 
course a moral idea and it will be impossible to draw a hard 
and fast line between sin, strictly so called, and moral evil. 
Yet one feels there is a difference,- for even if defined in 
terms of law, it would sufficiently describe moral evil to 
define it as "want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the 
law, 11 - whereas sin requires the further specification of the law 
as M the law of God." With the words, "of God," we enter a 
different region, and very especially is this apparent when the
concept of God has the wealth of gracious meaning which it has 
for the Christian heart. Sin thus becomes defined in relation 
to Grace,- as that which meets Grace with a deficient, no less 
than with a churlish, or defiant, response. Hence, among the 
saints the sense of sin is characteristically a confession of 
deficiency ("More love to Thee, 0 Christ} 11 ) and to them depravity 
seems to consist less in wrong actions than in a wrong attitude 
and state,- an appalling callosity of soul in the presence of 
"love so amazing, so divine." In this sense of deficiency,- a 
defect of nature, rather than of will,- of which the saints are 
chiefly conscious, we may get a clue to Original Sin. (For has 
not the saint become again as a child?) It, then, consists in 
a primal callosity, or selfishness, rendering the soul- imper- 
vious to the approaches of the love that would redeem.
The foot of this selfishness is in nature, with its primal 
urge towards selfpreservation. But if its root is in nature, 
its nurse is society. Society is a congeries of groups, ranged 
in concentric circles, narrower and wider, round the self.'  
Each of these groups has a moral unity, a moral character. 
There is the "group mind," the "group will,"- tending always to 
reproduce themselves in their constituent members; so that it 
is quite as true to say that the society or group is in the 
individual, as that the individual is in the society or group. 
The group mind and the group will tend to uniformity,- a general 
level, a prevailing tone. This is never of the highest: it 
represents the average,- L'&QEuae. moyery aenaujti . The group
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works to a level,- "both ways, up and down. A group is always 
in a confederacy against its worst, and in a conspiracy against 
its "best members 
This gives the individual the occasion of his moral struggle, 
and almost certain fall. His problem is one of extrication,- 
to shake himself free from one group, to find higher life in 
another.
The widest of these concentric circles is "the world. 11 
The world "lieth in sin, 11 - not as altogether morally bad; not 
as organising itself on the devilish principle of hating God; 
but on the sinful principle of "refusing all sacrifice for the 
good cause." In and of this sinful world we are, at the 
beginning. Adjustment to its demands; consent, tacit or 
avowed, to its actions',- complicity with its undisowned guilt,- 
this is the always repeated story of man's fall and depravity. 
A world lying under the guilt of dominion of sin,- a world 
wi6hin, and not merely without, the individual,- that is the 
situation. Extrication from this world,- that is the problem 
of sin; a problem fit for a redeeming God.
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CHAPTER XI
The Universal Saving Light.
The Fifth and Sixth Propositions are entitled,"Concerning 
Christ's Universal Redemption} and also the Saving Light vshere- 
with every man is enlightened."
Barclay groups them together, as forming his complete 
account of Redemption and its means.
With these two propositions, equally famous with the Second, 
we are in full face of the second of Barclay f s tasks. The 
first has been to describe the Way of Knowledge; the present, 
to set forth the Way of Life.
His main object here, of course, is to establish the Inner 
Light as saving principle: what precisely It is; how It is 
related to the Death of Christ; and how, to the nature and nec- 
essities of man. This task is pursued in part, directly; 
in part, polemically. Polemically, his emphasis on the uni- 
versality of the Saving Light, leads him to insist (in face 
of the Predestinarians) on the universality of Christ's Death. 
For the latter is cause of the former; and the cause must be 
of a range no leas extensive than the effect. But, again, he 
has a lance to break with those who, in the best Christian 
tradition, regard Christ's Death as universal, yet set practical 
limits to its efficacy, by insisting on the necessity of 
knowledge of the evangelical history. This, he holds, is 
Predestination in all but name; for if a believing acquaintance
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with the facts is necessary, and if such acquaintance is, b# 
God's Providence, in any quarter withheld, that amounts to 
practical reprobation; and it will be impossible to exonerate 
God from responsibility for the issue. This question, of the 
relation of the saving principle to the historical Christ, thus 
polemically developed, is of crucial importance to Barclay; and 
must be fully taken account of in any valuation of his theory.
But Barclay wages war in yet another field. His first
- f^t&.frJHl'ef n**i*»n*tib-
battle has raged round the connection of the saving principle 
with Christ's death - an issue not distinctively Quaker. The 
second great battle concerns the relation of the saving principle 
to the nature and need of man. Here the field is now taken 
in alliance with Augustine, (his former foe), against the 
,Pelagians, , the semi-pelagians, and their modern Socinian
successors. The question turns on the respective parts to be
to 
assigned to Grace anc/Nature, in the application of the saving
principle to the needs of the case. The Pelagians, ignoring 
the results of the Pall, considered that man had sufficient 
native ability to satisfy the divine requirements. The Semi- 
Pelagians did not deny the need of grace; but held that some 
degree of human effort and deserving was a pre-requisite for its
reception. It was to these views that Augustine very properly
the 
reacted, with his doctrine of /preventence , and unsfcared supremacy,
of grace; but Augustine carried his point to a false extreme, 
when he restricted the range of this grace by his theory of Pre- 
destination.
8?.
AH these errors, Barclay asserts, arose quite naturally 
from a misapprehension of the nature of grace and its communi- 
cation,- the range in which it was distributed, and the manner 
in which it operated. By a true theory of the means whereby 
the benefits of Christ's death are communicated, these dissen- 
sions would be composed. Accordingly, from his polemic we turn, 
with him, to the task of exposition.
Ex-position of the Doctrine _of the Saving j*_jgh t . 
The positions laid down are these three:- (fat>.v.n.4*+ff.)
1. God hath given to every man a certain day or time of
visitation, during which it is possible for them to be 
saved.
2. For this end, God hath communicated to every man a mea- 
sure of the light of his own Son.
3. In and by this Light, God calls, exhorts and strives
with every man in order to save him, and will do so, 
unless resisted and refused.
These positions, thus briefly stated, are expanded in detail s- 
(l) The Pay Q£_ Vial tat ion. (v.vi.**iV
This phrase bears a wider and a narrower connotation. 
In its wider sense, it denotes the indefinite period within whibh 
the possibility of salvation remains open. It is not necessarily 
coterminous with life-time, but falls within lifetime, and varies 
in extent, in each case, "as the Lord sees meet, 11
Its narrower and special sense indicates those particular 
occasions (within that wider period) on which the soul receives
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a call or exhortation, and is sensible that it is being striven 
with. Whether these occasions are few or many, whether the 
lifeperiod within which they fall is longer or shorter, in a,n$ 
event the doctrine of a day of visitation "sufficiently 
exonerateth God of every man's condemnation." And it is in 
the light of this truth that some, at least, of those Scriptures, 
which seem to carry Predestination, are to be read. 
(2) The Saving Light. (Wf.tf-'6;.
1. Agreeably to its manifold and diversified operations, - 
the fact being, that here we have the source of all that man 
knows of religion,- this principle is variously named. It is 
"a measure of the Light of God's Son; H "a measure of grace;" 
"a measure of the Spirit; 11 it is what Scripture calls "the seed 
of the Kingdom; ""the W0rd of G0d; H "the Light that makes all
- -^
manifest;" "a little Ifi^ven;" "the gospel preached in every 
creature." Such terms, however, hardly describe its real nature, 
- which is essentially Divine. It is not, indeed, "the proper 
essence and nature of God, precisely taken;" for while this is 
not divisible, that is universally distributed; and while this 
is properly impassible, that is, in fact, "resisted, hurt, 
wounded, crucified and slain, by all the efforts and strength 
of men." "It is a spiritual, heavenly, invisible principle in 
which G0d, as Father, S 0n and Spirit, dwells." It is "vehicuiujn 
Dei, or the spiritual body of Christ, the flesh and blood of 
Christ, Which came down from heaven," for all men's nourishment. 
11 It is never separated from God or Christ, but wherever it is
8?.
God and Christ are as wrapped up there-in." "This," says 
Barclay, "is that Christ Within, which we (Quakers) are so 
much heard to speak of."
2. The saving Light is Substance, not accident,- i.e., it 
can "be in a man's heart as a holy substance, without conferring 
holiness on the heart which it inhabits. Having Christ within, 
(as all men have,) no wise infers that all are Christian. 
Hence Saving Light or Seed is to be regarded as a foreign body 
(a spiritual substance), which may be present without imparting 
any of its quality to the nature in which it is enclosed.
3. It is related to the Death of Christ as effect to cause. 
The historical sufferings of Christ are its indispensable 
antecedent. "Remission of sins is only in and by virtue of 
that most satisfactory sacrifice, and not otherwise. H Christ's 
Death, therefore, remains the ultimate "efficient" cause of 
salvation; while the saving Light is the proximate. It is to 
be noted, however, that Christ's death operates as efficient 
cause, irrespective of any knowledge of its operation. Even a 
knowledge of the atoning Sacrifice, and still more a theory of 
the Atonement, is unnecessary. Just as natural causes operate 
with or without man's knowledge of them, so Christ's sacrifice 
has done and does it work, for men who know nothing of Christ's 
coming in the flesh. The case, in fact, is precisely parallel 
to the event of the Fall. Every son of Adam suffers from the 
Fall, though relatively few know the origin of their sufferings. 
In 1H* manner, everyone benefits from Christ's sacrifice,- since
therebjr the Saving Light inhabits him,- albeit he is ignorant 
of the source whence the Light has come to him. Such ignorance 
is, however, not allowable where the evangelical story has been 
.divulged . Hearing demands belief; and to such belief, the 
Inward Light invariably impels. Damnation follows disbelief 
of the gospel,- not because it is unbelief; but because of the 
resistance to the Light which unbelief presupposes. "Belief 
of the history of Christ's outward appearance ,M "while essential 
for those within hearing, is further "very comfortable 11 and 
edifying to such hearers as are led by the inward light. In 
short, "the history is comfortable and profitable with the 
mysteryn (i.e.the inward light) 11 and never without it; but the 
mystery is, and may be, profitable, without the explicit and 
outward knowledge of the history. tt (This jingle of "history" 
and "mystery11 seems to have been very current. Cp. Christian's 
talk with Ignorance in £he Pilgrim's Progress.)
4. It is no part of man's nature, nor any relics of good 
surviving the Fall. On this point Barclay is most emphatic, as 
he knowa how often the position has been either wilfully or 
unintentionally mistaken. And it must be confessed that it is 
hard to hold together, without confusion,, the two ideas of the 
universal diffusion of the Light in man, and of its nature as 
yet alien to man's. (Recall Penn's dictum, It is natural to man 
to have a supernatural light.) But its maintenance is all- 
important for Barclay.
It is not reason. By reason, man can know the arts and
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sciences, as animals can not. By reason, too, man may 
apprehend "in his brain, and in the notion,*1 a knowledge of God 
and spiritual things. Such knowledge, however, was demon- 
strated (under Prop, ii.) not to be true or profitable, and is, 
in fact, at the root of the prevailing apostacy. Not that
reason is of no value. On the contrary, it is indispensable
in 
in things natural; and even/things spiritual, when subservient
to the Light, it may be of great use, precisely as the animal 
principle is useful even for rational ends.
Likewise, it is not conscience. For conscience belongs to 
natural faculty, and may therefore be easily corrupted. It 
follows the judgment, and the judgment may be perverted; as in 
a Turk, whose convictions forbid wine, but permit conoubinage; 
and whose conscience, accordingly, pricks him if he should taste 
** strong drink, but allows him to add another wife without a 
qualm. This Lig£t does what conscience cannot. It removes 
the blindness of judgment, and by rectifying judgment, rectifies 
conscience in consequence. Conscience, then, is to this Light, 
what a lanthom is to a candle,- and excel lent apparatus if only 
the candle be there. "It is then not to the natural conscience, 
but to the light of Christ in the conscience, that we commend
men. 11
The final proof that it is no mere natural faculty is, that 
a healthy man is master of his faculties, and can exercise them 
at will. But this light and seed of God is not within his 
power,- "it moves, blows and strives with man as the Lord seeth
90.
meet 11 . A man must wait for it. It comes upon all at certain 
times and seasons, "wherein it works powerfully upon the soul, 
mightily tenders it, and breaks it." No man alive, Barclay is 
confident, can honestly deny that he has been sensible, less 
or more, of this experience. 
(3) The operation of the Divine Light or Seed. c<*4. <7+t*>-
The intention here is, by a careful description of the 
Spirit f s saving work, to shew "yet more manifestly how widely 
we differ from all those that exalt a natural light or power 
in man; and how our principle attributes all to the mere power, 
Spirit, and grace of God. M The opponents here in view are the 
Pelagians, semi-Pelagians, Socinians and Arminians, who all, 
in several degrees, maintain that the saving change is attri- 
butable to self-effort.
The question Barclay conceives himself as having ,to face is 
thiss Assuming that two men have equal light and grace, and one 
is saved, and the other not, is it not because one improves 
the occasion, while the other fails to do sos is not then the 
will the determining factor? The answer is, that, to begin; 
with at least, the one is saved because he passively submits 
to be saved, while the other resists the saving force. AH 
the efficacy is provided by the divine dynamic; all that man 
contributes is pure passiv-ity. To such an inglorious role, 
no merit attaches. The will, at the critical point, is in 
complete abeyance. Afterwards, indeed, it is different. For 
the will, like the rest of nature, is recreated, and so a man
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comes to be a co-worker with grace,- which is the true meaning 
of Augustine's saying, He that made us without us, will not 
us without us. But "the first step is not by man f s working; 
but by his not contrary working."
The position is illustrated by figuring a man ao heavily 
diseased, that he can contribute nothing to his recovery, save 
only a passive submission to the physician's treatment., As also 
by the case of entombed and stupefied miners, too prostrate to 
take any measures for their deliverance, (this against Socinians, 
Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians ); and even unable to co-operate 
with the rescuers 1 efforts (this for "Jesuits and Arminians.") 
Prevenient grace must make men sensible .t,o£ their need and misery; 
it must also give the pull which lifts them out of it, if only 
the pull is not withstood. Nor is the grace of God frustrated 
even in the latter case. For in either case it operates effect- 
ually, though to opposite ends,- precisely as the same act or 
operation of the sun "softens the wax and hardens the clay."
In certain specially selected cases (instance, the Apgatle 
Paul) the operation of grace rises to the point of irresistibility, 
God permits no resistance. In this unquestionable fact lies all 
the truth there is in a doctrine of election or predestination to 
life. The opposite doctrine, of reprobation, will be seen by 
a careful examination of Scripture, to apply only to those who 
have outlived "the day of visitation."
"Thus both the mercy and justice of God are established, 
and the will and strength of man are brought down and
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rejected; his ^condemnation is made to be of himself, 
and his salvation to depend oil God only."
Such then is a true and faithful account of Barclay f s 
theory of the Saving Inward Light. It is obvious that he is 
bent on conserving not only the "Quaker peculium" but certain 
great religious interests, imperilled in his day, and not too 
secure in our or any age. Such are, the Universality of Christ's 
Deathj and of the saving forces liberated thereby; the operation 
of these saving forces outside the geographical bounds of 
Christendom; the inwardness of the change effected by them; and 
above all, the sovereignty and prevenience of Divine Grace , 
Any doctrine of salvation will prove ultimately acceptable and 
credible, only as it takes security., for tneae inalienable demands. 
In these efforts, accordingly, Barclay enlists ou» fall sympathy; 
and any worthy criticism will seek to be constructive,- and will 
direct itself to conserving those ends which Barclay has in view, 
and to which he endeavours to point the way.
Accprdingly our criticism, so far as destructive, will be 
directed to these points s-
(i) The use of the category of "substance."
tii) The arbitrary connection of the Sacrifice of Christ 
with the Seed.
(iii) Barclay*s comparative indifference to the evangelical 
history.
On its conservative side, our criticism will endeavour to do
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justice to the universality, inwardness and divineness of the 
Saving process.
These will "be the burden of our next two chapters.
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CHAPTER XlY.
Criticiam of the Fore-going.
(I) The categQry of substance.
We have seen that, in order to secure the exclusively 
supernatural and non-human character of the saving agency, 
Barclay has resort to the scholastic distinction of substance 
and accident. The Inner Light is a "holy thing,"- a "spiritual 
substance." TO us, with our exacter notions of Spirit, such 
a phrase as "spiritual substance" seems a contradiction irj 
terms. Spirit is Subject, not Substance. It might, indeed, 
be strongly argued that Barclay's use of substance is only 
figurative, illustrative and incidental. And certainly, a 
substance that "calls, exhorts and strives with" simple man, is 
endowed with a potency to which a substance can lay no claim. 
But I think it must be urged that Barclay's use of the term is 
more than incidental,- that it has a controlling influence on 
his view of the relations in which the saving agency stands to 
the nature of man. These relations, we hold, are personal. 
And when Barclay speaks of the Seed as "calling," "exhorting," 
and. "striving," his thought is moving in the field of relations 
fully personal,- relations which do not subsist between a thing, 
or substance, and the subject upon which the thing acts. But, 
as will be seen, the relations which Barclay conceives actually 
to exist between the saving agency and the subject of salvation,
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are not personal relations. One indeed, of the related 
terms is personal,- Be "calls, exhorts and strives." But 
the other is not,- the personality of the subject of salvation 
is, at the critical moment, reduced to infra-personality. 
Reason, conscience, will,- all natural faculty whatever, are 
"banished out of court; and the man is reduced as near as 
possible to the ^!level./ of a thing, as the illustrations of 
a heavily diseased man, or an entombed stupefied miner, con- 
clusively show. A sick man is a thing - for medicine to act 
upon. A stupefied individual is at the moment a material mass. 
And these are really the terms in which Bar61ay thinks of the 
subject of the saving process. He may speak as he will of the 
Seed as calling, exhorting and striving. But he makes no 
provision for the call to "be heard, the exhortation to "be respon- 
ded to, or the striving to find any co-operation. His theory 
of nonresistance, and sheer passivity, reducing, as it does, to 
zero, the human term of the saving relation, is really self- 
contradictory. ?or such passivity is after all a form of action 
Non-resistance to the "seed of God" implies a greater or lews 
degree of resistance to the "seed of the serpent,"- implies, in 
short a "good will." The psychologist, in £ranging his "law of 
reversed effort," which prescribes passivity of a sort, knows 
quite well that if the will is for the moment put in abeyance, 
it is only by an act of will that this is done. What ever 
account, then, we give of the saving process, we must still 
view it as carried through within the sphere of personal
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relations. And however we ascribe prevenience to Sod's grace,
it will not act as a force which annuls, but one that succours
\ 
and enhances, personality (Oman). A man is never more a person
than when he is being saved. It was when the prodigal "came 
to himself," that the saving process was set in motion,
AH things considered, we shall have, I think, to conclude 
that here is a case of false hypostasis. The attributes with 
which Barclay endows the Seed, or Substance,- viz., universality, 
inwardness, and superhumanity, really belong not to a substance, 
but to a relation:, - the redemptive relation- in which the soul 
to be redeemed stands to the God who redeems it.
(II) The connection IQ£ Christ's Sacrifice witji the Saving Seed.
Beyond a doubt Barclay sincerely conceives himself, and 
those for whom he speaks, as standing in the great tradition 
that connects Redemption with Christ's Sacrifice. It is the 
ultimate cause of Redemption, Christ "tasted death for every 
man,"- to that "satisfactory sacrifice" remission of sins is 
d«e; and by means of it, the necessary conditions of salvation 
are provided. These conditions are wrapt up in the Saving 
Seed,- which thus becomes the proximate, as Christ's Death is 
the ultimate, cause of salvation. The Seed is the "purchase of 
Christ's death."
These two - the Death aril the Seed - being separate, Barclay 
is hard put to it to establish their connection. AS a Christian 
he cannot ignore, much less deny, the connection of Christ's
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death with man's salvation. As a Quaker, he is bound to 
establish the operation of the Seed to the same end. He can 
only maintain "both, by making the Death the primary, and the 
Seed the secondary cause. But the nexus between the primary 
and secondary is only asserted; not shown to be necessary. 
Having put them asunder, he cannot join them together again.
This insuperable difficulty may well suggest to us the 
enquiry whether the two are really separate? We have found 
above that the Seed is not substance, but relation. ^hat, 
then, if we now say that this saving relation is somehow con- 
stituted by the Sacrifice? Barclay says the presence of the 
seed in man makes man cap ax salutls. What, then, if we say 
that man's "capacity of salvation11 consists in the redemptive 
relation in which he stands,- a relation constituted by the 
Sacrifice? Barclay speaks of the Seed as calling, exhorting, 
striving with man for his salvation. But surely these are the 
very activities which we ascribe to "Christ and Him crucified. 11 
Who calls, exhorts and strives, like Christ from the tree? 
And did He not say, "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men 
unto Me?"
(Ill) Barclay* a attitude ia j&g. Evangel ica,\ History.
We have seen that Barclay devoutly believes in Christ's 
Death as the ground of salvation. It is a sacrifice,- a 
"satisfactory" sacrifice, necessary for the remission of sins. 
The point is not argued, since Barclay is not conscious of any
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disagreement with his opponents here. He has no theory of the 
atonement to offer, least of all a "moral" theory. It is viewed 
as expiatory, and is regarded solely in its Godward aspect. 
It was the price of purchase paid (to God, presumably) to procure 
and distribute the saving seed. As a transaction between
';;'
Christ and God, it lies outwith human competence, and largely out-
with 
/human knowledge. What really concerns man is the position in
which he is placed, in consequence of the transaction; and that 
position is one and the same, whether he knows, or knows not, 
how it has oome about. As Moehler justly says, the Death of 
Christ might, in this view, equally well have taken place in 
the planet Mars.
More than once Barclay adverts to the parallel which 
Christ's Sacrifice offers to the Fall. Eaeh has its consequence,
- in the one case, the propagation of the evil seed; in the 
other the propagation of the good seed. And in «ach case, the 
effect has no relation to knowledge of the cause. Multitudes 
suffer from Adam's Fall who know not to what their sufferings 
are due. And similarly, multitudes may be, and are, saved, 
without any historical knowledge of the source of their happiness.
A word as to this "parallel. 11 The two events are not 
really in counterpoise, if only because the effects of the Fall 
are historically subsequent to the Fall; while the effe.ets of 
the Sacrifice (so far as the pre-Christian era is concerned)
-antedate their cause,- surely an anomaly! Nothing could show 
more clearly Barclay's indifference to the history. That is 
not a "historical" fact, or at least is not considered in the
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light of a historical fact, whose effects are antecedent to 
itself. One fears the conclusion is inevitable. We saw that 
in spite of Barclay's genuine belief in the Fall, he had no 
place to give it in his theory. The same must be said pf his 
belief in the Cross I The further proof of this will appear 
when we come to consider Barclay f s theory of Justification. 
That doctrine is the answer to the problem of forgiveness. TO 
Barclay, forgiveness was no problem.
Some qualification of our verdict on Barclay's historical 
indifference, might seem called for, in view of the fact that he 
insists on the necessity of believing the history ubi declaratur 
Moehler 1 s rejoinder, that the necessity is not made evident, is
h, I0f.
not unanswerable (vide infra). And Moehler certainly goes too 
far when he argues that Barclay can nowise explain the enormous 
advance in the moral standard which the Christian era has wit- 
nessed. For Barclay really allows for this, by saying that, to 
the Christian, a knowledge of the history is very edifying. If 
it is so to the Christian individual, it is so to the Christian 
community also. And to the edification of the Church, the 
improvement of the world is, no doubt, measurably due.
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CHAPTER XIII.
Tfte Sovereignty of Grace 
With a note on "Grace and Nature."
We have agreed that the values to be conserved are, the 
universality, inwardness, and divineness of the redemptive 
aottv-ity.* If Barclay f s scheme as a whole, appears somewhat 
artificial and doctrinaire, there are certain considerations to 
"be set against that. There is, first, his largehearted, pas- 
sionate, plea for the unrestricted scope of redemptive action, -
both in respect of its Cause (in the death of Christ), and in
communicated 
fespect of the method and means by which Christ f s benefits are/
(by the Saving Light). His starting point is empirical,- the 
universal diffusion of the Saving Light. From that he con- 
cludes to the universality of Christ f s death. A universal 
result must have a universal cause. The result achieved, 
must have been the result intended. His plea for the 
universality of redemptive action will carry our sympathy.
Next is to be noted his emphasis on inwardness . A man 
becomes Christian, not by being called such (either by God or 
man), but by an inward, real and renovating process. TO this,
also, we agree.
And finally, the means by which this change is brought
about, are wholly divine. Grace is sovereign, and prevenient 
and supreme. These three notes, universality, inwardness and
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sovereignty of grace, are the key to his thought. They 
command our assent. A true account of the saving process 
will find room for all Barclay ultimately contends for.
1. The Initiative of Grace.
We start our enquiry where Barclay starts it,- with what 
he calls the Seed. By means of the seed, all men are "stated 
in a capacity of salvation." He regards the capacity as 
substantial: we have placed it in a relation; "but, equally 
with Barclay, we hold that this relation is capacitating. He 
regards the Death of Christ as the producing cause of the Seed; 
we say that the redemptive relation, in which sinful man finds 
himself, is somehow constituted by Christ's sacrifice. Equally 
with Barclay, we hold this sacrifice to have a Godward or 
expiatory and objective side. But we do not with Barclay, say 
that the Godward side is averse from the manward side,- a 
transaction, so to say, on the other side of the moon. We say 
the two are essentially  tfia-a-g_i1q- Barclay regards Christ- 
for-us as essentially another thing than Christ-in-us,- "Christ- 
for-us" may remain wholly out of sight, while "Christ-in-us 11 is- 
doing His saving work. This We deny. It is the sight of 
Christ-for-us, which does the work in us. We might put it in 
this way. Barclay rightly recognises the objective side of 
reconciliation. He finds, or rather "makes," it necessary. 
But he is so concerned about the subjective side, that he 
"stresses and overstresses" it, thereby rendering insecure the 
______ ground on which he stands.
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Leaving Barclay, for the moment, we ask what is the object- 
ive side of the redemptive relation? The objective term of 
the relation is, to begin with, God in act and attitude of 
forgiving. N0w, what is forgiving? It is not simply flwiping 
off the slate." It is the moral act of one who does justice to 
the situation which sin has created. Sin forgiven is never 
simply sin forgotten - regarded as a thing of nought, dealt 
with by a wave of the hand, dissipated into thin air by some 
mental alchemy that leaves no trace of what it destroys. Sin
has to be dealtli/with as a costly reality. Sin is something1 us
that someone always has to pay for. Our .human experience leads/
to associate it with tears and blood. It is at least as real
as these. Its account is not to be squared without them.
6 
Forgiveness without suffering is an impertinance. "Without
shedding of blood is no remission of sins.'1
The "objective theory'1 of the atonement rests on some re- 
cognttion of this basal fact. And from that, it goes on to 
say that the One who most clearly, recognises that, and most 
entirely "submits" to that, is God,- God in Christ. Thus the 
divine .term of the redemptive relation is cons-tituted by the 
Sacrifice of Christ. TO adopt Barclay's phrase, and adapt 
it to our present purpose, we say God is "stated in a capacity" 
to redeem by the Death of Christ. And by the same act, man is 
equally "stated in a capacity" to be redeemed. The redemptive 
relation is thus fully constituted; and both terms of it, the 
divine and the human, are vis-a-vis to one another. The
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relation, be it noted, is objectively constituted, irrespective
of the attitude of the human term. In this sense Barclay
is justified in saying that the existence of the Seed does not
depend on knowledge of its origin. The redemptive relation
is not set up by man, and is independent of man's knowledge that
it exists. Hence Barclay is also right in claiming that the
Seed is wholly divine - i.e., the relation springs from a divine
source, in the heart of a forgiving,God. God's grace is
prevenient.
2. The Inwardness of Grace.
But this redemptive relation in which man (however ignorant- 
ly) stands, vJLs_-2t-ila. with God, remains a potentiality only, 
until the human term is activated to reciprocal response. The 
redemptive activity of God is baffled until man wakes to it. 
The redemptive activity, at first outward, wholly objective, 
must reach the subject somehow,.must overcome the torpor in 
which the subject lies , must kindle the latent spark, and win 
for itself the response it yearns for. Here lies the interest 
of inwardness t for which Barclay is so justly concerned. 
This desired objective, he clearly sees, is not obtained by any 
mere historical knowledge. It is not what God has done in the 
historical past, it is what G0d is doing now, in the living 
moment, that matters. That Christ has suffered, is historical 
fact; but the soul is not dealing with the fact that Christ 
suffered, it is dealing with the Christ Himself who suffered.
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It is dealing not with "mere" objective fact, but with living 
Spirit. And the response is therefore not one of intelligence 
merely, but of the total personality; a response, in kind, 
to the advances made. This means that the relation cannot 
remain merely that of Subject and Object. Personal relations, 
as we have seen, cannot exist on that level. For the Object, 
in its real nature, is Subject; and must, be known as such - 
i.e., subjectively. God in Christ must be and become, not only 
for us,- but in us.
Barclay sees that clearly; but not the way to it. He 
treats the matter not as one of personal relations, but (one 
might almost say) as one of biological process. The metaphor 
of Seed overpowers him. A seed works biologically. Living 
itself, it takes up dead matter into itself to form living 
tissue. This nowise does justice to the redemptive relation, 
which is still a relation of two personal centres. The 
prevenience and sovereignty of God are nowise impinged upon by 
this view. The initiative remains God's. That initiative 
provides a homecall, and a welcome, and a home for the prodigal. 
But it is still for the prodigal to rise and go. This Barclay 
cannot allow. He reduces his prodigal not only to rags, but 
to paralysis .
3. The Universality of Grace.
We have seen with what particular and passionate emphasis 
he pleads for the absolutely universal range of Redemption and
its means. So much so, that he will not hear of any restriction 
of the redemptive influences . "by want of acquaintance with the 
evangelical history,- thereby laying himself open to Moehler's 
jibe that the Crucifixion might just as w§ll have transpired in 
JJranus. or Mars. Yet not ^Moehler himself will contend, surely, 
that salvation is impossible beyond the bounds of Christendom. 
The picture of heathen dropping into hell, so many per minute, 
has ceased to be, what once it was, the staple of the missionary 
platform. But if so, and if salvation is real, on what terms 
is it to be attained by those prevented by untoward circumstance 
from hearing and embracing the gospel tidings?
We may dismiss such a phrase as "uncovenanted mercies, 11 as 
being tantamount to a refusal to consider the question at all.
We must likewise deny, even more strongly",: the theory that 
the heathen (if saved at all) are saved in a different way from 
the Christian. TO suggest, for example, that 3QOX£ "ffc&Sh" is 
the Christian way of salvation, while some other way, as obed- 
ience, is the way for those outside, is to betray a very curious 
confusion of mind. For the raison d'Stre of the gospel is held 
to be the impossibility of a satisfactory obedience. Strange, 
therefore, if the heathen were left to find salvation by the way 
of obedience, when the gospel is built on the proved impractica- 
bility of that way!
We fall back on what we have said of the nature of God's 
redemptive activity, and of that activity as constituted by 
the Death of Christ.
Two questions thus arise: HOW can that "be a universal act- 
ivity which is restricted by historical and geographical conditions? 
And how can a fact elicit response, if the fact itself is un- 
known?
Our answer to "both these questions is given "by saying that 
while, sub £pe_c_le. a^cternitatis T Christ's Sacrifice is sole and 
sufficient (on the principle that an Eternal Purpose is an 
Eternal Deed; what is purposed is "as good as done,") it is, on 
the side of time, and in the field of history, only one, albeit 
the supreme, instance of a perpetual, pervasive, omnipresent 
and omni-active xrak. redemptive activity.
The proof of that is that there is nothing in Christ's 
earthly history and Passion which is not recognizably human. 
The traits it manifests are those of humanity at its best. If 
new in their range, their combination, their ideality, they are 
still what humanity feels, and has ever felt, to be most truly 
its own. They are not something superadded to humanity: they 
shew humanity to itself. What is this but to say again that 
God has never left Himself without a witness,-^ the witness, not 
of "rain and sun and fruitful seasons" merely, but of the Love 
that "suffers long and is kind, 11 - the Love which suffers and re- 
deems?
In Christ, then, the real nature of redemptive activity is 
seen, working at full strength; but, once seen, it is recogniz- 
able and recognized as what is everywhere at work.
And if, working at full strength in and through the histori-
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cal Christ, it evokes the "obedience of faith," it works always 
and everywhere, albeit in inferior strength, to the same result. 
In Christendom, and out of it, it seeks the submission of the 
heart to what the heart feels to be divine. W I always knew 
Grod was like that! 11 exclaimed an African woman, as she heard 
the gospel for the first time.
We therefore say Barclay is right, when he says that a 
historical know/ledge of Christ f s sufferings is neither sufficient 
nor indispensable. Not sufficient, because the "obedience of 
faith" is more and other than acceptance of historical fact; 
and not indispensable, because that obedience is undoubtedly 
offered in unnumbered instances where the redemptive approach 
takes a form and guise other than evangelical. Barclay is right 
too (pace Moehler) when he says that belief in Christ is 
necessary ubi declarator- For the call to the obedience of 
faith is most urgent where its tones are clearest,- to wit, in 
the gospel. Failure to respond to this call, provided such 
failure is not due to faulty presentation, is presumptive 
evidence that disobedience is due to perveraity.
Additional Note on "Grace and Nature." 
The following note is added in the hope of making the 
writer's position clearer,- viz., that Redemption stands in a 
real relation of persons, and not, as Barclay defines it, in 
the unrelated activity of a divine "substance."
The position here taken is that man's initiative and freedom
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are presupposed in the gracious redemptive relation. If free- 
dom to choose the right is entirely gone, the case is hopeless. 
Once "Ephraim is joined to his idols, 11 he must be "let alone. 11
The case of the Prodigal is surely of crucial significance. 
The "beginning of his reformation is when he "comes to himself. 11 
Mark you, he still has a "self" to come to. That personality 
has a will i H I will arise." He arises; goes; arrives. He 
falls in with the generous terms of his reception; puts aside 
the will to serve; adopts the will to be served. He passes 
on-to the life of home and sonship, and all his future hangs 
on his adapting himself to the situation, as his elde* brother 
had never done. At no point does he cease to be a person. He 
realises his personality in the blinding moment of self-revelation 
This personality advances from stage to stage till at last we 
leave it on the threshold of fulfilment. Thus all is "of works."
But all is no less "of grace." Vfoen he comes to himself 
he realises himself as his father's son,- a gracious relation 
on which he thinks he may depend,- to some extent. With that 
attenuated conception of paternal grace he ventures forth. 
Grace meets and greets him royally, and ushers him into a realm 
of grace which is above all that he could ask or think. And 
it is in that realm of grace, ever more profoundly felt, that 
the future development of his personality proceeds.
Thus the situation shows the perfect concurrence of grace 
and freedom, of "moral independence, and religious dependence. 11
Never can he say of his situation, This is my doing; this
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I have wrought for myself. In the moment of forgiveness he 
stands absolutely dependent on his father. Is it to be for- 
giveness, or rejection? The word is his father f s - the final 
"word without reply." Could grace "be more absolute or unbought? 
And yet, if he did not stand there, the forgiving word could not 
be spoken. Could man's freedom and initiative be better render- 
ed?
And similarly at every later stage. The house-hold-word is 
Grace* "Son thou art ever with me, and all that I have is
 
thine." Here is fellowship, freedom and possession; the 
responsibility of possession and therewith the opportunity of 
"making good." "Grace reigns" - that,the saved man must and 
always will say. But it is not the whole story. If Grace 
reigns, it must have something to reign over. The father's joy 
is less in the exercise of grace than in the development of 
personality which grace fosters. It is a story of which hjanan 
freedom and divine grace are the warp and the woof.
Freedom finds grace "waiting." But grace must "wait" the 
penitent's arrival.
Grace without freedom is like maternity without offspring; 




Having dealt with the means and application of the redemp- 
tive forces, Barclay now proceeds, in the Seventh Proposition, to 
consider their immediate outcome - in Justification.
The salient points in the proposition are these J-
HAs many as resist not this light ... it becomes in
them'a holy birth, to wit, Jesus Christ formed , within. 
"Thus formed within and working His works in us, as we
are sanctified so are we justified in the sight of God. 
"(Justification) therefore is not by our works wrought 
in our will, nor yet by good works in themselves con- 
sidered but by Christ who is ... the cause producing 
the effects in us." 
AS for the argument itself:-
(i) A brief review of the Roman and Protestant doctrines 
shows that "they differ in specie rather than in 
g£ne_£e_," since, by neither "is justification 
placed in any inward renewing of the mind, or by 
virtue of any spiritual birth, or formation of 
Christ in them; but only by a bare application of 
the death and sufferings of Christ outwardly per- 
formed for them." (VII. sect. 2.) 
(ii) Thereafter, a statement of his own doctrine, in
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three positions, follows (VII. sect, 4.)s- 
i. The obedience, sufferings and death of Christ 
is that by which the soul obtains remission of 
sins, and is the procuring cause of that grace 
by whose inward working Christ comes to be 
formed inwardly. 
ii. It is by this inward birth of Christ in man
that man is made just, and therefore so accoun 
ted by God.
iii. Since good works follow as naturally from this 
birth as heat from fire, therefore they are of 
absolute necessity to justification, as causa 
sine qua HQ&.
Exposition.
The Barclaian doctrine of Justification can be briefly sub- 
sumed under these 4- heads,- (i) Christ for usj (ii) Christ in us; 
(iii) Christ formed within; and (iv) Christ working in and 
through us. Of these, (i) and (ii) relate to the antecedents 
of Justification, and (iv) to its outcome; while (iii) describes 
the state of Justification itself. But the state, its antece- 
dents and consequences, are so necessarily interrelated, that a 
doctrine of Justification must embrace them all in one view:- 
(l) Christ for us. This imports a substitutionary, expiatory 
view of Christ's Sacrifice. It "qualified the wrath of 
God towards us; so that our former sins stand not in our
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way, being by virtue of His most satisfactory sacrifice, 
removed and pardoned, 11 - in short, the view of the Atonement 
known as "objective. 11 (VII. sect. 3.)
(2) Christ in us. This is "the capacity of salvation a man is 
put in," through Christ's Death. Nor is it a merely 
nominal position; it is a real "capacity." It is "a 
measure of that power, virtue, spirit, life and grace that 
was in ChfLst Jesus," and it is "able to counterbalance, over- 
come and root out the evil seed wherewith we are naturally, 
as in the fall, leavened." It is not as yet more than a 
potentiality; but it ia. potential,- energy if only in 
static, not yet kinetic form.
(3) Christ formed within. Here we see "the capacity brought
into act." We now "possess a real, true and inward redemp- 
tion from sin," and are justified, in the sense of being 
made righteous, not merely declared so.
(4)Christ working within. The formation of Christ in us begets 
good works, as naturally as fruit grows on a tree.
Remarks. 
This brief review should suffice to shew us where we stand.
Barclay's is a doctrine of Sanctification rather than of Justifl-
i
cation. He pointedly equates the two processes - "as we are 
sanctified, so are we justified," by Christ "being formed within,, 
and working His works in us." It is one more example of what 
Jas. Orr called "the Germ Theory" of Justification; of which
his criticism is that "it is a favourite one with writers of a 
mystical and speculative tendency; but it manifestly shifts the 
ground from Christ for us to Christ in us, and treats objective 
reconciliation as unnecessary." "It is evident,*1 says Orr 
further, "that on this hypothesis, the doctrine of forgiveness 
is retained only in name. The old man is not forgiven, and the | 
new man needs no forgiveness. Between the two, forgiveness falls 
to the ground." This criticism, directed against Schleiermacher 
and his school, applies to Barclay, and is, I think, conclusive.
We know, of course, what Barclay would say to this, fie 
would vehemently deny the accusation of "treating objective 
reconciliation as unnecessary." "Our former sins do not stand 
in our way, being by virtue of his most satisfactory sacrifice 
removed and pardoned." (VII. ,3.) But how are we to know that : 
"our former sins do not stand in our way" unless by knowing that 
they have been dealt v*ith, and put away, in a manner befitting 
God? God is not "stated in a capacity" to forgive, until He is 
known to have the right to forgive. Forgiveness can be no 
arbitrary act,- the act of a sovereign exercising his nobilg 
nff icium. God's forgiveness must be a right forgiveness. Its 
regenerative virtue depends on that. I am not to be forgiven 
by mere fiat. If forgiveness is to come home to me with clean- 
sing force, it must itself be clean. A redeeming God must 
certainly be a forgiving &od; but a forgiving G0d must also be 
a suffering God. I can only take forgiveness from hands that 
my sins have pierced.
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Hence, no mere inward revelation, apart from knowledge of 
objective fact, can really meet the necessities of the case. 
Suppose God should inwardly assure me that my sins were forgiven, 
I should still have to ask Him, "by what right?" The inward 
testimony that Luther the monk had, was very far from reassuring I 
And if it be said that the great emancipating word, The just 
shall live by faith, came to him by inward testimony it must be 
remembered that the word, thus inwardly rendered, was not inward- 
ly derived; and the faith it prescribed, had for its Object, a 
historical Figure and a historical Fact.
But if it is true that a "germ theory," like Barclay f s, can- 
not sustain a doctrine of forgiveness, our sympathies are with 
him in his repudiation of a theory of sheer imputation. He may 
not be just to the Romanist doctrine, (Moehler says he is not); 
and he does not unite all Romanists and Protestants alike in 
one sweeping condemnation. But what he (rightly or wrongly) 
condemns in both is evident,- that Justification is "placed by 
neither in any inward renewing of the mind, or by virtue of any 
spiritual birth, or formation of Christ in them; but only by a 
bare application of the death and sufferings of Christ outwardly 
performed for them." (VII, sect 2.) It is the danger of anti- 
nomianism,- a danger apparent from the first, and all along,- 
that Barclay is out to guard against; and in this he represents 
a truly Christian interest.
The truth would seem to be that both the "germ" theory and
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the theory of imputation (starkly stated), standing at opposite 
extremes, are not so much false, as partial and onesided. A 
true doctrine of Justification should seek to unite both in such 
a way as to show that they belong together. Such a doctrine we 
believe to be the Reformation doctrine of Justification by Faith. 
"Christ for us" is objective fact. But it is not really grasped 
without a spiritual movement which makes it a subjective exper- 
ience. In its real nature, "Christ for us11 is one of those facts 
of experience which cannot be apprehended entirely from the out- 
side; but from the inside,- from the standpoint of Christ,- the 
subjective standpoint. This is the real meaning of faith,- it 
is the intuition which sees the Fact of Christ from within. That 
spiritual movement makes the Subject-Object ours. We shall 
never properly believe in "Christ for us," except, and so far as, 
Christ is "in us." This swift intuitive glance which carries us 
to the heart of the truth, and makes it ours, is no mere intellec- 
tual or moral effort. It is an effort often beyond the range 
of the "wise and prudent," and yet within the compass of "babes." 
It is an abandonment to the Object which the pride of the 
Pharisee forbids; but which the Spirit of the contrite finds it 
easy to make .
In this view, the interests both of the imputationist and of 
the "germ" theorist are secured. The imputationist wants se-
*
curity and assurance. He feels he cannot remain at the mercy 
of fluctuating feelings. He must have solid rock to stand on. 
He has it here,- in the objective fact, of "Christ for us. 11
The fact is there,- not of his making. He can ""bank on it." 
But all the more that it is all-important for him, he must 
grasp it, and make it his own. This he cannot do so long as it 
remains a mere fact,- an object of experience. The very force 
of the term, "Christ for us? should teach Him he is not dealing 
with a Pact, but with a Person. And this he can do, only on 
personal terms of interrelationship - M I in Him, and He in me."
The "germ" theorist, in turn, is out for reality. Forgive- 
nes&, as mere acquittal, leaves him cold. It must come to him 
with guarantees both of its moral worth, and of its potentiality 
for a real regenerative advance. He has it here,- in the 
subjective fact, of "Christ in me. 11 But this fact, too, is 
not of his making. It is rooted in objectivity. It is the 
Christ Ifoo is "for" me, Who is the Christ that is "in" me. 
And He was "for me" before ever He was in me. Let him dig in 
to that rich loam of fact. Let him seefc to realise what Christ- 
for-me meant and means. And as the objective yields up its 
content, the Subject will take ever deeper hold of his being. 
He must look outward, if He is to know Christ within.
H-
We have dealt with the process of Justification only as it 
appears within Christendom. HOW does it act outside that field? 
This is a real question, to which Barclay has an answer, which, 
however, we have found unacceptable. Is there any provision for 
justification,- in the sense of a redemptive forgiveness,- out-
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side the "bounds of Christendom? The answer to that is two-fold.
(1) The need of forgiveness exists, and is ministered to, out- 
side the Christian field. TO that, impressive testimony is 
given by the widespread resort to sacrifice, which is everywhere 
a feature of ethnic religions. Further, apart from religious 
institutions, the experience of forgiveness is sacramentally
 
conveyed, through human channels, in the common intercourse of men 
H To err is human; to forgive, divine," is a truth to which 
Christianity has given emphasis, not origin.
(2) It is not contended that, outside Christendom, either the 
need or experience of forgiveness is met with in anything like 
the depth of meaning it has for Christian minds. The appearance 
of Christ raised "both the need and its satisfaction to levels 
unknown before. Indeed it might almost be said that Christianity 
specialised in forgiveness. With justice, H.R.Mackintosh can 
say that forgiveness was the "new thing" about the gospel. The 
fresh exposure of sin which Christ made, has left an ineffaceable 
mark on ethical thought. The authority with which Christ "for- 
gave sins 11 was what most arrested, not to say scandalised, His 
contemporaries. By a sure instinct, Christianity puts the Gross 
in the forefront. Its treatment of sin and forgiveness is 
radical, and has no real counterpart in ethnic religion.
Til.
We must, finally, make some reference, however brief to 
Barclay's doctrine of "good works." He places justification
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as we have seen, in an "inward MrthM which "makes man just." 
From this, good works inevitably follow, and hence are necessary 
to justification, not as procuring, Taut as realising it. (CsUfia. 
sine qua nonj - Such works he will not call meritorious; yet 
they are such as "God cannot but accept and reward." (VII. sect.4)
I think there is no school of thought that would be prepared 
to deny this. Justification takes a man as he is, in abstrac- 
tion from what he has done or has failed to do. It regards his 
personality rather than his actions. It views his personality 
as not fully expressed in those bad actions of the part; but as 
having potentialities of good which have not as yet found their 
scope, and to the development of which, its redemptive efforts 
are directed, A man is "created unto" good works by the redemp- 
tive experience of forgiveness. So that, if good works do not 
ensue, the redemptive action of justification is defeated and 
falls to the ground.
The jealousy against good works, manifested in certain 
quarters, is due, (where it is creditable,)to the desire of 
magnify the freedom of grace in forgiving. But we must never 
forget that what is forgiven is, not sins, but the sinner,- the 
man himself. The individual, here, is the real. And a real 
man cannot be dealt with abstractly, as if he were an algebraical 
symbol of so many wrong actions done in the past. If symbol 
at all, he is symbol of immense, though latent, potentialities 
which redemption may eventually raise to a throne. In short
you cannot see a man without taking a look forward. Justifi- 
cation takes the forward look. Only by false abstraction can 
justification by regarded as anything but an activity of the Love 
that "hopeth all things. 11 It deals with a man who has a past,- 






Barclay^ doctrine of Sanctification is, as we have seen, 
contained in his theory of Justification. Justification and 
Sanctification are equivalent terms. Justification is to 
"make just; 11 Sanctification is to "make holy;*1 and holy and just 
mean the same thing. The doctrine is carried further in the 
next two Propositions (VIII and IX).
With the Eighth Proposition, ("concerning Perfection"), we 
advance to the question as to what limits, if any, are to be 
assigned to the possibilities of earthly growth in holiness. 
The gist of the Proposition is as follows:-
11 In whom this pure and holy birth is fully broughtforth, 
the body of sin and death comes to be crucified and 
removed ... So as not to obey any suggestions ... of 
the evil one; but to be free from actual sinning ... 
and in that respect perfects yet doth this perfection 
admit of growth - 
*and 'there remaineth always a possibility of sinning,
where the mind doth not watchfully attend to the Lord.* 
The thesis here is that the man, renewed by the process above 
described, (and nowise as fallen or in his natural state), may 
attain a perfection which, while relative and admitting of growth 
is at each stage complete. The possibility of lapse (not
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necessarily fatal) is not excluded; lout, on the other hand,
Barclay will not deny (though modestly disclaiming personal 
experience of it) that a state of absolute impeccability (non 
posse peccare) is in this life attainable.
The argument 13 directed
(i) to shew "the absurdity of that doctrine that pleads
for sin for term of life, even in the saints | tt 
(ii) TO prove the doctrine of perfection from Scripture; 
(iii) To meet objections.
Remarks .
Barclay's question is as to "how far Christ may prevail in 
us,"- in other words, is there any limit assignable to the pro- 
cess of sanctif ication whose beginnings we have seen described? 
Barclay contends that there is none, short of absolute perfection, 
even within the term of life. Not that it is in its complete
4
form at once attainable. It is a process. Its beginning is 
but a seed. But its growth, like the sprouting of a seed, may 
be relatively perfect at each stage. Sin may from the first 
cease to be actual; and the process may even advance till sin 
is no longer possible. Grounded in theory, perfection, in a 
relative degree, is confirmed by experience,- even by the author's 
measurably.
We lose no time in professing our lively interest in Barclay^ 
question, and our sympathetic consideration of the answer he
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gives. The qaestion is of vital religious, nay, human interest. 
It touches the very existence of sainthood; and sainthood is 
one of those values which even this rough world will "not 
willingly let die." The religious interest here is two-fold. 
There is first the consideration drawn from the nature of saint- 
hood itself. For sainthood is just the impulse of perfection: 
nor could it live, if its goal were a proven mirage? Sainthood, 
again, is militants hour could it fight, if victory, so far from 
"being assured, were not so much as possible? R.L.Stevenson 
speaks somewhere of its being our earthly destiny to fail, and 
our earthly duty, to M fail cheerfully. 11 This is good advice 
after the fact,- not "before it. A man will fight with only 
half his heart, if he knows he is going to "be beaten; and (if he 
is at all in earnest) he will "fail cheerfully," only if he 
hopes for better luck next time.
But there is another religious consideration,- this one 
drawn from the thought of God. TO put it bluntly, what is God 
about, if He leaves His saint thus in the lurch? The saint 
never thinks for a moment that his "high emprise 11 is a self- 
chosen task. It is a vocation, a high calling. Before ever 
he started, he heard the call; and he knows he does not take 
the journey at his own charges. Shall we rule out beforehand 
the possibility of a completely successful partnership? Shall 
we deny the existence of human devotion on the one hand, and of 
divine faithfulness on the other; or set limits ,to what the union 
of both may accomplish, even here?
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Not less than Barclay f s own, therefore, is our interest in 
the question of Perfection; and our belief in its possibility. 
What we have to ask however, is what provision Barclay makes for 
its attainment?
The guarantee of Perfection is, says Barclay, Christ formed 
within. This Divine Power having once, seedlike, found a mat- 
rix, proceeds to draw upon the elements of nature, and transform 
them into its own living tissue. The elements, at the vital 
moment, were all in abeyance. Reason had no say; Conscience, 
no vbice; volition, no function. But afterwards, a "will is 
raised up" to co-operate with the divine working; reason, 
informed from above, becomes serviceable, even for spiritual
knowledge; and conscience, a lanthorn now provided with candle-
an 
flame, is no longer an erring,but/infallible guide. Let these
functions remain true to the divine regulative principle, and the 
result will be, first, the flawless act, toangcxbtaBafc^ then, 
the holy habit,and finally, the character unalterably fixed in 
well doing.
This seems to go well, oiK*e it is started. But does Barclay 
really get it started? We have examined that question, and we 
have seen reason to set aside the Barclaian theory. Hence, 
while we acknowledge that Barclay describes a real experience, 
we cannot admit that he accounts for it. And his description of 
the progress of the saint derives plausibility, just because the 
missing element is now surreptitiously introduced.
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That missing element, in the case of Justification, we 
found to be Christ for us, as an object of consciousness. Christ 
for us was, for Barclay, over the hill, out of sight, "crucified 
in Mars." And we maintained that Christ is not in us, unless 
and until, Christ for us is an object of consciousness. He is 
never a "mere 11 object of consciousness. He must become Subject 
of consciousness, i.e., Christ in us. Yet even so, He does not 
cease to be object. And just as consciousness in general is 
activated and enriched by the objective world, so Christ in us 
is vitally related to Christ for us, and from that relation, /$ 
drawn all its richness and strength.
Barclay knows that by experience; but excludes it from his 
theory. Yet subtly he yields to the claims of fact, and by hia 
recourse to the now renewed human faculties of knowledge and 
action (reason, conscience, will) he opens the door to the inlet 
of real experience.
Therewith, also, he surrenders the certainty of any sure, 
unwavering advance along the way of holiness. By no "high priori 
road" is that goal to be reached. By a road "uphill all the way," 
by feet that falter, with vision often dim, the progress of the 
pilgrim is made. But it is made. And the reverence accorded 
to the Christian hero even here, is but a distant echo of "trum- 
pets on the other side."
(ii) Perseverance. 
The Ninth Proposition, ("concerning Perseverance"), touches
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the question, then gravely discussed, "but now seldom raised, 
as to whether a man who has once been a saint can ever cease to 
be one.
This Proposition adds nothing to the theory of the Inner 
Light; but is here inserted by Barclay to show the Quaker 
position on this vexed question. He shows persuasively how the 
doctrine of the Inward Light fits in with Scripture, and satis- 
factorily blends what might otherwise be regarded as its 
equivocal testimony upon the point.
The three heads of the Proposition are:-
1. God's grace is sufficient in each case, but is not 
irresistible.
2. It may be partially yielded to, and subsequently 
departed from.
3. Indefectibility is attainable.
The argument proceeds as follows:-
The advocates of Perseverance read the Scriptures in the 
sense that grace inevitably prevails. For the reception at any 
time, of genuine grace at once registers its recipient among the 
elect.
The opponents of Perseverance have no difficulty in adduc- 
ing scriptures importing warning and exhortation to those who are 
regarded as being in grace, but also in danger. r̂hy those 
admonitions, they pertinently ask, if the danger is unreal?
Barclay argues for instability in the early, and for
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stability in the later stages, and distributes the scriptural 
references accordingly.
With this common-sense conclusion the mind of Christendom 
now generally concurs. Hence the doctrine of Perseverance has 
ceased to be a living issue. But if, to the theorist, it has 
ceased to be even an academic question, to the Christian saint 
it is no question at all. It is one of faith's "blessed 
certainties. 1* For he knowa that "love of God which is in 
Christ Jesus our Lord; 11 and he knows that - 
HLove is not love
That alters when it alteration finds,
Or bends with the remover, to remove. M
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Part III.
The Christian in Fellowship. 
Chapter.
16. The Church: 1. Catholic. 2. "Gathered." 3. Apostate.
1. is a quantitative conception, with some justifi- 
cation in fact.
2. The utility of the gathered Church does not 
appear.
3. Barclay f s criticism harsh; yet relatively
justified where the Church is made an object 
of faith.
17. The Ministry: a question of Polity. Church and Polity 
to "be distinguished: a biological analogy suggested
18. Silent Worship: total exclusion of "the outward 11 a
dream. Suggestion of hypnosis. Relative value 
of different methods. A real place among these for 
silent worship.
19. The Sacraments: Right of the Sacramental in a religion 
of incarnation. Why only two sacraments? They 





From the consideration of the Inner Light in the Experience 
of the individual Barclay now turns to investigate the working 
of this principle in its social reference; and, first of all, 
in the "joint fellowship and communion 11 of the Church, or "body 
of Christ. His treatment, it will "be seen, still follows in- 
dividualistic lines. It is still the experience of the 
individual, though "stated in fellowship, 11 which he explores. 
He will show how the individual may "become a minister of the 
Church; and what are the individual's experiences in the course 
of its worship. The first of these is the "burden of the next 
proposition (x); "but as he rightly feels it to be "somewhat 
preposterous" to speak of office in the Church, without premising 
somewhat as to the Church itself, he devotes a few rather cursory 
paragraphs to this topic. (X.-t^zhS).
What Barclay says is "by way of defining three separate 
senses in which the term may "be used,- viz., the "Catholic 11 ; 
the "gathered;" and the "apostate" Church.
1. The "Catholic" Church is composed of "all such as God hath 
called out (ek kaleo) of the world and worldly spirit, to 
walk in the Light and Life of His S0n» M These comprise 
both the living and those who have "passed into their 
heavenly mansions." Its members might be "outwardly 
strangers, and remote from those who profess Christ and
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Christianity in words." They might be Turks, Jews and even 
blinded and superstitious "Christians;" yet being "upright in 
heart, aiming and labouring to be delivered from iniquity, and 
loving to follow righteousness, they have been enlivened by the 
Inner Light in their souls, and so secretly united to God." 
This is the Catholic, and also, the "invisible" Church,- since 
it is nowhere gathered into a visible body, and its members are 
known only to God. Outside this Church there is, indeed, no 
salvation.
2. The "gathered" Church is composed of those members of the Catholic 
Church whose lives have been cast in gospel places. Among 
such, the testimony of the Spirit, given through Scripture'or 
pre^ehing',- . answers to the testimony of the Spirit within; so 
that belief and profession of faith necessarily follow. "Their 
hearts being united by the same love, and their understandings 
informed in the same truths," they gather to worship God, and to 
bear a joint testimony, and "suffer for the same." Through 
this fellowship of worship and suffering, they become as one 
family, watching over and caring for each others interests. 
Ideally, this is the "visible" church; but, unhappily, its 
visibility has been obscured since the apostles' days.
3. The "apostate" Church. The eclipse of the "gathered" church 
has been due to the intervening apostacy. Apostacy arises from 
two errors:- (i) insistence on the absolute necessity of outward
profession and ritual initiation; and (ii) insistence that members
and 
so qualified are,/ought to be esteemed as being, real members
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irrespective of their inward state,- in other words, that outward 
profession and ritual initiation are necessary and sufficient. 
The root of the apostacy was the decay of inward life. The 
decay was gradual. The close of the ten persecutions ushered 
in the full tide of declflaion. A profession of Christianity, 
having ceased to be a reproach, became an avenue to preferment. 
Iti came to be a matter of birth and education, not of conversion 
and inward renewal. "Teachers and pastors became the com- 
panions of princes; and marshalled themselves in manifold 
orders and degrees. 11 "And so the virtue, life, substance and 
kernel of the Christian religion came to be lost.*
The Protestant Reformation has not retrieved the situation, 
through not being radical. It lopped the branches; but pre- 
served the root. Protestant churches are national rather than 
spiritual; and make their infants members by the sprinkling of 
a little water. But of all the errors of the apostate church, :-/ 
the most grievous is an unspiritual ministry: with which matter 
he thereupon proceeds to deal,
Remarks.
Before following Barclay into the subject of the Ministry 
we shall weigh what has just been said of the Church in these 
three terms. And first we must remark it as significant that 
his reference to the Church is so slight,- merely introductory 
to what he has to say of the Ministry. This is far from conson- 
ant with the Church's consciousness of herself, as the Body and
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Bride of Christ, the "fullness of Him that filleth all in all." 
This, however, by the way.
(i) The "Catholic 11 Church.
This appears to be a HE rely quantitative term,- the aggre- 
gate of those who are, as Barclay holds, in a state of grace. 
As such, the dictum, "Extra Bcclegiam nuj_la Salus" is merely an 
identical proposition,- equivalent to saying that only those who 
are in a state of grace can be saved.
Yet even as quantitative, the conception is not without 
value • -
(a) It answers to our conviction that, outside the membership of 
the Christian Church, and unaccustomed to use the stated means 
of grace, must be many of God's children, "not of this fold." 
They do God's will, and are therefore the "brothers and sisters 
and mothers" of the Lord. They belong, as Roman Catholics 
charitably say, "to the soul of the Church."
(b) It answers, in some degree, to the characteristics of the 
"Kingdom of God." This is certainly a vague and disputed term, 
whose relations to the Church of Christ have never been conclusi-ve- 
ly stated. The two, Church and- Kingkm, have been regarded as 
identical,- as simply convertible terms; or, again, as expressing 
the sajne entity in different aspects and relations; or, once 
more, as related instrumentally as means and endf But exegetical 
questions apart, there is in all men f s minds the inexpugnable 
idea of a secret union of good and honest hearts everywhere - an
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ideal union,not yet, "but still to "be, realised,- perhaps on 
earth, ("when man to man the warl 1 ower etc. 1*) but certainly in 
heaven; yes, even here sporadically visible, as when a good 
cause unites good men, if only for a time. This conviction 
inspires the reformer; and his faith, if often sorely tried, 
has not seldom been fully vindicated. TO this conviction 
Barclay's "Catholic 11 Church gives, if not a local habitation, at 
least a name.
(c) Finally, it answers to what we believe of the work of the 
Holy Spirit in the world. This, where it has not an explicitly 
Christian form, has at least an implicitly Christian tendency 
and effect. That effect is registered in what Barclay calls 
the "Catholic*1 Church. The name may be justifiable or not. 
But what it stands for is indubitably real.
(ii) The "gathered" Church.
On the basis of this diffuse and indefinite Kingdom of the 
Spirit, arises the "Christian 11 Church, strictly so called. It 
is, sgQjcs Barclay, constituted of those who, already born of the 
Spirit, hear and profess the gospel. TO their Inner Light is 
superadded the outward knowledge of the evangelical facts; and 
these, once heard, they by an inward necessity receive. They 
are those of honest and good heart, who receive the seed into 
good soil.
Thus it appears that both an inward and an outward factor 
are necessary to constitute a "gathered" Church. The inner is 
supplied by the inward and immediate testimony of the Spirit*
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the outer, by the same Spiritfs testimony, either mediated by 
Scripture or by preaching ("the testimony of some of God's 
servants raised up for that end"). Barclay aays that the 
inward and the outward testimonies will necessarily concur,
i
since the same Spirit originates both. Here we would seem to 
have a quite unnecessary reduplication, reflecting seriously 
upon the utility of the Church. And certainly, if the Spirit 
can be relied upon inwardly and immediately to "bring all things 
to remembrance," then alike the reading and the preaching of the 
Word would seem to be gratuitous. But the very fact of 
association, and particularly the invariable reliance upon 
external means of grace, is sufficient proof that exclusively 
inward communications have never sufficed for human need.
Further, Barclay 1 s assumption that the inner and the outer
 
voices are always concurrent, is not borne out by the facts. 
The Scriptures are not univocal; and the prophets do not always 
hit the sense of the spiritual community. Some standard, or 
norm, is required to which the sometimes divergent deliverances of 
Scripture or prophet may be submitted. Such standards are a 
quite invariable feature of every "gathered" Church. Churches 
vary, not in the possession of Creeds, Confessions and other 
declarations; but only in the greater or less degree of arti- 
culation their Creeds have received, and also in the spirit in
the 
which they are conceived and in/use to which they are put.
Crucial for every Church is the necessity of holding and
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setting forth the truth "in love." This means that the nature 
of the truth held is such that it can only be true for those in 
whom the Holy Spirit is. TO return to our oft-repeated theme, 
the Truth is not mere objective truth, and cannot be merely 
objectively held. It is truth as it is "in Jesus." It comes 
from the heart of Christ and cannot be grasped by those who are 
strangers to Him.
Thus we agree with Barclay as to the necessity of an inner 
and of an outer factor. But whereas he seems to regard them as 
duplicates, or, at best, as supplementary, we regard them as 
complementary,- as absolutely necessary to one another. And 
this means that the "gathered" Church has a double function,- 
that of instruction, and that of mutual edification in love. 
Her task of instruction is constant. Not only has she constantly 
to mint fresh coinage from the old dies; she has also to remould 
the dies themselves. Each new generation requires instruction 
in the ageless truth; but each new generation can only receive 
it in "its own tongue."
Her task of edification is no less continuous. It is to 
keep alight the fire of love, at which each may kindle his own 
torch. These two factors Barclay well knows to be necessary. 
He knows that "hearts must be united in the same love and under- 
standings informed in the same truths." But if he found them 
both vigorously alive in his own communion, as he assuredly did 
it was not because of his theory but in spite of it. It was
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"because the instinct of the community knew its own needs, and, 
regardless of theory, found its own way to supply them.
(iii) The "apostate" Church.
The apostacy which Barclay asserts, was assuredly in his day,
J 
and remains in ours, a fact to be deplored. The difference
between the "Church of God," so gloriously spoken of in NT, and 
the Church that history knows, is the apostacy.
According to Barclay, the apostacy is not of yesterday, and 
not confined to Rome. It set in long before the era of the 
Western Schism. Already its virus was in the veins of those 
who fled the seat of infection,- the virus of "pride and covetous- 
ness and sensuality" (the "lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye 
and the pride of life")
His account of the causes of decline seems - harsh,- more
so to us, probably, than it appeared to the age of Milton and
J 
Salmasius. A more sympathetic and understanding account would
reveal the difficulties and dangers of the developing Ecclesia, 
as well as the moral causes of her failure to surmount them.
The necessity of stating her Creed (even if only negatively, 
as Gore seems to think) in .face of encroaching heresies, was one 
of these dangers. The institution of a hierarchy to safeguard 
the sacred deposit was another. Both necessities tended to a 
certain externalism, the effect of which was to transform the 
Church from an aid to faith into an object of faith. And since 
there is but One Object of faith, the displacement of that, and
the substitution of the other, was an injury to faith from which 
it has not yet recovered. Creed and polity are means, not ends. 
Materialism has "been defined as taking means for ends. The 
apostacy may therefore be defined as the triumph of materialism. 
That the danger was there, we plainly see; that it was 
inevitable, we contend; that it was insurmountable, we deny; 
that it was not overcome, we admit. And that is the whole story 
of the apostacy.
But we cannot see that Barclay's way would have avoided the 
danger, since it is no other than the danger of living in the 
actual world. Barclay's is not the actual world, which he con- 
sistently disparages and vilifies. The Church has at least 
sought to serve the world she lives in. She has made her choice 
between service in the world, and" a fugitive and cloistered 
virtue." And if in serving she has stooped too low; if she 
has not touched pitch without defilement, the signs are not 
absent that she fedls her shame; the hope is not extinguished 
that she will retrace her erring steps. But if she finds her 





The salient points of Prop. X (freely rendered) are, these s- 
As "by the light ... of God all true knowledge in things 
spiritual is received, ... so "by the same ... every 
true minister of the gospel is ordained prepared and 
supplied in the work of the ministry; and ought to "be 
led and ordered thereby "both as to the place, persons 
and occasions of his ministry.
Having this authority, they may and ought to preach, though 
without human commission or literature, as, without 
this authority,they are but as deceivers.
As the gift was freely received, so they are to give it free- 
ly without hire or bargaining, far less for profit. 
Yet if called away from (their avocations) it may be 
lawful ... to receive such necessary temporals as are 
freely and cordially given by those to whom they have 
communicated spirituals.
These positions cover the four points, of (i) call and 
ordination; (ii) qualification; (iii) work, and (iv) mainten- 
ance; ,. regarding all which his argument is as f ollows:-
As to (i) call and ordinatfcdny- this is, like their Christ- 
ian experience (which it presupposes) purely inward and spirit- 
ual,without any human intervention. The validity of orders
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under the respective rules of Episcopacy, Presbytery and Inde- 
pendency is reviewed, and it is shown that, in these systems, at 
the "best, an inward spiritual call and endowment are held to "be 
but of the bene essej not of the esse of the ministry}, while at 
worst, it is contended that ministerial functions may be validly 
performed by one regularly ordained, who has yet no grace at all.
As to (ii) qualification, the chief and most necessary, is 
the power of the Spirit Who gave the call. Opponents state 
three requirements:- viz., natural parts; acquired parts; and 
the grace of God. But this last, they hold, is not essential,- 
the grace of orders being sufficient for the purpose. Presup- 
posing as much of natural endowment as that a man is "not an 
idiot," Barclay says that school learning, occasionally useful, 
is more likely to be hurtful than not; while, as for the third, 
grace,- it is absolutely essential, if for the Christian, then a 
fortiori for the minister, seeing that'Spiritual instruction can- 
not be given by one who has not himself the Spirit. AS for 
sacramental grace,its existence is denied. Then follows an 
examination of the usual curriculum in divinity,- the learned 
languages, the logic and philosophy and the school divinity,- the 
conclusion being that the devil has more language, logic, philo- 
sophy and school divinity than the best of them, yet remains the 
devil still. Pex ,C.pn.tra, of the powerful ministry of illiterate 
men, Barclay has the best evidence, in the effects it has wrought 
in his own soul.
As to (iii),the discharge of ministerial functions, the 
Spirit can be fully trusted to see to it that what is needful is
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done decently and in order. Church government, so called, has 
"been the occasion of as much tumult and bloodshed as the conjuefct 
of kingdoms is responsible for. "Orders" are forms and shadows, 
and for some of them no Scriptural name or precedent can be found  
The various offices named in Scripture have befrind them the one 
selfsame Spirit and power, and when this Spirit is given on any 
occasion.*: it ordains the recipient, there and then, for a service 
which is recognized by those present as genuinely inspired. 
This gift is not the monopoly of any man or class. It befalls 
according to God's free choice, and may authorise anyone, rich 
or poor, servant 'or master, young or old, yea, male or female. 
The HT names, (as prophets, apostles, etc.,) denominate not 
offices but operations of the Spirit, Who chooses now this 
individual, now that, as His instrument. The apostle today may 
be the prophet tomorrow, or may be reduced to the role of a 
submissive listener. The gift confers the office; the office 
infers the gift. Both go together, and both are temporary. 
This is not to say that there is none whose gift is not more 
permanently bestowed. The Spirit is thus found to endow some 
to a continuous ministry, of teaching or ruling as the case may 
be; whose ordination is tiJaerecognized by the Church accordingly. 
What is denounced is the caste distinction of clergy and laity, 
and the assignation of individual Christians to this or that 
order,- a fruitful source of injury;- since it makes the ministry 
a profession, and opens the door to that pride and covetousness
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and sensuality which we found to "be the worm at the root of the 
apostate church. With a stout assertion of the right and 
freedom of women to minister as welllas men, this part of the 
argument concludes.
As to (iv) Maintenances The minister has a right to be 
maintained, and the people a duty to maintain him as far as 
necessary. The ad hog minister is understood to have his own 
occupation, of which his ministry may be even a,serious inter- 
ruption. A "concern11 may be laid on him involving prolonged 
absence from his business and family; and his and their 
necessities are a proper charge on the church in whose interest 
the mission is undertaken. Such support is not however to be 
enforced. It is a minister's duty to give "spirituals," and his 
right to receive "temporals." But his duty is not determined 
by any consideration of his right. A man must do his duty
whether others do theirs or not. And if a forced maintenance is
so is a superfluous,-
unlawful,-/as is pretty commonly admitted by those who, whether
Papist or Protestant, exclaim against the clergy's excessive 
revenues. A true minister will not ask too much; nor is he 
likely to receive too little. That the church is apostate in 
this direction too, is reflested in the current saying, The 
Kirk is always greedy. We Quakers know this only too well. 
"I know myself, 11 says Barclay, "a poor widow, that for the tithes 
of her gedse, which amounted not to five shillings, was about 
four years kept in prison, thirty miles from her house."
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"We arc then, 11 he concludes, "for a holy, spiritual, pure 
and living ministry, where the ministers are both called, quali- 
fied and ordered, actuated and influenced in all the steps of 
their ministry by the Spirit of God; which being wanting we 
judge they cease to be ministers of Christ."
Remarks 
In this Proposition, "Concerning the Ministry, 11 we are 
dealing with a matter of form and polity; and there is a sent- 
ence of Barclay's which is very pertinent. "The form," he says, 
"is entailed to the substance, and not the substance to the 
form." This is unexceptionable; but, like a two edged sword, 
it cuts both ways. Barclay, too, has his "form," to which he 
is so wedded that he is apt to argue as if hia form "entailed 
the substance." The truth is, that when the substance we are 
dealing with is life, th§ form of its manifestation is not one, 
but manifold. That this truth was hid from Barclay and the early 
Friends (and not least from their great leader), is not, perhap§, 
surprising; it was hid no less from their churchly opponents. 
It is less excusably, still today, below the horizon of many, in 
spite of the fact that ours is an age in which the study "of life, 
its factors and evolving forms, has been ardently pursued, and 
16 which the results of that study ought to be familiar.
It is perhaps too much to ask of our ecclesiastics that they 
should apply the lessons of Darwin's "Origin of Species" in the 
field of ecclesiastical polity. But it might reasonably be
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expected that acquaintance with the phenomena of the Foreign
Mission should have yielded instruction. For in that field,
to 
as not/the same extent at home, the forces of fresh life are
shaping for themselves new forms, adapted, by a necessity which 
is not logical, but vital, to the world in which they struggle 
for existence. The native Churches are finding that "substance 
entails form; 11 and yet, though 1 the substance, there as here, is 
the same, the form is different.
In short, Church and Polity are not the same thing.
"Church" stands for a spiritual ideal entity, having no 
actual existence apart from polity of some kind; but yet not to 
be identified with polity, any more than spirit, because embodied, 
is therefore only a form of body.
"Polity 11 is a material thing, a matter of charters and docu- 
ments, of laws and officers. It is embodied spirit; idea 
become fact; and only not material, because informed with spirit, 
and used by Spirit for spiritual ends.
Those who decry polity, as Barclay is inclined to do, are 
thinking of the "Church," and forgetting that the Church must 
incarnate herself in polity, and suffer thereby the kenoaig^ that 
attends every form of incarnation,- since incarnation means liv- 
ing in a "lower degree of reality."
£hose, again, who are all for polity, are really thinking 
of polity while speaking of "Church." They clothe their 
particular polity w itfr the attributes of the Church. And since 
they rightly hold the Church to be one and indivisible, they
wrongly think their polity is the only Church there is.
Church and Polity are related as End and means. The End is 
one; the means, many. We must seek to reserve for life its 
multiplicity and freedom.
The ease of the Church is to be the vehicle of Christ. The 
aim of polity is to mediate Christ to an ever-changing world. 
The £as£. of the Church is unchangeably the same. Polity must 
change, if not with, yet for, the timds. Polity belongs to 
things seen and temporal; the Church, to things unseen and eter- 
nal.
It is, surely, from this standpoint that questions concern- 
ing the ministry must be faced and met,- a regular clergy or
j
a secular; free scope for various gifts; the ministry of women; 
stated or spontaneous forms and occasions of worship; free or 
liturgical prayer; music and so on. The Quaker ministry has 
undoubted rights; spontaneous utterance, its uses (and abuses); 
an unpaid ministry its own place and honour. But these, too, 
are but forms, which a living Church will know how to use, with- 
out restricting herself exclusively to them, or to any others.
Two questions, raised by Barclay, call for brief remark. 
The first, refers to an "educated ministry. 11 With much of what 
Barclay says, we must have great sympathy. But with what lies 
at the root of his objection, we can have none at all. He objects 
to learning, because learning has reference to "the outward; 11 
whereas he would recall us to the purely inward voice. This is
a mirage. NO knowledge of any kind, saving or other, is to be 
derived save from commerce with objective fact,- in this case 
the Fact of Christ. We have seen rea-son to hold that this is no 
merely objective fact. Like every fact of the personal order, 
it must be inwardly, intuitively, subjectively apprehended. But 
it is objective too. And as such it takes its place in the 
objective world, and needs to be related to all that comes to us 
from that quarter. TO be known as Subject, Christ must first 
be known as Object of Knowledge; and as such, must be integrated 
with the whole system of thought. The minister f s learning need 
not be his most conspicuous quality. It may suffice if he him- 
se.lf is able to turn, and to direct others, to the sources 
and authorities of knowledge required upon occasion, and for 
special purposes.
The other question relates to "orders" and ordination. Is 
there a "grace of orders, 11 in virtue of which a minister's 
functions may be effectively discharged, irrespective of his 
religious character and state, and without which, no matter how 
good a man he may be, the unordained can exercise no valid 
ministry? This question, in practice, mainly affects the 
administration of the Sacraments. fPor as regards preaching, no 
church maintains that ordination is required, or is able, to make 
an effective preacher; and none would contend that effective 
preaching is to be expected from one who is himself a stranger 
to grace,) The question of "orders" must therefore be postponed
till the doctrine of Sacraments has been dealt with.
On the whole question of the relation of a minister's 
character to the effective discharge of his duty, the commonsense 
of mankind may fairly be said to have arrived at a conclusion. 
NO man is fit to be a minister of the Church of God who cannot, 
in some degree, testify to an experience of God's grace. But 
the grace which he commends and conveys to his people, is a 
much greater thing than his experience of it. TChen he speaks, 
he speaks for the Church at large; and his words derive their 
weight from that fact. ^hen he visits the sick and dying, he 
brings no mere personal sympathy to bear, but "the consolations of 
Gody as these are known to, and made known by, the Church. He re- 
presents the Church. That gives his words and his presence a 
significance which they have not of their own,- a circumstance of 





Regarding worship, Prop. XI sets forth that:-
AH true worship is offered in the inward and immediate 
drawing of the Spirit, which is not limited to places, times 
nor persons; in its inward signification worship is con- 
tinuous.
In its outward signification (prayers, praises and preach- 
ings) we ought not to do it when and where we will; but 
only as moved thereunto by the stirring and secret inspira- 
tion of God in our hearts.
Such stirring is never wanting where needful - of which 
God is the alone proper judge.
AH other worship which man sets about in his own will and 
appointment, and can begin or end, do or leave undone, at 
his pleasure ... is but superstition, will-worship and 
abominable idolatry.
However it may have pleased God [in the past to distil true 
worship from these dead elements] they are now to be denied, 
rejected and separated from, in this day of His apititual 
arising.
The subject of Worship Barclay treats at great length, inter- 
estingly, on the whole, and at times with strong geeling; but in
a style somewhat repetitious and diffuse. Instead therefore of 
pursuing the argument closely along its tortuous course, we sh&ll 
endeavour rather to present an objective view of his theory, 
stript of its polemic excrescences.
What he has to explain and justify, is the Silent Worship 
of the Quakers, a form so remote from all that men are accustomed 
to, and so admittedly hard for the "natural man" to receive, 
that all the patience and candour of his readers, he pleads, 
will "be required to enable Shem to "begin to understand it, and 
perhaps, to practise it themselves.
He begins by seeking to remove certain misunderstandings:-
It will be necessary, to begin with, t^. keep in mind that 
the worship of God in gospel times is quite different from the 
legal worship of the O.T. No argument accordingly, against a 
non-ritual worship is valid that is drawn from Jewish practice.
Also, it is a mistake to suppose that Quakers are either ad- 
verse to the use of set times and places of worship, or inconsis- 
tant in resorting to them. Such appointments are an earthly 
necessity. Moreover, they do not constitute worship, which is 
a spiritual matter beyond man's control. Neither do they impart 
any special sacredness to the times and places thus appropriated. 
Such times and places are not more holy than others, only more 
convenient. These considerations apply in particular to the 
Sabbath day. What is solely objected to, is the appointment of 
particular persons to do particular aots at a particular time 
since these appointments involve laboured and artificial pre-
paration, and their discharge takes no sufficient account of the 
officiant's state or the hearers 1 necessities at the moment.
And finally, while testifying against idolatry and will- 
worship, the Quakers are not concerned to dyny, the possibility 
of real worship even in such circumstances. Good, though 
misguided men are found in all communions; and the mercies of 
God are not restrained,- though not to "be presumed upon,
\
These preliminaries premised, we now turn to study the 
Quaker procedure.
*
The gathering meets, then, by appointment at a given time 
and place. Its object is to wait upon God, or in other words, 
"to feel the Light and Life ©f God arising in the soul." TO
this end, silence is a needful prelude; but this "silence,"
not
be it noted, is/only a refraining from apeech, it is a with- 
drawal of attention from the flow of one's own thoughts, a 
turning of the stript and naked soul towards God. This turning 
is never in vain: for God is there, at the soul's centre, 
waiting to be gracious. A tide of sweet refreshing feeling 
arises, cleansing, cheering and strengthening and comforting the
soul with moral strength, and confirming it in the love of God./ *
tvwoAyy*,^)
and not only so, but in thus making contact with God, the soul
A
feels its unity with all others who sit where he sits. This 
tide of feeling may rise to the point of utterance in testimony 
prayer or praise,- an utterance which "is witnessed to" (i.e. 
finds response) in the hearts of all present. If comes fresh
and free,- not as "conned and gathered stuff;" it is what the 
Spirit haw inwardly and immediately given. Few meetings are 
altogether silent. But even those that are, if held in the 
true spirit, are refreshing and edifying. Some friends, 
nourished by this bread from heaven, grow to great stature, and are 
able to minister more or less constantly, and always with effect. 
But all, even the least practised, or apparently least equipped, 
are kept in mind that the Spirit may choose to employ them on any 
occasion, and must be ready to go as they are sent.
In these meetings a wonderful rapport of one and all is fre- 
quently experienced. The unspoken needs of the soul will he 
somehow felt as a common burden. The "condition" of each wait- 
ing soul is "spoken to," either inwardly or outwardly. This is 
the reality of communion*, A busy and preoccupied man, coming 
into a good meeting, will often find himself at once lifted up 
to the higher level to which the spirit of the meeting has been 
raised. And per contra, a spiritual man coming into a cold 
meeting will sometimes, if not without travail of soul, raise it 
to his own level. Not only so, but rude intruders will often 
be seized with the terrors of conviction; while outsiders of 
gentler nature will be gentlier .won,- "of which," says Barclay*- 
11 of which I myself, in part, am a true witness, who, not 
by strength of arguments, or by a particular disquisition 
of each doctrine, and convincement of my understanding 
thereby, came to receive and bear witness of the truth 
but by being secretly reached by this life; for when I
came into the silent assemblies of God's people, I felt 
a secret power among them, which touched my heart, and as 
I gave way to it, I found the evil weakening in me, and the 
good raised up, and so I became thus knit, and united unto 
them, hungering more and more after the increase of power 
of this life, whereby I might feel myself perfectly redeemed!! 
It must not however be supposed that all invariably proceeds 
quietly and smoothly. Apart from the unseemly interruptions 
of malicious invaders (among whom Barclay commemorates particular- 
ly the undergraduates of Oxford, Cambridge, Aberdeen and 
Edinburgh,- many of them divinity students - "the young fry of 
the ministry! 11 ) an inward and spiritual conflict is often under- 
gone. The old nature is there in all, resisting the efforts 
made to chain him down. It is essential for the unity of all 
that he should be chained down in each. And the sense, often 
present, of a process still incomplete, a battle going on and 
victory not yet won, will give rise to an inward disturbance 
which may have even bodily manifestation in groans and tremblings,- 
whence the name "Quakers, M which though given in scorn we are not 
ashamed of.
Among other advantages which our meetings have is this 
before all,- that the devil can have.no hand in them. Another 
is, that the rude interruptions we constantly suffer, such as 
have been referred to already, are not material. Any one of a 
thousand accidents would seriously disturb, if not prevent
altogether, the worship of the apostate Churches. From these 
our worship is immune* > It can even "be maintained in good 
measure in enforced separation.
In fine, our method ranks as a discovery, - or far rather a 
recovery,- of true Christian worship, enjoyed in primitive times, 
"but lapsed and lost through the great apostacy. The discovery 
was made by those who made honest trial of established methods, 
"but found in them no satisfaction for their weary and afflicted 
souls. Not even Scripture itself gave what they required; but, 
turning away and within, deaf to human voices, silencing even 
the last murmur of their own thoughts, and waiting only upon 
God, they found Him; - and one another.
Remarks.
It is impossible, one would think, for anyone to read wholly 
unmoved Barclay's account of the Quaker worship. It is couched 
in the vein of argument; by no means devoid of sarcasm and 
bitterness; yet it takes, at times, the melting tones of one 
speaking of things very dear, and at others, the fervour of the 
exponent of a great discovery.
In all probability Barclay will have readers who, if they 
cannot accept his theory, must envy his experience. For they 
know too well the frequent barrenness, the devastating tedium, 
of customary ordinances. TOO much, it may be felt, is laid upon 
the officiating minister. His "gift" - if he has one - is not
equally felt throughout. Or his character drowns his doctrine. 
Or his mannerism intrudes upon his ministrations. Such things 
have been the staple of satire in all ages, not least in our own. 
Though, happily, that is by no means the whole story.
But is the Quaker meeting itself, in its actual form and 
conduct, exempt from drawbacks? "What mortal weariness," says 
Moehler, "what vacancy of mind, and dulness; what sickly fancies 
most of their members labour under, during the silence in their 
religious meetings, God knows, and every man may infer, who 
has acquired any knowledge on this subject." This witness is 
probably true in its measure.
On the whole, when we closely scrutinize the procedure, we 
cannot easily convince ourselves that it is so wholly "divine" 
as i& made out. Barclay claims to have excluded the devil? he 
cannot exfurcate the flesh. The process of silence and waiting 
inevitably suggests hypnosis,- the state of extreme suggestibility 
induced by abstracting the mind from the flow of thought. This 
is not to say that there is no good use to be made of hypnosis, 
nor of the suggestibility it aims at. Q,uite the contrary.; In 
fact, it is pretty certain that the first object of a religious 
gathering is just to produce the suggestible state; and in
particular that the evangelistic meeting is "successful" or not
the
just in proportion as its promoters have/means of this at com- 
mand. As between the means adopted in the one case and in the 
other, it is largely a question of which is best adapted to reach
the end in view. In fact, it might be suggested that no 
exclusive choice should be made; but that the Christian Church 
should exercise a larger freedom in the use of means. In this 
connection it is significant that Otto recommends that a place 
should be found within the stated services of the Church, for a 
partial adoption of the Quaker form.
TO Barclay, of course, such a course would be as the unlaw- 
ful yoking of the ox and the ass. For it is of the essence o£ 
Public Worship, as statedly observed from distant ages, to be 
conducted by ordained officiants who are looked to to conduct the 
devotions (with or without book) and to supply the sermon (with 
or without a MS.) The two insurmountable objections to that, 
in Barclay's view, are the studied preparation beforehand, and the 
discharge of duty without the guarantee of any immediate influence 
of the Spirit on speaker and hearer. Both objections depend on 
a certain view of the Holy Spirit. Does the Spirit consent to 
work ugfter law; and can the laws of His working be ascertained 
and taken advantage of? In particular, have minister and people 
the right to expect that the Spirit will observe the law of per- 
iodicity, and be available as certainly and regularly as the 
Sabbath comes round? Barclay would deny this. But it would 
assuredly by many be as vehemently affirmed. And certainly, it 
seems to involve an unduly restricted view of prayer and its 
possibilities, to deny that it can secure either a prepared 
minister or a waiting people on Sabbath. Our Lord found no
difficulty in associating himself with the synagogue worship of 
the Sabbath day. And whatever use He made of "silence" (and 
it was probably of greater use to Him than we commonly apprehend) 
it was neither practised "by Himself nor imposed on his followers 
as a necessary prelude to utterance. The Spirit's aid would 
seem rather to be relied on, as equal to any emergency, even to 
providing the preacher with "supply of sermon'."
As for the preacher's state at the moment of discharging duty 
the same consideration seems to apply here also. In fact, a 
calm and humble reliance on the Spirit's faithfulness is needed 
precisely to save the preacher from that morbid introversion and
anxious expiscation of "frames," which were so common in Barclay's
of 
age, and/which manifest, and not too agreeable, traces are found in
the journals and correspondence of our elder divines. The 
preacher's state is not the only consideration, even if his feel- 
ings gave, as they notoriously do not, a true index of i_t.a*3Ebe.
Bunyan sometimes preached not less effectively when he preached "in
the 
chains1^ and slew/more Philistines when it seemed he must die
with them.
And what applies to the preacher, applies mutatlj-i muta.nd.flft ; 
to the hearer.
What is unsound in Barclay's teaching rests on what is 
untenable in his doctrine; while,, happily, what is acceptable, 
remains when his theory is discarded. We discard, then, his 
doctrine of two metaphysical natures, the one wholly human and
bad, the other wholly pure and divine. We have no means of 
leaving the flesh behind us, and entering a region from which 
the devil is almost geographically excluded. It is true that, 
in coming to God, we are coming to One whose ways and thoughts 
are not asoours. Indeed we must be willing to leave our ways 
for God's, and have our thoughts brought into captivity to 
Christ's law. We must be still and know that He is God. And 
we must still look.to the Spirit as our Teacher and Guide. But 
the means He uses are assuredly (even if not exclusively) human. 
As Abbe Huvelin said: "God, who might have created us directly, 
employs, for this work, our parents to whom He joins us by the 
tenderest ties. He could also save us directly, but He saves 
us, in fact, by-means of certain souls, which have received the 
spiritual life before ourselves, and which communicate it to us, 
because they love us. H
CHAPTER XIX.
The Sacraments.
Prop. XII. There is one baptism.
This baptism is a pure and spiritual thing, the baptism
of Spirit and fire, by which we are buried with Christ,
that being washed and purged from our sins, we may
walk in newness of life. 
Of this the baptism of John was but a figure, commanded for
a time, and not to continue for ever. 
Infant baptism is a mere tradition without either precept or
practice of Scripture (to warrant it.)
After a few preliminary observations on the sacraments in 
general, the argument is directed to shew that Christian baptism 
is quite distinct from water baptism, as aiming at a wort of 
cleansing which water cannot accomplish. ^ater baptism was not
supported by the example of Christ; nor is the command of
enjoining 
28.19 t° ^e under s to o$/asA baptism b£ water. Neither is it
supported by the unvarying practice of the apostles,- Paul in 
particular seeming even to disparage it. If any regular practice 
of the apostles can be alleged, it shows no more than a concession 
to the weakness of early converts habituated t.»; Jewish baptism; 
not were even apostles infallible, as their hesitant reception 
of Gentiles shows; and they certainly enjoined practices
(abstaining from "things strangled11 etc.,) of a temporary kind.
The argument, of which these are the main conclusions, con- 
sists almost wholly of discussions of texts.
Prop. XIII. The communion of the body of Christ is inward and
spiritual ... "by which the inward man is daily 
nourished in the hearts of those in whom Christ 
dwells.
Of this the breaking of bread by Christ with his 
disciples was a figure, which even they who had 
the substance used in the church for a time, for 
the sake of the weak. 
Abstaining from blood etc; washing the feet;
anointing the sick with oil was commanded with no 
less authority and solemnity ... yet seeing they 
are but shadows of better things they cease in such 
as have obtained the substance.
The argument proceeds thus:-
The body and blood of Christ, to the eating and drinking of 
which eternal life is attached, is no other than the holy sub- 
stance, vfifriftulum DeJL, which we described fully in Prop. V.and VI 
The consumption of this body and blood has no relation to the 
act of eating bread and drinking wine, which was a memorial 
instituted for the purpose of commemorating Christ's death at 
Jerusalem, until He should (spiritually) come into their hearts 
after which no such ceremonial commemoration would be necessary.
AS a matter of fact, the foot-washing was even more solemnly, 
and with greater particularity, enjoined than was the memorial 
feast.
Remarks*
Barclay f s idea clearly is that the sacramental system, 
whether of the Catholic or Reformed Church,is a morbid develop- 
ment, due to the intrusion of the natural man on the domain of 
the spiritual. Such a development is clearly traceable in O.T., 
where the condescension of God in adapi^g the means of grace to 
human weakness was abused by gratuitous additions. Thus the 
object of the divine dispensation was thwarted. Its merely 
typical and pre-figurative intention was lost, in the idea that 
ritual itself was religion.. The same development, due to the 
same cause, and conducing to the same mistaken view of ritual, is 
evident in the apostate Church of the Christian era. Rite 
becomes an^ end in itself: the shadow replaces the substance. 
And since no human inventions can command universal veneration, 
rites become a fruitful cource of division.
We cannot lightly dismiss this view, which indeed has received 
support from the closer study of the sacred text (rendering 
dominical institution less certain); and also, from our larger 
knowledge of the Hellenistic influences under which the Catholic 
idea of the sacraments was shaped.
Barclay opens with a shrewd thrust. The name "sacrament 11 
is not found in scripture, but was borrowed in an age of decadence
from the military heathen oath. If all parties would agree to 
drop the unscriptural term, and use in its place any other term 
having Scriptural precedent, they would at once see that the 
institution of two, and only two, sacraments is unwarranted. 
what the sacraments, lay definition, are supposed to do (as, to 
confer grace, or to signify grace, or to seal grace) is proposed 
and secured "by bther means, "both specified and unspecified, as 
well.
In this trenbhant style Barclay disposes of the sacramental 
idea, "before passing on to Submit the two sacraments to particular 
enquiry. Before proceeding further, we may, therefore, pause 
to consider what exactly is the nature of a sacrament.
In the catholic view, the Sacraments, whether two or seven, 
take their place as elements integral to the entire system of 
religion. AH true religion, nay, life itself, is sacramental. 
The Word must ever take Flesh, that it may dwell among us. Pafe 
Barclay, it is not Spirit alone we have to deal with; nor is 
"flesh1* simply to be discarded and disclaimed. What our ex- 
perience yields, is the inexplicable union of both, in a 
teleological system under which flesh is viewed as instrumental 
to Spirit. And it is because Christianity sets forth this view
so clearly and completely,- it is because, in short, it is the
says 
religion of Incarnation,- that, as Harnacl^ Christianity is not
so much a religion, as religion itsfclf.
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But this view, which seems, on the one hand, favourable to 
the maintenance and observance of the Sacraments, might seem no 
less, on the other, to threaten their position of privilege. For 
if all life, all rejigion, is organised on this sacramental 
'basis, why two sacraments only, or seven, or indeed any specified 
number? If tradition is advanced, we should have to ask, What 
tradition? If dominical institution,- then why is not foot- 
washing admitted? If apostolic authority,- that is uncertain; 
it could also be pled for abstention C H I thank God I baptised 
none among you")? and it is not immune from criticism, as 
Barclay shows, in certain other important matters.
The question ultimately resolves itself, I think, into 
this: Is Grace so linked with Sacrament, that without it, Grace 
would be withheld? TO answer that, we must first ask, What is 
Grace, and how is it mediated?
Grace is, first and always, the "grace of our Lord Jesus Chri«t"- 
i.e., the Divine Goodwill which seeks to establish and maintain 
the fellowship of Christ and the souli of man. A man is "in 
grace," when he is "in Christ, 11 and Christ is "in him." 
This is grace expressed in general terms. But grace has part- 
icular applications and determinations. It is relative to need, 
and is as particular and diversified as the needs it ministers to. 
It will be seen that the two sacraments of the Reformed Churches 
have reference to the first form of grace; the Roman 7, giving 
fuller recognition to the second. 
And how, we ask, is grace mediated? It is mediated to faith.
i6ff.
Is faith always conscious? The answer to that cannot be simply 
given. Consciousness is a wide term, embracing degrees, 
shading down from the focal centre of clear consciousness to the 
peripheral regions where impression is slight and unattended to, 
if not wholly beyond attention, This last is the region of the 
subconscious, or even the unconscious,- to which ao much study 
is now given, and to which, on any showing, the motive forces 
are largely to be referred. What cannot be denied, however, 
is that the subconscious is not out of all relation to the con- 
scious, the uncontrolled to the seat of control. The general 
attitude and direction of the mind still prescribes its limits.
For our present purpose that means that clear conscious 
faith determines the attitude of the soul to Christ,- turns the 
camera of the mind, as it were, in His direction, so that the 
influences arriving on the soul, whether clear or subconscious, 
are still the influences of Christ, Consciously or unconscious-
£»iv««*r«brf
ly received, the accesses of grace are mediated to faith.
^
The sacraments of the Reformed Church are subservient to 
clear consciousness only. Those of the Roman Church take more 
account of the peripheral elements. This seems to account for 
what is true in the fii flpazs. flpe.rat-.Q. theory. It refuses to 
limit to clear consciousness and to intellectual processes, the 
accesses of divine grace.
The function of Sacraments in the process by which grace is. 
mediated to faith, now begins to become clear. Their function is 
the arousal of faith. As Calyin says (inst. iv.14) "A sacra-
ment is an External sign whereby God represents and testifies 
His good will to us, in order to sustain the weakness of our 
faith, which is so weak and exiguous that, unless it is under 
propped and buttressed, it is liable to waver and totter (q.uot.
*
by Pat.Giff.422). This auxiliary function is eminently sub- 
served by their simple, dramatic and suggestive form, constitut- 
ing them a swift effective mode of appeal to minds and hearts of 
every calibre. In them, therefore, Christ is "represented, seal- 
ed and applied" to the believer,- because through them faith is 
strengthened to see and embrace the Redeemer.
This function, it is evident, is no exclusive prerogative of 
the sacrament. There is not "a grace of the sacrament, 11 if by 
that is meant something given in, and by way of, it alone. 
Grace remains one and the same by whatever channel it flows. 
Rightly therefore the Reformers allowed no efficacy to the 
Sacrament which was not already in the Word; and rightly they 
forbade an administration in which the Word had no place - were 
it even only the "words of institution. 11
We have now briefly dealt with these topics,- the Sacramental 
idea, and ita right within a spiritual religion; its relation to 
Qra.ce on the one hand; and to Faith on the other. Some ques- 
tions of detail remain for notice,- (i) Why two sacraments? 
(ii) Why one is administered to infants and (iii) why the other 
is not.
(i) Why two sacraments? The answer is simple. 
Grace of Christ is a form of redemptive activity, and as such, 
addresses itself to the two supreme needs of the soul,- its 
deliverance (a) from the guilt, (b) from the power of sin. 
The Sacrament of Baptism addresses iself primarily to the supply 
of the first need; that of the Supper, to the second. The 
water of baptism indicates the need, and imparts the assurance, 
of clsansingjOf forgiveness, pardon and acceptance. Hence it 
is administered once, and once only, in a Christian's life-time. 
For as true love, once declared, is not withdrawn, so the for- 
giving love of Christ, declared and sealed in baptism, needs no 
further declaration. Baptism does not give forgiveness, else 
it must often b? repeated. It pledges once for all the for- 
giving love of Christ - it attaches itself to the idea of 
reconciliation, which, when once effected, is complete.
But if reconciliation is the act of a moment, the life of 
fellowship which it initiates, is continuous. Hence the sign- 
ificance of the bread of the communion-table, and of its frequent 
recurrence. The believer's need is that of strength - the 
Saviour's grace addresses itself to that need. The Christian 
must grow, and to grow he must be nourished. The needs of the 
soul, like that of the body, are recurrent and must be often 
supplied. Of all this the Supper is a lively representation. 
His body grows by food; his soul, by communion,- for "personality 
is the proper food of personality,*1
Thus the two sides of the redemptive relation,- its objective
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( W I in Him") and subjective ("He in me"),are fully and sufficiently 
represented in the two sacraments. Anymore, only blurs the 
conception; any less, would not do the relation justice.
(ii) Next we touch the subject of Infant Baptism. Why is 
Baptism administered to infants and why only to the infants of 
members? The answer to this introduces the conception of the 
family, as applying both to the Church as a whole, and to the 
households it includes. The Church is a family. Is it also 
a family of families? The answer, assuredly, is yes. The 
existence of the family as an economic unit, is forcing itself 
ever more assertively on the minds of economists. It is the 
main and most urgent factor to be considered in any attempt to 
reach what is called the "standard of life. 11 It is no less 
assertive in the sphere of religion. The Church cannot ignore 
the family, even if she would. What then is her attitude to 
the Christian household? Shall it be merely a hopeful and 
charitable expectation that the children of Christian parents 
shall ultimately "adopt 11 the religious views of their parents? 
It is that; but it is more. It is an objective declaration 
that the infants of Christian parents, infants whose personality 
is so to speak, in grem^o,- not as yet detached from the per- 
sonality of the parents, are like their parents, "in Christ.*1
And the restriction of baptism to the infants of members is 
further, connected with what was said above, of the Reformers 1
refusal to separate ^ord and sacrament. Infants of Christian 
parents, the subjec% of "baptism, are subjects also of Christian 
instruction. Caution is taken of the parents that "the nurture 
and admonition of the Lord* will "be subjoined to the administra- 
tion of the rite. Inhere such guarantees cannot be given, the 
rite is properly withheld.
(iii) And why, finally, is one sacrament only administered? 
If baptism, why not also the Supper? The answer lies, it would 
seem, in the distinctive natures of the two ordinances,- the 
one^XX largely objective ("we in Christ") and the other, so large- 
ly subjective .("Christ in us"). The infant's life is largely 
objective. "The baby new to earth and sky ... hath never 
thought that This is I." Not till much later and only gradually, 
"rounds he to a separate mind," and attains a will which he can 
make Another's. The withholding of the right of the Table is 
also, no doubt, partly disciplinary and paedagogic. AS the 
studious school boy is incited to progress by seeing the privi- 
leges of the Sixth Porm; or the athletic spurred on by hope of 
achieving the school "cap," so the adolescent Christian's parti- 
cipation is deferred, not because he is held devoid of grace, but 
because his powers are trained, his intelligence .aroused, and 
his desire excited, by the prospect of a s&ep to be taken in 
which his free personality is felt to be involved.
i6'6.
These views of the Sacrament may seem loose and "low church, 
as compared not only with Sacramentarian views still so strongly 
urged, but even with those of the Reformers, to whom "sealing 
ordinances" meant so tffiten terms of Reparation from their 
brethren. We may humbly think that we lhave learned something 
that was hid from our fathers. For Ws, "terms of communion" are 
not terms of separation. For as Fairbairn truly says, "parti- 
cular churches do not break the unity of the Catholic Church 
visible, while their faith and love" - or, as we may here say,- 
their common participation in the Grace of Christ,- "constitute 
the unity of the invisible."
Part IV.
The Christian in Society. 
Chapter.
20. Toleration: impossible to "ride the marches" "between
Authority and Freedom, A working corn-promise now 
reached in front-rank states. Social value of 
"conscientious objection."
21. Customs and Recreations. Barclay here treats a question 
of Art as one of Morals. Place of Art in life. 
Jesus and Art.
22. Oaths and War. Former question practically settled; 
latter, not. Another case of conflict "between 





Prop. XIV. G0d hath assumed to Himself the dominion of
the conscience and can alone instruct and 
govern it. 
(It is therefore unlawful for the civil magistrate) to
force the conscience of others.
Provided always that conscience is not pretended in 
prejudice of the neighbour's rights, or (in 
action inimical to) human society, in which 
case impartial justice is to "be administered. 
This subject having been "of late years so largely and 
learnedly handled" is treated with brevity.
Conscience is a persuasion of the mind, following on a conviction 
of the understanding as to the "truth or falsity of anything. 11 
Its authority, though fallible, is supreme over a man's actions. 
The question here raised concerns a man !s actions only in the 
sphere of religion,- i.e., practically, freedom of worship. Here 
liberty is claimed,- but only within the bounds of common morality 
("the moral and perpetual statutes generally acknowledged by all 
Christians") and not at all to condone such excesses as those 
of the Anabaptists of Munster. The question of Church discipline 
is also saved; i.e., our question solely regards the proper 
direction of the force residing in civil magistracy. It is
denied that this force has application in the field of religious 
conviction and worship.
The reasons are:- (i) The magistrate as such has no qualification 
for judging. If even the chief members of the church had no 
comnission to "lord it over the conscience" of their "brethren, 
how much less the civil magistrate?
(ii) The pretended power of the magistrate is 
inconsistent with the nature of the gospel. God can be wor- 
shipped in spirit and truth only "by a willing and persuaded 
people.
(iii) It is also contrary to reason and the 
law of nature. Reason cedes to reason, not to force. 
The opposite view lands in absurdity. If magistrates have a 
right and duty to coerce religious freedom, they sin by omission 
if they do not persecute. The crimes of the Inquisition, the 
Huguenot wars, and the shame of Luther (in the matter of 
Carolostadius) and of Calvin (in that of Servetus-) directly 
follow from this view.
The ground of persecution really lies in an unwillingness to 
suffer. Short of persecution, this unwillingness takes many 
forms, of evasion flight and concealment. The true spirit of 
suffering scorns all subterfuge. The Quakers have shown itfc 
now for 25 years, and their testimony is at least reaching the 
hearts of "their superiors."
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Remarks.
Barclay's contention may be said to be in principle ad- 
mitted "by all states of the front rank. Where it is not yet 
a working policy, where religious conviction is oppressed, the 
offending party is less likely to be the magistrate than the 
priest,- or, if the magistrate, then only as the tool of a 
priestly caste jealous of privilege. V^hereyer the issue be- 
tween civil authority and religious freedom has "been faced, and 
fought out, the settlement has been reached on the lines which
/
Barclay prescribes. In other words, there is consensus that
a 
there is/region of human rights over which the civil authority
has no jurisdiction; and any infringement of which is not 
conducive to those interests of law and order which the magistrate 
is specifically appointed to uphold.
The course of progress which has led to this result has been 
dual. On the one hand, the territory in which freedom holds 
sway has been more exactly defined, and more widely extended. 
On the other hand, the power wielded by the magistrate has 
shifted its seat. As someone has said, there are no subjects 
now, only citizens. The ruler holds power by consent of the 
governed, and that consent is not long to be relied upon unless 
it is free, - the fruit of conviction.
The consensus above noted takes the form of a rough 
practical agreement between both parties. The party of the one 
part agrees that in asserting his conscientious convictions he 
will be considerate of the rights of others. The party of the
other part agrees that one so acting shall have all reaona"ble 
liberty allowed him. Some such concordat between the rights of 
conscience and those of the civil authority is probably all that 
is to be looked for. No rigid demarcation of the marches'.is 
possible. It is a question of practical politics - a matter 
of tact,- the instinct to govern wisely.
Such provisional, ad hoc arrangements are of the nature of 
the case. For society is in a perpetual flux;;. Institutions 
do not abide for ever. They begin; they grow; they decay and 
die. The laws that conserve them become obsolete, and so, 
unjust: summa lex becomes summa injuria. Among the corroding 
influences to which they are exposed is the criticism of con- 
science. The institution demands a service, a submission,- 
the service or submission she has always demanded, and always 
hitherto received. But today conscience can no longer give it. 
"Here I stand. I can no other. M What then is to be done?
Society hasilearned (perhaps) to see in conscience, even in 
the inconvenient and stubborn form of conscientious objection, 
one of her greatest assets. £fae is quick to suspect the counter- 
feit,- is perhaps never quite sure she has the real thing before 
her till she sees it suffering. It is her coarse but effective 
rule of thumb. The discovery stirs her broad awake,- not in 
the sufferer's interest, but in her own. For she knows that 
the good that conscience has at heart is a social good - her own 
good. So that oppression of conscience is a social injury 
suicidal.
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Conscience, then, the Inner Light, is by no means unrelated 
to the outer world. ^hat she pleads for in her own right is a 
social good. H0w comes it that a principle which, according to 
Barclay, has nothing to do with the "outward" should "be so 
vitally related to the outwr world? Barclay's theory is, that 
the coincidence is of God. We would not deny that it was of 
God, only that it is coincidence. For the good of the world is 
not secured by one who has not the world's good at heart; but 
by one who, looking at the world, sees it as Christ saw it, and 




Prop XV. The chief end of religion is to redeem men from
the spirit and vain conversation of the world and 
to lead into inward communion with God. 
Therefore all vain customs and habits of the world, 
"both in word and deed, are to "be rejected and
forsaken.
Abiding in the evangelical Spirit, the blessing of God 
attends on necessary action undertaken for out- 
ward sustenance.
Argument: The principles of true religion, hitherto traced in 
the fields of doctrine and worship, are now followed into the 
field of society and social intercourse. They prescribe in 
general a spirit of sobriety, gravity and godly fear, which com- 
men&« itself to all the judicious; and this praise oil the whole 
the Quakers have extorted, That they are a pure and clean people 
as to the outward conversation. But fidelity to these princip- 
les carries us beyond the range of what is generally approved 
by sober judges, into certain singularities of speech and 
behaviour, which, being of a conspicuous nature, have raised a 
strong animus against us;and of these some justification is now 
to "be given.
17*.
Thus, we forswear all complimentary titles, phrases, postures 
and ceremonies; superfluities of dress and ornament; games, 
sports and dramatic representations; oaihs, whether conversa- 
tional or judicial; revenge and resistance to evil generally, 
and, very specially, ^ar. In this, no levelling or communistic 
principles are at work. We recognise private property, degrees 
of rank and station, and the differences of manners, education, 
habiliment, victual, and so on, that naturally go with such 
distinctions. A man serves God according to his degree. "What 
is solely condemned is the superfluous, the prodigal and the pro- 
fuse, in each rank and relation.
Among these, are empty titles of honour, having no "basis 
in moral worth, and all the worse in that they attribute worth 
where there is, or may be, none. They spring from the root of 
pride. The falsity of addressing an individual as YOU, instead 
of by the singular, Thou, arises from the same cause; as also, 
kneeling, bowing and uncovering the head in salutation. Such 
postures express a homage which is only due to God. Refraining 
from them in any case argues less incivility that does the 
treatment it exposes us to. Ag to vanity and superfluity in 
dress - clothes are a consequence of the fall; it is incon- 
gruous to take a delight in anything so originated. The uses 
of clothing are two - to cover nakedness; and to keep out the 
cold. Fashion consults not these, but other ends. Its 
vagaries are contrary to Scripture,- hard, then,it is, that
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those who seek to follow Scripture is this matter should be con- 
demned by those who make Scripture their (pretended) rule. Games 
sports and plays come under the same condemnation - they differ 
in no respect from the amusements of the heathen. The need of 
recreation is not denied. But the necessary business of life is
If If
itself a relaxation of the mind from the more serious duties; 
and if more is needed, there are innocent diversions to hand,- 
such as visiting friends; reading history; sober discussion; 
gardening; mathematical studies, etc., etc. And even in these 
pursuits, the love of God mingles itself,- just as, in human love, 
the image and influence of the beloved are never far awayl As 
for swearing - both profane and judicial (particularly the last; 
for none would defend the first) it is Scripturally forbidden. 
It suggests a double standard of truth. If it is said, Paul 
swore ("Before God I lie not" etc) the answer is,this is not 
swearing; and if it is, the question is not what Paul did,but 
what Christ forbade. The experience of the Netherland States 
where the necessity of the oath has been these 100 years relaxed 
in the case of conscientious objectors, shows that the state has 
taken no prejudice thereby, but rather the reverse. Finally 
there is the matter of War, which also, like judicial oaths, 
is strangely upheld by professed followers of the Prince Of 
Peace. The prohibition of oaths and of revenge was given at 
the same time, and history shows that in practice, both stand 
or fall together. The best antiquity discouraged swearing and 
resisted militarism. The modern admission of both is a
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declension from the standards of a purer age. By us, according- 
ly, the refusal of both, as alike prohibited by eternal and 
unchangeable laws, has been revived. The prohibition of revenge 
and of war is so clear as to need no illustration to explain it. 
How is it defended? By O.T. practice? We live by ahigher law.
 
As a natural right? But we live by supernatural, not natural 
standards. As a State right, though not a private one? But
rulers are subject to^ Christ, even as individuals are. But
are 
since even Christian States and magistrates/ not come to the pure
dispensation of the gospel,- since they are "in the mixture, and 
not 
/in the patient suffering spirit" they are not yet able to bear
this prohibition, and must be allowed to use arms for defence. 
But this concession to weakness eannot be extended to the true 
Christian.
Remarks .
Barclay f s concluding proposition has regard to those 
peculiarities of the Quaker in Society which, whether trivial 
or important, were at least conspicuous enough to seize public 
attention from the first, and to incur the odium which all must 
expect who affect a singularity which, besides being odd, impl 
a censure upon prevailing standards. The mixture of the 
apparently trivial with the admittedly important,- the gravity 
with which it is argued to be sinful to say You instead of Thou 
reminds one of Br owning f s Lazarus who was
"witless of the size, the sum 
the value in proportion of all things, 




The poet means to suggest the "transvaluation of values 
consequent upon spiritual illumination. AH things are freshly 
seen in the new light, and things "big and little assume a new 
place in the scale of importance. This is what the poet suggests 
His Lazarus, remaining sane, has been admitted to a higher order 
of reality, and his judgment of things conforms to surer stand- 
ards of true value. It is also open to suggest that his 
Lazarus is the subject of a dislocation which has left him not 
more, but less, fit for the conduct of life. He is obsessed,- 
the victim of an idexe fixe. The same suggestion haunts the 
reader of Barclay's Fifteenth Proposition. The writerte judgment 
is felt to be warped. The conclusions, right or wrong, are 
those of a strong, but hardly a wholesome mind. The free play 
of life is unnaturally restricted. Things are* not seen in 
their true relations; they are lifted out of the sphere to 
which they properly belong. These criticisms have been tacitly 
admitted by the slowly changing practice of the Society. .The 
attitude to oaths and war regains what it was; the days and 
months are still named by their order in the calendar. But the 
predilection for Thee has disappeared with the broad-brimmed 
hat, the collarless coat, and the Quaker bonnet. Such traces
as remain of these peculiarities are now regarded as merely
survivals 
amiable/ due to conservative sentiment,- the fragrance of a now
empty jar.
The reader's mixture of irritation and sympathy, his 
attitude now of agreement,now of doubt, and now again of dissent
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settles down to a conviction that Barclay is dealing with things 
"belonging to two different spheres as if they "belonged to one. 
It is another instance of the puritanical attitude to Art - of 
the standing Conflict of Art and Morals.
Thus it will be obvious that much of what Barclay has to 
say about dress, and address; about manners generally; and 
particularly about sports and recreations, misses the mark, 
because these matters are treated as if they were serious questions 
of morals, whereas they belong to the sphere of Art. Not that 
it is contended that:.these spheres are unrelated, with nothing to 
say to each other. Our sympathy with the slogan, Art for Artfe 
sake, is, <to say the least, cool; and some at least of its 
results leave us not cold, but hot and indignant. The t£uth 
is, both are functions of life, and life is not lived in compart- 
ments. The artist is still a man, and a mantis still a moralist) 
and unless^ or until, his art expresses his morality, it has not 
succeeded in giving a full expression of the artist's personality. 
But still, as an artist, he is working under canons which 
morality has no commission to prescribe, and to a result which 
morality, though it may claim its say, could never reach. The 
Beautiful has its own r.aison d'etre,, and does not eriist upon 
sufferance either of the Good or the True.
To this region of Art we must agree to assign in large 
measure those matters of speech, dress and behaviour which 
Barclay disposes of as matter of morals. Go<|d taste will not 
offend morals, though it may pay scant regard to moral convention.
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With this we dismiss those singularities of speech, and those 
denials of ceremony, which modern Quakerism itself has so largely 
discarded. There was a cosmopolitan breadth and sanity in the 
apostle who could make himsfc&f a Jew to the Jew, a .Greek to the 
Greek, and all things to all men, and all with an eye to his 
mission,- which early Quakerism was (quite understandably) with- 
out.
This defect which we haye pointed out is clearly seen in 
Barclay's treatment of dress. It is a question, he holds, of 
utility and morality only: we dress to cover our nakedness and 
to keep out the cold. It was an expedient forced on by the Fall 
- a regrettably necessity, best briefly dealt^ with, and then 
put out of mind. But we know now that dress is fundamentally an 
artistic product. Protection and concealment are physical and 
moral necessities; but an instinct no less primary, the instinct 
of adornment, turns these necessities to glorious gain. That 
is not the whole matter, of course; but no one who misses the 
point, as Barclay, will be listened to now. ,
And similarly with games, sports, and piays. They are 
different developments of the same root,- the instinct of play. 
Games of skill and games of chance, feats of strength and bouts 
of adventure, poetry, the drama,- the feigning of life,- all 
have here their common inexpugnable root. They do not spring 
from a moral, but from a mimetic, artistic, impulse; and 
though they require to be moralised, they are not to be moralised
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out of existence. The attempt to do so has often been made, 
and has, as often, failed. It is tragic that Puritanism has 
not yet come to terms with Art. When it does so, it will cease 
to be puritanical. For this is the "narrowness" of Puritanism, 
that it takes a part for the whole. It must come to see that 
Art springs from no different soil than that which gives rise to 
morality. Both are functions of Life.
But before leaving altogether the subject of Art, it is not 
irrelevant to raise the question of the attitude of Christ there- 
to,- seeing it is in the name of Christ that Barfelay has sp&ken.
^e have spoken as if Art and morality had equal rights, - 
as if 3dt the development of both was necessary for a complete 2ii£e. 
Is it possible to claim Christ in support of this view? Supreme 
Teacher as He was in the moral region, can we say as much 
regarding the artistic? Was His human nature limited on this 
side? And if so, does that relegate art to an inferior position, 
and justify its exclusion from the interests of a serious life?
A little consideration will, I believe, lead us to conclude 
that while the world of Art was by no means a sealed book to our 
Lord, it gave place to considerations even more imperious and 
absorbing. An is said, as I believe, when it is said that Art 
is Elay. Now,there is a time and place for play in life - a 
necessary, but a limited time and place. And our Lord's time 
was short. He had serious work to do and but little time to do 
it in. It was His, not to live artistically^but dangerously 
not to paint pictures,but to die.
And yet that saying about "not painting pictures" gives us 
pause. For did anyone ever paint so memorably as He? Are not 
some of His parables, though only reported, artistic gems of the 
purest water? And even that awful death,- do not the closing 
scenes satisfy every canon of the truest art? Of the death of 
one,- whom it were blasphemy itself to name in the same sentence 
with His name,- it was written, "He nothing common did, or mean, 
upon that memorable scene." How true, yet how merely negative, 
are these, or any, words to describe our Lord's passion 1 Milton 
said it was necessary, in order to write a great poem, for the 
poet to be himself a great poem. And such^in every detail and 
aspect of His life and death and resurrection, was our Lord: a 
great Poem.
The "grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, 11 - does not the word 
carry with it an aesthetic nuance? Does not the impression of 
his life and words, passed on by the reporters, seem to embody 
an aesthetic element, which the reporters themselves may not 
have been fully conscious of? His love of Nature, and His eye
for natural beauty,- of these we are somehow sure. His love of
are also notable, 
children and his observation of children's play/and these could
not be in the heart of one to whom the world of art was an
untravelled country. Christ was one who could have played, if
he had had time,- and His play would have been true artistry}
But He had no time. W0rk came first. And that puts Art 
in its place. "She is the second, not the first."
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Art takes time, leisure, freedom. And that perhaps 
explains why the H.T,, unlike the Old, has so little to say about 
Art. For the writers of N.T., the "time is short," The 
Christian must work, while it is called to-day.
For us, the horizons of life have widened. The realms 
of time and space have broadened immeasurably, and play - 
the play that Christ had no time for - has come into our lives,- 
perhaps, nay certainly, too largely. Let this suffice for 
what we have to say about the relation of Christ to art, and to 
the art of living.
CHAPTER XXII.
Oaths and War.
When we turn to the subjects of Oaths and War (so expressly 
associated together by Barclay) we are in a different region 
altogether. We are away from Art, and into a field which Morality 
may claim as her own. Here Barclay is on his own ground,- that 
of a moralist,- and can be heard with the deference due to real 
authority. It is noticeable that his Society still maintains 
its constant testimony in these matters, and has not receded 
from the Barclaian standpoint here, as it has in the matters just 
discussed.
As regards the judicial oath, Barclay f s contention is two- 
fold: (i) the Christian must never take an oath.(ii) He ought 
not to be compelled by law to do so. As to the first point, 
Barclay*s contention is weakened by his citation of the example 
of the Apostle Paul, who resorted on occasion to such a form 
of asseveration as,Before God I lie not. This, Barclay will not 
allow to be called taking oath. The difference, if there is one, 
is hardly distinguishable. It is the solemn asseveration of a 
simple fact - that the apostle is alive to the sense of an all- 
hearing G0d; as such, it is entirely proper and unobjectionable. 
The frequency, and suitability to the occasion, of such forms of 
expression, must be largely a matter of circumstance and good 
taste. What Barclay objects to, however, is manifestly the
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legislative compulsion under which, on given occasions, the 
asseveration is exacted. In effect, it has the suggestion of 
a double standard,- that statements made on oath have an 
obligation to veracity which ordinary statements have not; that 
lying under oath is one thing, and lying without oath is another, 
and less heinous, offence. There is further the suggestion, 
which an upright self respect ing man might be expected to resent, -
he requires to be intimidated by supernatural sanctions 
telling 
into/ the truth. But one senses just a suspicion of pride here,-
should 
a touch of resentment on the part of the upright man that he/be
suspected of sharing a common frailty. On the whole matter our 
judgment would be that an oath, in the sense of a solemn invoca- 
tion of God's name, is not in principle wrong. It may be given 
spontaneously at any suitable time, and may therefore be exacted 
when occasion call® for it. But when a man gives sufficient 
guarantee, by known character or credible profession, that the 
terms of the oath are the terms of his witness,- being in fact 
the terms on which it is his invariable custom to speak,- the 
oath in set terms may be pretermit ted. And v;nen his objection 
to the oath is based on religious grounds,- auch as his loyalty 
to Christ, and to Christ's teaching as he understands it,-* then 
the oath not only may, but ought to be pretermitted. For the 
substance of the oath is conveyed in the very grounds alleged by 
way of objection. The Bworn servant of Christ is so bound as 
no oath could bind him more.
And to this common- sense conclusion, the law of this land
has now arrived. The question accordingly is not a "burning one.
But when we turn to the companion subject, of War, we are 
in the troubled atmosphere of a question still vexed and still, 
alas, unsettled. Here, too, the question is dual: (i) is 
wat in any circumstances lawful? (ii) is it in any circumstances 
lawful for a Christian? Barclay f s answer to the first in 
effect is that War is natural, and on the natural plane may be 
just and allowable; to the second, that the Christian does not 
live on the natural plane, and to him War is wrong and forbidden.
Object as we may to Barclay's sharp distinction between 
"natural 11 and "supernatural" we shall not find it easy, if 
indeed possible, either to ignore the existence of two orders of 
experience, or to strike the balance between them. The distinc- 
tion between those two planes is not to be obliterated by dis- 
carding the term supernatural. Huxley's famous Romanes lecture 
is evidence of that. Huxley had no traffic,in terms, with 
the supernatural; but his distinction between the "cosmic order" 
on the one hand, and the M ethical order" on the other, introduces 
a diremption no less abrupt than did the distinction he discards.
Reduced to simple terms the distinction is that between 
what is, and what ought to be,- the actual and the ideal. 
These are not two separate worlds, for man lives in the sense of 
both. They are one world; for they are his world.
The two orders are not mutually impervious. The actual 
is the sphere of Necessity, determined by lav/. The ideal is
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the sphere of Duty, actuated by the sense of law. Between 
acting under Iaw 5 and under the sense of law,there is a whole 
diameter of "being. But the diameter is the diameter of one 
globe,- man's globe. There are degrees of necessity. There 
are sequences apparently unalterable. These it is for man to 
master. He learns the way of things and finds that knowledge is 
power. He gets his way in the end. But often the End is 
long of coming.
A; simple illustration occurs here of how these 2 spheres 
may interpenetrate. A man must eat,- here is the sphere of law, 
nature, necessity. He must also glorify God,- here is the 
sphere of duty and the ideal. The two have interpenetrated 
when he eats and drinks to the glory of God.
Approaching now the Subject of War, we find ourselves 
again in face of the two necessities of Nature and the Ideal. 
Existence is struggle. Struggle is a law of Nature. Peace, 
shall we say, the law of God. The peace we are after is not 
the cessation of struggle; for life is struggle. Struggle is 
life's unalterable law. ^hat then is peace? Peace is not 
ceasing to struggle; it is striving together. When men learn 
to strive together, the two realms will have interpenetrated - 
What is, and what ought to be, will be identical.
Peace, being defined as striving together, is seen to be an 
incomplete statement of human good. For men might strive to- 
gether for bad ends. If our fellowmen are seeking bad ends,
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we must not join with, but oppose them. ^ar is one form of 
opposition; non-resistance another. Non-resistance is "badly 
named. It is really a powerful form of resistance. Passive 
resistance is not much better, for it is most active. But 
apart from any question of terms, the point $.t issue is, whether 
war is for the Christian a legitimate form of resistance. We 
are trying to argue the question on the bare point of principle - 
the principle of resistance to evil by armed force, uncomplicated 
by consideration of unjust wars, wars of conquest and aggression, 
and of the barbarities that attend all wars. These, no one 
could defend, at least, in cold blood. But is the use of force 
defensible on any terms?
The answer is, it depends on the end of which it is directed. 
The Christian end is not merely the frustration of evil but its 
conversion - not the mere overcoming of evil, but overcoming it 
with good - the change of mind and heart from evil into good and 
into co-operative striving for the good.
And just here we come upon a feature of Christian teaching 
which seems to conflict with its teaching about non-resistance., 
i.e., its teaching about judgment and doom. . Apparently the 
divine resistance to evil has its limits,- the patience of God 
is at length exhausted, and the evil will, abandoned as hopeless, 
works its own destruction.
If this is indeed integral part of Christian truth, it 
means that the principle of nonresistance has limits. And if it
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has limits why should they be ignored by men? It is no complete 
answer to say Vengeance is mine; for if Divine justice admits 
vengeance then human justice,which reflects it, must admit it too.
It is further arguable that the use of force is, not 
inconceivably, calculated to reach the Christian end. To thrash 
a bully may be to do his soul good. If it is objected that war 
seeks not to convert but to exterminate men; the answer to that 
is, that though the enemy nationals die, the nation persists 
and is therefore to be fought as a potential friend.
Our conclusion is that War is not intrinsically wnaong. It 
is rooted in natural necessity. But like all natural necessity 
it too may be turned to gain. The true antidote to war is not 
refusal to fight; it is to cultivate the spirit to which-war 
is foreign - the spirit which takes away "the occasion of all 
wars."
CONCLUSION.
We began our examination by saying that the Inner Light 
was experience before it was doctrine,- an experience, we were 
convinced, which was real and valuable, and one, to be respect- 
fully treated, and if possible conserved. Our criticisms 
have been directed to this conservative purpose, and so far as 
negative and destructive, have been made under the idea that 
theory and experience, while distinguishable, are not so mut- 
ually independent that they are of no help or hindrance to each 
other. A wrong theory is in the long run detrimental to the
experience it seeks to account for. And since the experience
and concern, 
is a human, while the theory is a personal/sectarian /we can have
no hesitation in sacrificing the one to save the other.
The question is whether the presuppositions of the theory 
are sufficient to account for the experience, and whether, if 
followed out, they wou^d be sufficiant to maintain it in vigorous 
existence. As a matter of fact the early promise of the Quaker 
movement has not been realised. FOX and his contemporaries cer- 
tainly never -anti'dpa'ted that the outcome of the movement would 
be the addition of one more to the multitude of sects that form 
a species of undergrowth within the shadow of the mightier 
forest trees by which the Christian religion is represented to 
the world. They contemplated nothing less than an instauratio 
magna, a rebirth of Christianity in its pure original and catho- 
lic form. The replacement of that by a religious Society,
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small in members and, however tenacious of life, and however 
respectable and respected, yet apparently incapable of further 
expansion, must have seemed, if they could have forseen it, a 
pitiful falling away from the splendid vision overhanging the 
horizon of their hopes.
If the movement then has side-stepped, something must be 
taken to account for it. It is not for us to do more than con- 
sider whether a cause contributory to this result may not lie in 
in the theoretical errors of Barclay's classic formulation.
TO go at once to what seems the radical error, we have 
found that to be in a false objectivity. Barclay is emphatic 
in his repudiation of mere subjectivity - spiritual influence is 
not limited to any mere subjective heightening of human faculty, 
The guarantees of its divine certainty are not thus to be gained. 
Truth must be objectiv^ - given. But how? By immediate inward 
revelation, delivered like a letter of parcel at the subjects 
door.
That is what we mean by false objectivity. The Object is 
all-important| tut it is sought for in the wrong quarter. 
For the true Object is found precisely in that quarter from which 
Barclay so pointedly averted his gaze,- viz., from "the Outward." 
From the soil of nature which Barclay unduly despised, the
preaious plant of knowledge must spring,if it is to grow at all.
to maintain 
have tried throughout/the view that Nature % in the
large sense of the "nature of things'1 -is the field in which 
knowledge of God is to ^e reaped. We regard Nature as the
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scene of an omnipresent gracious redemptive activity. This 
activity is not equally evident throughout. "Nature" is not a 
flat undifferentiated surface. It has points of greater signi- 
ficance. It has one point of supreme^ significance - sriz., the 
redemptive Fact of Christ. This Fact in its redemptive meaning 
and virtue is interpretative of all the rest. Its meaning is 
the Qlue to the meaning of Nature. "God commendeth His love 11 
therein,- i.e., we get a clear, straight,uninterrupted vision 
into the heart of reality. "Reality" and Nature mean to us the 
same thing. And the Cross of Christ unveils Reality. Standing 
there, with open eyes, we see into "the life of things. 11 And 
beholding there the glory of the Lord,(i.e., His redemptive love 
and purpose) ? we are changed into the .same image (i.e., are 
redeemed.)
This is so obviously true that Barclay is forced to admit it. 
The divine regenerative principle takes up into itself the 
elements of human nature,- reason, conscience, will, and uses 
them after their kind. Thereby the subject is adjusted properly 
to the outward world and can live the good life therein. Thus 
Barclay provides room for a real experience and for its gradual 
growth, and for the needful helps of education, of Scripture, of
Church fellowship. But on his main principle it is not apparent
are 
how growth is possible,or helps to growth/needed. For if the
spiritual man has already within him the source and fountain of 
truth and life, it does not appear why he should have recourse
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to anything else. Accordingly, while Barclay admits the rights 
and advantages of reason, he has only very grudging acknowledge- 
ment to make of the value of education. While he honours 
Scripture a"bove all writings, he knows of something which 
enables him to dispense with it. And while he prizes the pri- 
vilege of Christian fellowship, the worshipper must abstract him- 
self as far as may be from any sense of human contact, from the 
flow of his own thoughts,- must leave all that behind, must sink 
into the "pure," and receive without earthly channel, the inflow 
of truth and life direct from its divine source. Thus in com- 
merce "alone with the Alone "^ he may receive something which, 
"breathed into the air," and falling to the earth he knows not 
where, he may "find again in the heart of a friend." AH this 
is an unreal account of a real experience; and a misdirection 
of those who are seeking the way thereto.
HOW far the Barclaian theory really stifled the life of the 
society and reduced the persuasiveness of its teatimony to the 
world, we have no present call to enquire. Our concern now is 
with what is positive and valuable in the experience of the 
Inner Light, as something to which the Christian and the Church 
should serve themselves £eirs.
In its real essence, then, we take it to be not the com- 
munication of Truth or Life simpliciter,- but a luminous state 
of mind resulting from true Vision into Fact. The use of the
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term "vision* reminds us of the ambiguity attaching to the 
word. It may mean the faculty of sight, or it may mean the 
result of the exercise of the faculty. A similar ambiguity 
attaches to the Inner Light. It may mean the faculty of 
recognizing truth,- the sense of oughtness; or it may mean a 
positive enlightenment on a concrete problem of thought or 
action. The former is an unrealised, the latter a realised 
potentiality.
But the point is that in neither sense is it independent 
of the external-objective. If regarded as faculty, its 
development proceeds by exercise,- we learn to see by using our 
eyes. While if regarded as the psychic state resulting from the 
use of the faculty, that is reached by direction of the faculty 
upon the subject matter of experience. For the Christian mind 
there can be no question as to what this subject matter is, and 
where it is to be sought for. It is in the historic Fact of 
Christ.
But again we must reiterate that this historic fact cannot 
remain external. The Object is not merely Object. In its 
real and inmost nature it is Subject, and must be known as such. 
-The relation of subject and object is reciprocal - "I in Him and 
He in me. H When this relation is realised, it is by an inward 
spiritual movement and interchange. The Light of the World, has 
become my Inner Light.
